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STRICT PRODUCTS LIABILITY AT 50: 
FOUR HISTORIES 
KYLE GRAHAM* 
This Article offers four different perspectives on the strict products-
liability “revolution” of a half-century ago.  One of these narratives relates 
the predominant assessment of how this movement coalesced and spread 
across the states.  The three alternative histories introduced by this Article 
view the shift toward strict products liability through populist, practical, 
and contingent lenses, respectively.  The first of these narratives considers 
the contributions that plaintiffs and their counsel made toward this change 
in the law.  The second focuses upon how a formerly common, but now 
moribund, type of products-liability lawsuit framed the argument for strict 
liability as a superior alternative to negligence.  The third examines why 
tort law eclipsed warranty as the principal doctrinal forum for products-
liability reform.  As detailed herein, these three alternative accounts both 
challenge and complement the standard description of strict products 
liability’s rise.  
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I. INTRODUCTION 
Strict products liability recently observed its fiftieth birthday.  In 1960, 
the New Jersey Supreme Court breached the walls of the “citadel” of 
privity in Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc., a warranty case.1  Three 
years later, the California Supreme Court formally adopted a tort theory 
of recovery for products liability, regardless of fault, in Greenman v. Yuba 
Power Products, Inc.2  And 1964 witnessed the final approval of the long-
awaited Restatement (Second) of Torts § 402A, which prescribed a basic 
framework to govern strict products liability in tort.3  Today, these three 
events are widely recognized as seminal moments in the products-liability 
“revolution”4 that would sweep the nation and come to be described as 
“the most rapid and altogether spectacular overturn of an established rule 
in the entire history of the law of torts.”5   
 
1.  Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc., 161 A.2d 69, 73, 75, 81, 84, 99–100 (N.J. 1960).  
The “citadel” metaphor for the privity requirement was coined by Justice Cardozo in 
Ultramares Corp. v. Touche, 174 N.E. 441, 445 (N.Y. 1931).  
2.  377 P.2d 897, 900 (Cal. 1963). 
3.  RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (1965).  Though formally published in 
1965, this section had been approved by the members of the American Law Institute in May 
1964.  Friday Afternoon Session, May 22, 1964, 41 A.L.I. PROC. 324, 375 (1965).  This provision 
remains perhaps the most-cited of all Restatement sections.  See Henry J. Reske, Experts Tackle 
Torts Restatement, 78 A.B.A. J. 18, 18 (1992) (observing that § 402A “has been cited by courts 
far more than any other part of any ALI restatement”). 
4.  Virginia E. Nolan & Edmund Ursin, The Deacademification of Tort Theory, 48 U. 
KAN. L. REV. 59, 60 (1999). 
5.  William L. Prosser, The Fall of the Citadel (Strict Liability to the Consumer), 50 MINN. 
L. REV. 791, 793–94 (1966); see also From the Editor’s Scratch Pad, AM. TRIAL LAW. ASS’N 
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The swift ascendance of strict products liability, whether framed in 
tort or warranty, has prompted thoughtful examinations of how and why 
this doctrine coalesced and gained acceptance.  As to the “how,” these 
accounts all drape around a handful of trends and events that represent 
generally accepted drivers behind, and milestones in, the development of 
products liability.6  Meanwhile, two explanations have come to frame the 
“why” component of the discussion.  The first focuses upon the roles 
played by a select group of judges and academics in molding and 
proselytizing the core concepts that underlie strict liability to the 
consumer.7  Another account concentrates less on the contributions of 
individuals than on the environment that allegedly inspired them.  This 
description assigns motive force to broad economic, political, and cultural 
trends that, by the middle of the twentieth century, supposedly aligned to 
make strict products liability inevitable.8  
Repetition of these accounts over the years has tended to marginalize 
other aspects of strict products liability’s emergence.  As this doctrine 
enters its second half-century, this Article excavates its foundations and 
identifies three “hidden histories” buried under the prevailing dialogue.9  
 
NEWS LETTER, Mar. 1965 (Boston, Mass.), at 38, 39 (“Sometimes progress in tort law comes 
not in isolated individual advances but in onrushing battalions.  This is surely true of the yeasty 
field of products liability where development of the law since World War II has been 
spectacular & moved with lightning-like speed.”). 
6.  See infra Part II.A.  For a good example of a recent history of products liability that 
adopts this focus and format, see KENNETH S. ABRAHAM, THE LIABILITY CENTURY: 
INSURANCE AND TORT LAW FROM THE PROGRESSIVE ERA TO 9/11, at 141–49 (2008).  
7.  E.g., G. EDWARD WHITE, TORT LAW IN AMERICA: AN INTELLECTUAL HISTORY 168 
(1980) (“The dramatic rise of strict liability theory in defective products cases between the 
1940s and 1970 furnishes a striking example of the way in which tort law has been shaped by 
the interactions of influential scholars and visible appellate judges.”); Robert C. Bird & Donald 
J. Smythe, Social Network Analysis and the Diffusion of the Strict Liability Rule for 
Manufacturing Defects, 1963–87, 37 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 565, 566–68 (2012); James P. 
Hackney, Jr., The Intellectual Origins of American Strict Products Liability: A Case Study in 
American Pragmatic Instrumentalism, 39 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 443, 444 (1995); David G. Owen, 
The Intellectual Development of Modern Products Liability Law: A Comment on Priest’s View 
of the Cathedral’s Foundations, 14 J. LEGAL STUD. 529, 529–30 (1985); George L. Priest, The 
Invention of Enterprise Liability: A Critical History of the Intellectual Foundations of Modern 
Tort Law, 14 J. LEGAL STUD. 461, 463–64 (1985); see also Jane Stapleton, Bugs in Anglo-
American Products Liability, 53 S.C. L. REV. 1225, 1228 (2002) (“Section 402A of the 
Restatement (Second) of Torts . . . was a top-down law reform motivated, not by social or 
forensic pressures, but by the enthusiasm of a small group of Legal Realists that saw the 
opportunity to make what they saw as a small win-win change to legal entitlements.”). 
8.  See, e.g., Gary T. Schwartz, The Beginning and the Possible End of the Rise of Modern 
American Tort Law, 26 GA. L. REV. 601, 601–03 (1992). 
9.  The phrase “hidden histories” is borrowed from JOHN FABIAN WITT, PATRIOTS AND 
COSMOPOLITANS: HIDDEN HISTORIES OF AMERICAN LAW (2007).  
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These additional narratives complement and challenge the existing 
literature by offering populist, practical, and contingent accounts, 
respectively, of strict products liability’s emergence: three new lenses 
through which to view this change in the law.10  The first of these stories 
concerns the contributions of consumers and the emerging plaintiff’s 
personal-injury bar in generating the raw material—cases—for the 
products-liability revolution.11  The second considers the practical 
problems that drove mid-century courts toward strict products liability, 
with a focus upon the issues presented by a certain recurring case type 
that appeared often at the time of strict products liability’s inception, but 
is now almost extinct.12  And the third examines the element of chance 
associated with the development and adoption of a theory of strict 
products liability sounding wholly in tort, as opposed to a solution more 
closely tethered to the previously prevailing language of warranty.13  
The first of these “new” histories relates how consumers and their 
attorneys provided the momentum and matter for the products-liability 
avalanche.  The lawsuits that led to the development and adoption of 
strict products liability did not appear out of thin air.  Plaintiffs had to 
recognize an injury, connect their harm to a product, and appreciate the 
prospect of recovery; lawyers had to be willing to take these cases and 
present them effectively.  As it happens, strict products liability unfurled 
in synch with evolving claim consciousness among prospective plaintiffs 
and enhanced sophistication of their attorneys.14  Members of the public 
appreciated the existence of some products claims before they discerned 
 
10.  For a discussion of torts scholarship representative of a “contingency”-centric view of 
doctrinal change, see John Fabian Witt, Contingency, Immanence, and Inevitability in the Law 
of Accidents, 1 J. TORT L. 1, 16–34 (2007).  Professor Witt also delved into the contingencies 
associated with the development of modern American accident law in JOHN FABIAN WITT, 
THE ACCIDENTAL REPUBLIC: CRIPPLED WORKINGMEN, DESTITUTE WIDOWS, AND THE 
REMAKING OF AMERICAN LAW (2004), and John Fabian Witt, Toward a New History of 
American Accident Law: Classical Tort Law and the Cooperative First-Party Insurance 
Movement, 114 HARV. L. REV. 690, 694 (2001).  Meanwhile, the word “practical,” as used here, 
signifies that this supplemental narrative is less concerned with whether and how elites kept 
the law in line with broader social trends (i.e., a broad “functionalist” narrative), than with how 
a larger cast of judges may have viewed strict products liability as a fix for more mundane 
problems that recurred on their dockets.  For a discussion and critique of functionalist legal 
histories, see Robert W. Gordon, Critical Legal Histories, 36 STAN. L. REV. 57 (1984).  
11.  See infra Part III.  
12.  See infra Part IV. 
13.  See infra Part V. 
14.  See infra Part III.  
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others; predictably, the law followed a similar path.15  Meanwhile, in the 
years following World War II, plaintiffs’ counsel came to perceive 
products liability as an ennobling and potentially lucrative area of 
practice, and improved knowledge-sharing networks among these 
attorneys made these cases less daunting to pursue.16  These conditions 
facilitated the lawsuits that provided the nation’s courts with ample 
fodder for a doctrinal shift.17  
The second narrative explains why strict products liability was 
endorsed not only by Dean William Prosser and Justice Roger Traynor,18 
but also by the C. William O’Neills19 and Hamilton S. Burnetts20 of the 
legal world.  This story considers how certain types of lawsuits made a 
practical case for products liability by framing the argument for this 
innovation and auditioning it during its gestational phase.  Specifically, 
this section of the Article examines the doctrinal pressures created by a 
particular type of products-liability lawsuit, the so-called “bottle case.”  
Origin stories of strict products liability must account for Escola v. Coca 
Cola Bottling Co. of Fresno,21 in which Justice Traynor of the California 
Supreme Court used a lawsuit over a broken soda bottle to sketch the 
arguments in favor of strict liability to the consumer.22  Most 
commentators appreciate the prescience of Traynor’s opinion; fewer 
recognize the ubiquity of the fact pattern he addressed.23  From the 1940s 
through the 1960s, exploding or bursting beverage bottles probably 
generated more products-liability lawsuits than did any other single 
 
15.  See infra Part III.A. 
16.  See infra Part III.B.  
17.  This Article’s analysis of the contributions made by the plaintiffs’ bar toward the 
development and initial diffusion of strict products liability thus supplements and builds upon 
the discussion in Paul H. Rubin & Martin J. Bailey, The Role of Lawyers in Changing the Law, 
23 J. LEGAL STUD. 807 (1994), which develops the hypothesis that “[t]he shape of modern 
product liability law is due to the interests of tort lawyers.”  Id. at 808 (emphasis omitted).  
18.  See infra text accompanying notes 91–93. 
19.  C. William O’Neill was an associate justice on the Ohio Supreme Court and wrote the 
majority opinion in Lonzrick v. Republic Steel Corp., 218 N.E.2d 185 (Ohio 1966), in which that 
court adopted strict products liability in tort.  Id. at 191, 194. 
20.  Hamilton S. Burnett was a Chief Justice of the Tennessee Supreme Court and the 
author of Ford Motor Co. v. Lonon, 398 S.W.2d 240 (Tenn. 1966), in which that court adopted 
strict products liability in tort.  Id. at 242.  No disrespect is intended toward either Justice 
O’Neill or Justice Burnett by referencing them; the point is simply to underscore that strict 
products liability appealed to more than a handful of academics and similarly minded judges.  
21.  150 P.2d 436 (Cal. 1944). 
22.  Id. at 440–44 (Traynor, J., concurring).  
23.  See infra note 310 and accompanying text.  
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consumer good.24  These bottle cases also placed more strain on generic 
negligence principles than did most other products cases.25  As these 
lawsuits mounted, so too did the argument for a strict-liability approach.26  
Yet these contributions toward the products-liability revolution are today 
forgotten.  With bottle cases now rare,27 it is easy to underestimate how 
they once may have weighed on minds of even relatively conservative 
mid-century jurists.  
Finally, this Article considers the contingencies associated with the 
ascendance of a strict-liability theory rooted firmly in tort over an 
approach grounded in the language of warranty.  Strict products liability 
in tort spread across the country like wildfire.28  It took less than 25 years 
from the Greenman decision onward for 45 states to adopt this new 
branch of tort law.29  Yet today, more than a quarter-century after 
Wyoming became the last state to clamber aboard this bandwagon, five 
states still prefer to cast their enhanced consumer protections in the 
language of warranty.30  These holdouts underscore two fortuitous 
circumstances associated with the adoption of a “pure” tort approach to 
strict products liability.  First, this doctrine capitalized upon a period of 
transition in warranty law, which otherwise might have absorbed more of 
the momentum for doctrinal change.  Second, a critical mass of states 
adopted strict products liability during a brief window in which a 
preemption argument premised on states’ contemporaneous adoption of 
the Uniform Commercial Code (UCC) had not fully matured.  Had 
circumstances aligned only slightly differently, the path toward strict 
products liability—to the extent that it is truly strict at all—easily could 
have followed a somewhat different doctrinal route in many jurisdictions. 
This Article proceeds as follows.  This Introduction is followed by 
Section II, which offers a standard retelling of the path toward strict 
products liability and a summary of the prevailing explanations for this 
transition.  Sections III through V then elaborate upon the three 
narratives described above.  Finally, Section VI relates how the obscurity 
of these stories manifests recurring tendencies in the composition and 
 
24.  See infra note 310 and accompanying text. 
25.  See infra text accompanying notes 323–326. 
26.  See infra text accompanying notes 322–334. 
27.  See infra note 365. 
28.  See McCormack v. Hankscraft Co., 154 N.W.2d 488, 500 (Minn. 1967) (discussing the 
“remarkable shift” toward the adoption of strict products liability). 
29.  Greenman v. Yuba Power Products, Inc., 377 P.2d 897 (Cal. 1963); see infra note 167. 
30.  DAVID G. OWEN, PRODUCTS LIABILITY LAW 282–84 (2d ed. 2008). 
 2014] STRICT PRODUCTS LIABILITY AT 50 561 
consolidation of histories of doctrinal development in tort law.  As others 
have observed, accounts of doctrinal movement commonly overlook the 
groundwork laid by prospective plaintiffs and their attorneys and 
downplay the fortuitous circumstances associated with the diffusion of 
many “successful” new ideas in the law.31  This Article suggests still 
another bias, to wit, that many histories fail to appreciate how specific 
recurring case tropes can catalyze doctrinal change.  By pulling these 
tendencies out of the shadows, as this Article seeks to do with strict 
products liability, one can better understand some of the complexities 
inherent in the processes of doctrinal change.  
II. THE CONVENTIONAL NARRATIVE:  
LANDMARK CASES AND SIGNAL TRENDS 
From the first state to adopt it through the forty-fifth, strict products 
liability in tort swept through the nation’s courts faster than any other 
major doctrinal shift in the history of modern tort law.32  But the rapid 
adoption of strict products liability came only after a very long incubation 
period.  This gestational era incorporated a series of signal trends and 
events for which all origin stories must account.  Following is a fairly 
conventional retelling of these developments.  
A. A Brief History of Strict Products Liability  
1. Winterbottom and the Privity Requirement 
The first landmark event in the history of modern products liability is 
the decision of the English Court of Exchequer in Winterbottom v. 
Wright.33  Decided in 1842, Winterbottom quickly became the leading 
stateside authority for a “privity of contract” (or simply “privity”) 
requirement for the recovery in negligence against a manufacturer, 
wholesaler, or retailer for injuries associated with a defective product.34   
 
31.  See Gordon, supra note 10, at 70 (opining that “Realist functionalism almost 
unconsciously reserves even what it believes to be the very marginal opportunities for legal 
influence on the direction of social change to an elite of policymakers: Mass movements and 
local struggles are not ordinarily thought of as makers of legal change,” and that “essential 
working assumptions [of this approach] misleadingly objectify history, making highly 
contingent developments appear to have been necessary”).  
32.  See Kyle Graham, The Diffusion of Doctrinal Innovations in Tort Law, 99 MARQ. L. 
REV. (forthcoming). 
33.  Winterbottom v. Wright, (1842) 152 Eng. Rep. 402 (Exch.); 10 M. & W. 109. 
34.  See infra note 47 and accompanying text.  
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The plaintiff in Winterbottom was an English postman who worked 
for a contractor who had, in turn, been retained by the postmaster general 
to deliver the mail.35  The plaintiff’s duties required that he use a coach 
provided by the defendant, who had entered into a contract with the 
postmaster general to supply and maintain these vehicles.36  Due to 
“certain latent defects,” the coach broke down while the plaintiff was 
driving it, causing the plaintiff to “become lamed for life.”37  The plaintiff 
brought suit against the supplier of the coach, alleging negligence.38  
In rejecting the plaintiff’s suit, the Court of Exchequer stressed the 
absence of privity of contract between the plaintiff and the defendant.  
Per Lord Abinger’s opinion,  
if the plaintiff can sue, every passenger, or even any person passing 
along the road, who was injured by the upsetting of the coach, 
might bring a similar action.  Unless we confine the operation of 
such contracts as this to the parties who entered into them, the 
most absurd and outrageous consequences, to which I can see no 
limit, would ensue.39  
Winterbottom did not bar any and all recoveries by plaintiffs who 
lacked contractual privity with the manufacturer or other seller of a 
defective product.  Significantly, Baron Alderson’s concurring opinion in 
Winterbottom distinguished the recently decided case of Langridge v. 
Levy.40  The court in Langridge had allowed a plaintiff, a minor, to recover 
for injuries caused by a defective gun that had been purchased from the 
defendant by the plaintiff’s father.41  The seller had represented to the 
father that the gun was safe.42  Alderson saw the Langridge plaintiff’s 
claim as sounding in fraud.43  Since there were no comparable 
representations made in Winterbottom, the plaintiff could not recover.44  
In distinguishing Langridge in this manner, Alderson left open a narrow 
aperture for plaintiffs who could cast their products claims in the 
 
35.  Winterbottom, 152 Eng. Rep. at 402–03. 
36.  Id. 
37.  Id. at 403. 
38.  Id. 
39.  Id. at 405. 
40.  Id.; Langridge v. Levy, (1837) 150 Eng. Rep. 863 (Exch.); 2 M. & W. 519. 
41.  Langridge, 150 Eng. Rep. at 863, 869. 
42.  Id. at 863. 
43.  Winterbottom, 152 Eng. Rep. at 405; Langridge, 150 Eng. Rep. at 863.  
44.  Winterbottom, 152 Eng. Rep. at 405. 
 2014] STRICT PRODUCTS LIABILITY AT 50 563 
language of deceit.45  In the years that followed, however, relatively few 
plaintiffs framed their cases this way, likely because the required 
representations and reliance rarely appeared.46 
2. MacPherson and the Demise of Privity in Negligence Cases 
American audiences appreciated Winterbottom as a leading case in 
the area of products liability,47 but soon carved out a significant exception 
to its rule.  In Thomas v. Winchester,48 decided in 1852, a bottle of poison 
was erroneously given an innocuous label by the defendant, sold through 
a series of intermediaries, and ultimately purchased by the husband of the 
 
45.  Id. 
46.  Note, Sales—Manufacturer and Dealers—Liability of a Supplier of Goods to One 
Other Than His Immediate Vendee, 21 MINN. L. REV. 315, 321 (1937) [hereinafter Sales—
Manufacturers and Dealers] (“[A]s a practical matter, this solution offers little protection to the 
ultimate consumer, because very seldom can he prove the elements necessary to maintain this 
action . . . .”).  Framed broadly, the Langridge holding can be understood as the wellspring for 
later decisions that allowed plaintiffs to recover against product manufacturers, 
notwithstanding a lack of privity of contract, by pleading and proving that the manufacturers 
had communicated express warranties to them through advertising or other representations.  
E.g., Bahlman v. Hudson Motor Car Co., 288 N.W. 309, 312–13 (Mich. 1939); Rogers v. Toni 
Home Permanent Co., 139 N.E.2d 871, 886 (Ohio Ct. App. 1957); Baxter v. Ford Motor Co., 
12 P.2d 409, 412 (Wash. 1932). 
47.  Most American torts treatises of the late 1800s and early 1900s lined up behind the 
Winterbottom rule.  E.g., THOMAS M. COOLEY, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF TORTS: OR THE 
WRONGS WHICH ARISE INDEPENDENTLY OF CONTRACT § 373 (John Lewis, student ed. 1907) 
(“The general rule is that a contractor, manufacturer, vendor or furnisher of an article is not 
liable to third parties who have no contractual relations with him for negligence in the 
construction, manufacture or sale of such article.”); WILLIAM B. HALE, HANDBOOK ON THE 
LAW OF TORTS § 232a (1896); 2 EDWIN A. JAGGARD, HAND-BOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS 
§ 260 (1895); THOMAS G. SHEARMAN & AMASA A. REDFIELD, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF 
NEGLIGENCE § 54 (3d ed. 1880); FRANCIS WHARTON, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF 
NEGLIGENCE §§ 439–40 (1874).  That said, a few of the leading treatises of that period failed 
to mention Winterbottom in their discussions of products liability.  E.g., FRANCIS M. BURDICK, 
THE LAW OF TORTS: A CONCISE TREATISE ON THE CIVIL LIABILITY AT COMMON LAW AND 
UNDER MODERN STATUTES FOR ACTIONABLE WRONGS TO PERSON AND PROPERTY § 550 
(3d ed. 1913).  One treatise appears to have regarded Winterbottom as stating an exception to 
the general rule: 
[T]he general result may be stated to be, that if the defendant intended or if he can 
fairly be assumed to have intended the acts of the intermediate agency, as where he 
expects or contemplates them, —for instance by making a railway carriage, to be used 
by passengers of the railway company for which it is made, —he will be liable, though 
his act was a breach of contract with another. 
MELVILLE MADISON BIGELOW, THE LAW OF TORTS 189–90 (8th ed. 1907) (distinguishing 
Winterbottom with a “but see” signal in an accompanying footnote) (footnotes omitted). 
48.  6 N.Y. 397 (1852). 
 564 MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW [98:555 
unfortunate consumer.49  In allowing the husband and wife’s negligence 
suit to proceed, the New York Court of Appeals genuflected to 
Winterbottom’s reasoning and result, but found its rule inapposite in 
situations where the product involved was “imminently dangerous to 
human life.”50  
Other jurisdictions came to recognize a similar exception.51  These 
decisions and other authorities phrased this principle in different ways.  
One leading treatise provided that the privity rule did not bar claims 
where “the act of negligence is one which in its nature endangers human 
life.”52  The Massachusetts Supreme Court bypassed the privity 
requirement in a case that involved “[t]he furnishing of provisions which 
endanger human life or health.”53  The Minnesota Supreme Court refused 
to bar a plaintiff’s lawsuit when the defendant, a manufacturer of ladders, 
“had reason to apprehend that the use of [the product] by the plaintiff, or 
by any one, would be attended by serious personal injury.”54  And the 
New York Court of Appeals later applied the exception in cases involving 
a collapsing scaffold55 and an exploding coffee urn56—potentially 
dangerous items, to be certain, but not quite as obviously so as mislabeled 
poison.57 
These cases set the stage for the 1916 decision by the New York Court 
of Appeals in MacPherson v. Buick Motor Company.58  MacPherson 
involved a Buick automobile that “suddenly collapsed,” injuring the 
 
49.  Id. at 405–06.  
50.  Id. at 408.  
51.  E.g., Norton v. Sewall, 106 Mass. 143, 144 (1870).  Furthermore, some jurisdictions 
recognized exceptions to the general privity rule where “an owner’s act of negligence which 
causes injury to one who is invited by him to use his defective appliance upon the owner’s 
premises may form the basis of an action against the owner,” or (drawing from the Langridge 
precedent) when “one who sells or delivers an article which he knows to be imminently 
dangerous to life or limb to another without notice of its qualities [and] any person . . . suffers 
an injury therefrom which might have been reasonably anticipated . . . .”  Huset v. J. I. Case 
Threshing Mach. Co., 120 F. 865, 870–71 (8th Cir. 1903). 
52.  SHEARMAN & REDFIELD, supra note 47, § 54.  
53.  Bishop v. Weber, 1 N.E. 154, 154 (Mass. 1885). 
54.  Schubert v. J. R. Clark Co., 51 N.W. 1103, 1104 (Minn. 1892).  
55.  Devlin v. Smith, 89 N.Y. 470, 478 (1882). 
56.  Statler v. George A. Ray Mfg. Co., 88 N.E. 1063, 1064–65 (N.Y. 1909). 
57.  See Devlin, 89 N.Y. at 477; Statler, 88 N.E. at 1064. 
58.  111 N.E. 1050 (N.Y. 1916).  For a detailed evaluation of the MacPherson case, see 
James A. Henderson, Jr., MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co.: Simplifying the Facts While 
Reshaping the Law, in TORTS STORIES 41 (Robert L. Rabin & Stephen D. Sugarman eds., 
2003). 
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owner.59  Turned plaintiff, the owner attributed the accident to a defective 
wheel supplied by a components manufacturer and integrated by Buick 
into the finished vehicle, allegedly without adequate inspection.60  
Because the automobile had been purchased from an intermediary 
dealer, as a defendant Buick naturally pointed out the lack of privity of 
contract between it and the plaintiff.61  The Court of Appeals, in an 
opinion by Justice Cardozo, held that the lack of privity did not protect 
Buick.62  Drawing upon and engrossing Thomas and its progeny, the 
MacPherson court rejected a privity requirement in negligence actions 
where “the nature of [the product] is such that it is reasonably certain to 
place life and limb in peril when negligently made.”63  
MacPherson’s diminution of privity requirement dovetailed with 
ongoing shifts in the market for consumer goods.  The rise of mass 
production64 and the transportation revolution of the 1800s and early 
1900s65 placed physical distance between the makers and users of many 
products, limiting the consumer’s ability to interrogate the manufacturer 
about the qualities of its goods.  This distance was accompanied by the 
introduction of wholesaler and retailer intermediaries into the supply 
chain,66 which further alienated consumers from the manufacturers of the 
products they purchased.  Also, product branding—a relative novelty as 
late as the 1880s67—became a central part of many companies’ marketing 
strategies, with manufacturers turning more and more toward advertising, 
packaging, and promotion to influence how consumers perceived their 
 
59.  MacPherson, 111 N.E. at 1051. 
60.  Id.   
61.  Henderson, supra note 58, at 48–49 (discussing Buick’s strategy on appeal). 
62.  MacPherson, 111 N.E. at 1053. 
63.  Id. 
64.  See generally DAVID A. HOUNSHELL, FROM THE AMERICAN SYSTEM TO MASS 
PRODUCTION 1800–1932 (1984) (tracking this evolution).  
65.  See JOHN STEELE GORDON, AN EMPIRE OF WEALTH: THE EPIC HISTORY OF 
AMERICAN ECONOMIC POWER 148–49 (2004) (discussing how the expansion of railroads 
contributed toward the creation of a national market); RICHARD S. TEDLOW, NEW AND 
IMPROVED: THE STORY OF MASS MARKETING IN AMERICA 12–13 (1996) (discussing 
improvements in transportation and communication and their effects on market development). 
66.  Cornelius W. Gillam, Products Liability in a Nutshell, 37 OR. L. REV. 119, 129 (1957) 
(“In a bygone age, when goods were largely made to order by local craftsmen, no legal 
distinctions between manufacturers and retailers were generally necessary to protect the 
consumer.”); Sales—Manufacturers and Dealers, supra note 46, at 315 n.2; Note, The Marketing 
Structure and Judicial Protection of the Consumer, 37 COLUM. L. REV. 77, 78–81 (1937). 
67.  SUSAN STRASSER, SATISFACTION GUARANTEED: THE MAKING OF THE AMERICAN 
MASS MARKET 37 (1989). 
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products.68  Finally, at the point of sale, customers gravitated toward large 
stores69 and chain retailers70 with showrooms that offered an ever-broader 
array of items71 but were staffed by clerks who often knew little about 
these goods and were in no position to advise consumers about their 
proper use.72  Combined, these trends threatened to make a lack of privity 
 
68.  See CHARLES F. MCGOVERN, SOLD AMERICAN: CONSUMPTION AND CITIZENSHIP, 
1890–1945, at 10 (2006) (“[O]nly between 1880 and 1930 did Americans come to depend on the 
commercial marketplace, with few feasible alternatives, for the necessities of daily life.”); 
Robert S. Lynd with the assistance of Alice C. Hanson, The People as Consumers, in 2 RECENT 
SOCIAL TRENDS IN THE UNITED STATES: REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT’S RESEARCH 
COMMITTEE ON SOCIAL TRENDS 857, 871–77 (1933) [hereinafter Lynd & Hanson] (discussing 
trends in advertising and branding); DANIEL POPE, THE MAKING OF MODERN ADVERTISING 
49–51 (1983); DANIEL STARCH, PRINCIPLES OF ADVERTISING 32–35, 674 (1923) (discussing 
the growth in print advertising venues in the years leading up to 1922, and charting the nearly 
100-fold increase in trademarks registered annually between 1870 and 1921); STRASSER, supra 
note 67, at 52–57; Note, Advertising and the Buyer’s Remedies, 6 VAND. L. REV. 376, 376 (1953) 
(discussing the prevalence of consumer advertising).  By the early 1900s, branding and 
advertising had made a significant impact on consumer preferences.  A 1917 study published in 
the Journal of Applied Psychology found that almost all consumers could identify at least one 
brand of twenty commonly used household products, and that advertising represented one of 
the principal influences upon purchasing decisions.  L.R. Geissler, Association-Reactions 
Applied to Ideas of Commercial Brands of Familiar Articles, 1 J. APPLIED PSYCHOL. 275, 
278−80 (1917). 
69.  See, e.g., JAN WHITAKER, SERVICE AND STYLE: HOW THE AMERICAN 
DEPARTMENT STORE FASHIONED THE MIDDLE CLASS 8–29 (2006) (surveying the history of 
downtown department stores from 1900 to 1960).  
70.  See POPE, supra note 68, at 257 (relating that chain stores accounted for 36.6% of 
retail sales in 1963, as compared to 22% in 1929); Lynd & Hanson, supra note 68, at 870 (“It is 
only since 1900 that chains may be said to have gained real momentum, while only since the 
World War have they emerged into a position of dominance in distribution.”); Richard C. 
Schragger, The Anti-Chain Store Movement, Localist Ideology, and the Remnants of the 
Progressive Constitution, 1920–1940, 90 IOWA L. REV. 1011, 1019–20 (2005) (discussing the 
growth of chain stores in the early 1900s); Friday Afternoon Session, May 22, 1964, supra note 
3, at 357–58 (comments of Dean William L. Prosser) (“[T]he little corner shop, the little grocery 
store.  Gentlemen, that is no longer the retailer of today to any very great extent.  The retailer 
is Safeway Stores, The Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Company, National Stores, a large 
chain . . . .”). 
71.  See CHESTER H. LIEBS, MAIN STREET TO MIRACLE MILE: AMERICAN ROADSIDE 
ARCHITECTURE 117–35 (1995) (discussing the emergence and eventual dominance of 
supermarkets in the food-retail business); MESSAGE FROM THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED 
STATES RELATIVE TO CONSUMERS’ PROTECTION AND INTEREST PROGRAM, H.R. DOC. NO. 
364, at 2 (1962) [hereinafter CONSUMERS’ PROTECTION AND INTEREST PROGRAM] (“The 
typical supermarket before World War II stocked about 1,500 separate food items—an 
impressive figure by any standard.  But today it carries over 6,000,” and “[t]he housewife is 
called upon to be an amateur electrician, mechanic, chemist, toxicologist, dietician, and 
mathematician—but she is rarely furnished the information she needs to perform these tasks 
proficiently.”). 
72.  See STRASSER, supra note 67, at 203–215, 222, 248–51 (discussing this trend).  
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an increasingly common, and increasingly unfair, defense for product 
manufacturers who failed to act with reasonable care.73  
Whether because of these changes74 or simply concurrently with them, 
a substantial majority of states adopted the MacPherson rule between 
1916 and 1960.75  In most of these jurisdictions, courts continued to 
require privity of contract between a plaintiff and the defendant(s) when 
the plaintiff brought a negligence claim that involved a product not 
“reasonably certain to place life and limb in peril when negligently 
made.”76  But these same courts softened this requirement through a 
broad construction of the “reasonably certain” standard.77  Beginning in 
the 1940s, some states went further, and rejected the privity requirement 
in all products cases sounding in negligence, regardless of the nature of 
the product involved.78  
The resulting upswell in products cases led to some doctrinal 
refinement, with clearer distinctions being drawn between different types 
of negligence claims involving defective goods.  In addition to the 
negligent construction and testing at issue in MacPherson, plaintiffs could 
 
73.  See, e.g., Lester W. Feezer, Manufacturer’s Liability for Injuries Caused by His 
Products: Defective Automobiles, 37 MICH. L. REV. 1, 2 (1938) (discussing the effect of changed 
circumstances on the equities of products liability); Robert W. Miller, Liability of a 
Manufacturer for Harm Done by a Product, 3 SYRACUSE L. REV. 106, 106 (1951) (“[C]ase law 
before the advent of radio, television, assembly line production, modern packing methods, 
mechanical refrigeration, high speed transportation and current legislation may or may not be 
in point in modern litigation.”). 
74.  Several judges would reference these developments when contemplating reform in 
the products-liability context.  E.g., Escola v. Coca Cola Bottling Co. of Fresno, 150 P.2d 436, 
443–44 (Cal. 1944) (Traynor, J., concurring); Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc., 161 A.2d 
69, 78, 8081, 83 (N.J. 1960); Randy Knitwear, Inc. v. Am. Cyanamid Co., 181 N.E.2d 399, 402 
(N.Y. 1962).  
75.  David G. Owen, The Evolution of Products Liability Law, 26 REV. LITIG. 955, 965–
66 (2007); R.D. Hursh, Annotation, Privity of Contract as Essential to Recovery in Negligence 
Action Against Manufacturer or Seller of Product Alleged to Have Caused Injury, 74 A.L.R.2d 
1111, 1128 (1960).  While MacPherson involved liability to an ultimate purchaser, later cases 
extended its rule to non-purchaser third parties.  WILLIAM L. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE 
LAW OF TORTS § 84 (2d ed. 1955). 
76.  PROSSER, supra note 75, § 84 n.24; Hursh, supra note 75, at 1180–83 (listing cases). 
77.  Hursh, supra note 75, at 1128 (“The imminently dangerous product exception to the 
privity requirement is an exceedingly broad one, covering a wide range of products.”). 
78.  In 1946, Massachusetts became the first state to make this leap.  Carter v. Yardley & 
Co., 64 N.E.2d 693, 700 (Mass. 1946).  A 1960 American Law Reports annotation identified 
Georgia, Kentucky, Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan, Tennessee, and Wisconsin as states 
where the courts had generally rejected a privity requirement in products cases sounding in 
negligence.  Hursh, supra note 75, at 1192–203.  
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and did allege negligence in product design,79 negligent failures to warn,80 
and otherwise inadequate warnings.81  Design and warning claims 
remained relatively uncommon, however, at least through the 1950s.82  
 3. Escola, Warranty, and the Rise of Strict Products Liability in Tort 
Even after the MacPherson reform, a sense remained that negligence 
law could not adequately address all of the problems presented by 
defective products.83  It remained difficult for plaintiffs in some of these 
cases to prove that a particular party in the product-supply chain had 
 
79.  E.g., Kieffer v. Blue Seal Chemical Co., 196 F.2d 614, 615 (3d Cir. 1952); Coakley v. 
Prentiss-Wabers Stove Co., 195 N.W. 388, 391–92 (Wis. 1923); Statler v. George A. Ray Mfg. 
Co., 88 N.E. 1063, 1064 (N.Y. 1909); Torgesen v. Schultz, 84 N.E. 956, 957 (N.Y. 1908); see also 
R.D. Hursh, Annotation, Liability of Manufacturer or Seller for Injury Caused by Household 
and Domestic Machinery, Appliances, Furnishings, and Equipment, 80 A.L.R.2d 598, 611–12 
(1961) (“The manufacturer is under a duty to exercise reasonable care in adopting a safe plan 
or design for his product.”).  On this issue, § 398 of the Restatement of Torts, published in 1934, 
provides: 
A manufacturer of a chattel made under a plan or design which makes it dangerous 
for the uses for which it is manufactured is subject to liability to others whom he 
should expect to use the chattel lawfully or to be in the vicinity of its probable use for 
bodily harm caused by his failure to exercise reasonable care in the adoption of a safe 
plan or design. 
RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 398 (1934).   
80.  See Hardy Cross Dillard & Harris Hart, II, Product Liability: Directions for Use and 
the Duty to Warn, 41 VA. L. REV. 145 (1955) (discussing this type of claim).  For a discussion of 
failure-to-warn claims in the pre-MacPherson era, see Huset v. J. I. Case Threshing Mach. Co., 
120 F. 865, 871–72 (8th Cir. 1903). 
81.  E.g., Peaslee-Gaulbert Co. v. McMath’s Adm’r, 146 S.W. 770, 771 (Ky. 1912); Farley 
v. Edward E. Tower & Co., 171 N.E. 639, 640, 642–43 (Mass. 1930); Hartmon v. Nat’l Heater 
Co., 60 N.W.2d 804, 810–12 (Minn. 1953); Noone v. Fred Perlberg, Inc., 49 N.Y.S.2d 460, 462 
(App. Div. 1944), aff’d, 294 N.Y. 680 (1945); see also Hursh, supra note 79, at 612 (“A 
manufacturer, in furnishing instruction with respect to the use of his product, must exercise 
care to assure that the instructions are adequate to protect users from harm . . . .”); A.G.S., 
Duty of Manufacturer or Seller to Warn of Latent Dangers Incident to Article as a Class, as 
Distinguished from Duty with Respect to Defects in Particular Article, 86 A.L.R. 947 (1933) 
(collecting cases). 
82.  See Harold A. Katz, Negligence in Design a Developing Area of Product Liability Law, 
NACCA ELEVENTH ANNUAL CONVENTION 1957, at 216, 217 (1958) (“Negligence based on 
‘failure to exercise reasonable care in the adoption of a safe plan or design’ is the field of 
product liability law to which least attention has been directed.”); Harold A. Katz, Liability of 
Automobile Manufacturers for Unsafe Design of Passenger Cars, 69 HARV. L. REV. 863, 871 
(1956) (observing that lawyers had not yet devoted significant attention to flaws in automobile 
design). 
83.  Feezer, supra note 73, at 3 (“[T]he legal problems arising from the function of 
manufacturers in the modern social organization cannot be handled adequately on the basis of 
negligence alone.  Proof of negligence is impossible in many cases where human nature 
instinctively senses obligation.”). 
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failed to exercise due care,84 and the devices that courts adopted to avoid 
these problems struck some observers as needlessly circuitous.85  
Frustrated by these shortcomings, some critics lobbied for a 
comprehensive strict-liability approach.  In the first edition of his 
Handbook of the Law of Torts treatise, published in 1941, William 
Prosser related the case for the imposition of strict liability upon the 
manufacturers of defective products.  Prosser noted that “in recent years” 
there had been 
an increased feeling that social policy demands that the burden of 
accidental injuries caused by defective chattels be placed upon the 
producer, since he is best able to distribute the risk to the general 
public by means of prices and insurance.  Added to this is the 
difficulty of proving negligence . . . with the aid of res ipsa loquitur, 
together with the wastefulness and uncertainty of a series of 
warranty actions carrying liability back through retailer and 
jobber to the original maker, the practice of reputable 
manufacturers to stand behind their goods as good business 
policy, and a recognition that the intermediate seller is usually a 
mere conduit to market the product.  There is an obvious 
argument that in the public interest the consumer is entitled to the 
maximum of protection at the hands of some one [sic], and that 
the producer, practically and morally, is the one to provide it.86  
Three years later, California Supreme Court Justice Roger Traynor 
would echo these arguments in his concurring opinion in the Escola 
case.87  Traynor also emphasized that because of mass-marketing trends, 
 
84.  Gerald A. Gleason, Investigation, Preparation and Defense of Products Liability 
Cases, 20 INS. COUNS. J. 114, 117 (1953) (“Negligence upon the part of the manufacturer is 
often very difficult to prove.”); William L. Prosser, Assault upon the Citadel (Strict Liability to 
the Consumer), 69 YALE L.J. 1099, 1116–17 (1960) [hereinafter Prosser, Assault upon the 
Citadel]. 
85.  E.g., Escola v. Coca Cola Bottling Co. of Fresno, 150 P.2d 436, 442–43 (Cal. 1944) 
(Traynor, J., concurring); WILLIAM L. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 83 
(1941) [hereinafter PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS]. 
86.  PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS, supra note 85, § 83. 
87.  Escola, 150 P.2d at 440–44 (Traynor, J., concurring).  Another jurist, Karl Llewellyn, 
thought along similar lines.  A 1941 draft of the Revised Uniform Sales Act prepared by 
Llewellyn contained a Section 16 B, titled “Obligation to Consumer and to Dealer for Latent 
Dangerous Defect,” that would have made manufacturers liable to remote buyers injured in 
person, property, or otherwise as a result of a defect in the manufacturer’s goods.  REVISED 
UNIF. SALES ACT § 16 B (Proposed Second Draft 1941).  A comment to this section provided 
that the term “defect” was “intended to be broad enough to include defects of manufacture or 
design, adulteration, presence of foreign substances, and indeed the whole range of hidden 
danger, when the net product appears and ought to be safe to use in the ordinary manner, but 
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“[t]he consumer no longer has means or skill enough to investigate for 
himself the soundness of a product.”88  
In lobbying for strict liability in tort, Prosser noted that extension of 
the law of implied warranty represented “[t]he device most ready at hand 
to accomplish this result.”89  Indeed, breach-of-warranty claims would 
provide the principal vehicle through which plaintiffs pressed products 
cases through the 1950s.90  A products case potentially implicated an 
express warranty,91 an implied warranty of fitness for a particular 
purpose,92 and an implied warranty of merchantability.93  The last of these 
warranties gave rise to the most claims.94  
Recovery under a warranty theory could be simpler or more 
complicated than in a lawsuit framed solely in negligence.  Plaintiffs could 
obtain relief for a breach of the implied warranty of merchantability by 
showing that the goods they purchased from the defendant had not been 
“reasonably fit for the ordinary uses to which goods of [their] kind are 
 
is not.”  Id. § 16 B cmt. B.1; see also John W. Wade, Tort Liability for Products Causing Physical 
Injury and Article 2 of the U.C.C., 48 MO. L. REV. 1, 13–17 (1983) (quoting REVISED UNIF. 
SALES ACT § 16 B and discussing the circumstances surrounding its preparation).  When placed 
up for debate, this section did not meet with a rousing reception, and Llewellyn abandoned it.  
Id. at 16–20.  
88.  Escola, 150 P.2d at 443 (Traynor, J., concurring). 
89.  PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS, supra note 85, § 83. 
90.  Gillam, supra note 66, at 124 (“The consumer’s rights against the retailer now are 
stated principally in terms of warranty rather than in terms of negligence.”). 
91.  Per the Uniform Sales Act,  
Any affirmation of fact or any promise by the seller relating to the goods is an express 
warranty if the natural tendency of such affirmation or promise is to induce the buyer 
to purchase the goods, and if the buyer purchases the goods relying thereon.  No 
affirmation of the value of the goods, nor any statement purporting to be a statement 
of the seller’s opinion only, shall be construed as a warranty. 
UNIF. SALES ACT § 12 (1908).  The Uniform Sales Act was adopted by thirty-four states 
between 1906 and 1947.  Donald J. Smythe, Transaction Costs, Neighborhood Effects, and the 
Diffusion of the Uniform Sales Act, 1906–47, 4 REV. L. & ECON. 341, 341–42 (2008).   
92.  Under the Uniform Sales Act,  
Where the buyer, expressly or by implication, makes known to the seller the particular 
purpose for which the goods are required, and it appears that the buyer relies on the 
seller’s skill or judgment, whether he be the grower or manufacturer or not, there is 
an implied warranty that the goods shall be reasonably fit for such purpose. 
UNIF. SALES ACT § 15 (1908). 
93.  Per the Uniform Sales Act, “Where the goods are bought by description from a seller 
who deals in goods of that description, whether he be the grower or manufacturer or not, there 
is an implied warranty that the goods shall be of a merchantable quality.”  Id. 
94.  SAMUEL WILLISTON, THE LAW GOVERNING SALES OF GOODS AT COMMON LAW 
AND UNDER THE UNIFORM SALES ACT §§ 229, 232–34 (1909).  
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put,”95 without also having to establish that the defect owed to the seller’s 
negligence.96  Liability under an implied-warranty theory was therefore 
“strict” in a manner that negligence liability was not.  But there were 
trade-offs.  Among them, there existed important defenses to a warranty 
claim that did not appear in the negligence context.  Warranties could be 
disclaimed by the seller as part of a contract for sale,97 and a plaintiff had 
to provide the defendant with reasonable notice of any breach of 
warranty.98  
Of at least equal importance, under prevailing privity rules only the 
person who had purchased the goods at issue could claim warranty 
protections, and only against the immediate seller.99  This privity barrier 
proved more resilient in the warranty context than it had been in 
negligence.100  Although it was widely understood that the concept of an 
implied warranty had a historical and logical connection to public-policy 
precepts similar to those associated with tort liability,101 it remained that 
 
95.  William L. Prosser, The Implied Warranty of Merchantable Quality, 27 MINN. L. REV. 
117, 130 (1943). 
96.  Id. at 119. 
97.  Per § 71 of the Uniform Sales Act,  
Where any right, duty, or liability would arise under a contract to sell or a sale of 
implication of law, it may be negatived or varied by express agreement or by the 
course of dealing between the parties, or by custom, if the custom be such as to bind 
both parties to the contract or sale. 
UNIF. SALES ACT § 71 (1908); see also Fleming James, Jr., Products Liability (pt. 2), 34 TEX. L. 
REV. 192, 210–12 (1955) (discussing the law of disclaimers); Prosser, supra note 95, at 157–67 
(same). 
98.  Under Section 49 of the Uniform Sales Act, “if, after acceptance of the goods, the 
buyer fails to give notice to the seller of the breach of any promise or warranty within a 
reasonable time after the buyer knows, or ought to know of such breach, the seller shall not be 
liable therefor.”  UNIF. SALES ACT § 49 (1908); see also James, supra note 97, at 196–98 
(discussing the notice requirement); Donald P. Newell, Notice Requirement in Warranty 
Actions Involving Personal Injury, 51 CALIF. L. REV. 586 (1963) (same). 
99.  WILLISTON, supra note 94, § 244. 
100.  2 FOWLER V. HARPER & FLEMING JAMES, JR., THE LAW OF TORTS § 28.16 (1956); 
see also R.D. Hursh, Annotation, Privity of Contract as Essential to Recovery in Action Based 
on Theory Other than Negligence, Against Manufacturer or Seller of Product Alleged to Have 
Caused Injury, 75 A.L.R.2d 39, 44–45 (1961) (“The traditional, and still prevailing, view is that 
privity of contract is indispensable to recovery against the manufacturer or seller of a product 
which has caused injury where the defendant’s breach of an express or implied warranty is 
asserted.”). 
101.  See, e.g., PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS, supra note 85, § 83 
(observing that “the action for breach of a warranty was originally a tort action”).  
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without some contract, there could be no warranty.102  This connection led 
to a conflation of the two concepts, with courts declining to extend 
warranties to remote (downstream) purchasers, or to strangers to a 
purchasing contract, such as family members or employees of the 
consumer.103  Even as they paid lip service to the privity rule, however, 
courts resorted to a number of stratagems to avoid it.  The various legal 
fictions they developed toward this purpose,104 which honored the privity 
requirement in theory if not in spirit, got the job done but failed to satisfy 
from a doctrinal perspective.105  
The first batch of outright rejections of a privity requirement for an 
implied-warranty claim appeared in cases involving tainted or 
unwholesome food.106  Starting with a Washington Supreme Court 
decision in 1913,107 many states carved out an exception to the prevailing 
privity rule for warranty claims premised on rotten or adulterated food 
products.  This deviation caught on slowly at first.  In 1941, Prosser wrote 
that the majority of jurisdictions still demanded privity of contract 
between the plaintiff and defendant in these cases.108  Prosser could have 
added the word “vast” in front of “majority,” since the highest courts in 
only a handful of other states had joined Washington as of that time.109  
 
102.  Note, Strict Products Liability and the Bystander, 64 COLUM. L. REV. 916, 923 (1964) 
(“[P]rivity—i.e., the existence of a direct contractual relationship—was a conceptual necessity 
because the seller’s modern obligations for defective products developed as a part of the law of 
contracts.”). 
103.  PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS, supra note 85, § 83.  
104.  One commentator, writing in 1957, identified twenty-nine “fictions, subterfuges, and 
bold strokes” that courts had used to avoid the privity bar in warranty suits.  Gillam, supra note 
66, at 15255. 
105.  Id. at 155; see also Marc A. Franklin, When Worlds Collide: Liability Theories and 
Disclaimers in Defective-Product Cases, 18 STAN. L. REV. 974, 991 (1966) (stating that the 
reasoning employed in cases that employed legal fictions to dodge the privity bar “was never 
very clear.”).  That courts were resorting to spurious fictions to avoid the privity requirement 
was far from a secret among judges.  See, e.g., Beck v. Spindler, 99 N.W.2d 670, 682 (Minn. 
1959) (“It would seem that some other courts have tried to find a way of permitting recovery 
without expressly discarding the idea of privity.”). 
106.  See Prosser, Assault upon the Citadel, supra note 84, at 1103–06. 
107.  Mazetti v. Armour & Co., 135 P. 633, 636 (Wash. 1913).  Earlier decisions had 
applied a similar rule, but under the authority of state-specific pure food and drug laws.  E.g., 
Meshbesher v. Channellene Oil & Mfg. Co., 119 N.W. 428, 429–30 (Minn. 1909). 
108.  PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS, supra note 85, § 83.  Prosser noted, 
however, that “[t]he more recent cases . . . have shown a definite tendency in that direction.  It 
seems probable that this will be the law of the future, and that the end of the next quarter of a 
century will find the principle generally accepted.”  Id.  
109.  Klein v. Duchess Sandwich Co., 93 P.2d 799, 804 (Cal. 1939); Swengel v. F. & E. 
Wholesale Grocery Co., 77 P.2d 930, 935 (Kan. 1938); Coca-Cola Bottling Works v. Lyons, 111 
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But the tide would soon change.  A few states—Texas,110 Florida,111 
Oklahoma,112 Louisiana,113 and Minnesota114 (the latter in express 
warranty cases only)—forswore a privity element in food cases during the 
1940s and the early 1950s.  And then, the floodgates opened.  Between 
1957 and 1961, the supreme courts of eight states115 all rejected or 
significantly pared back the privity rule in warranty cases involving food 
products.116  
The post-World War II era also saw a few courts chip away at the 
privity rule in warranty cases involving products other than food.  Some 
of these decisions rejected any need for privity where the product at issue 
was somehow analogous to food.  For example, the privity requirement 
was lifted in a few cases involving defective animal feed,117 “apparently on 
the bald theory that food is food.”118  Some of the few courts to confront 
the issue also declined to require privity of contract in cases involving 
personal-hygiene products, analogized to food on the ground that they 
were all used directly upon, if not inside, the person.119  The Michigan 
 
So. 305, 307 (Miss. 1927); Davis v. Van Camp Packing Co., 176 N.W. 382, 390 (Iowa 1920); 
Kelley v. John R. Daily Co., 181 P. 326, 329 (Mont. 1919); Catani v. Swift & Co., 95 A. 931, 932 
(Pa. 1915).  Also, an appellate court in Ohio had upheld the privity requirement, but cast the 
consumer as a third-party beneficiary of the contract for sale between the manufacturer and 
the retailer.  Ward Baking Co. v. Trizzino, 161 N.E. 557, 559 (Ohio. Ct. App. 1928).  Arizona 
appears to have implicitly rejected a privity requirement in Eisenbeiss v. Payne, 25 P.2d 162, 
166 (Ariz. 1933), but in a 1957 decision that formally interred the privity requirement in food 
cases, the Arizona Supreme Court said that the privity issue “has never before been presented 
to this court for decision.”  Crystal Coca-Cola Bottling Co. v. Cathey, 317 P.2d 1094, 1096 (Ariz. 
1957). 
110.  Jacob E. Decker & Sons, Inc. v. Capps, 164 S.W.2d 828, 834 (Tex. 1942). 
111.  Blanton v. Cudahy Packing Co., 19 So. 2d 313, 316 (Fla. 1944).  
112.  Griffin v. Asbury, 165 P.2d 822, 826 (Okla. 1945) 
113.  Le Blanc v La. Coca Cola Bottling Co., 60 So. 2d 873, 875 (La. 1952). 
114.  Randall v. Goodrich-Gamble Co., 54 N.W.2d 769, 771 (Minn. 1952). 
115.  Manzoni v. Detroit Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 109 N.W.2d 918, 921–22 (Mich. 1961); 
Asher v. Coca Cola Bottling Co., 112 N.W.2d 252, 255 (Neb. 1961); Greenberg v. Lorenz, 173 
N.E.2d 773, 775–76 (N.Y. 1961) (rejecting the privity requirement, at least when the plaintiff 
was a member of the purchaser’s household); Tiffin v. Great Atl. & Pac. Tea Co., 162 N.E.2d 
406, 411 (Ill. 1959); Midwest Game Co. v. M. F. A. Milling Co., 320 S.W.2d 547, 550 (Mo. 1959); 
Swift & Co. v. Wells, 110 S.E.2d 203, 208–09 (Va. 1959); Schneider v. Suhrmann, 327 P.2d 822, 
825 (Utah 1958); Crystal Coca-Cola Bottling Co. v. Cathey, 317 P.2d 1094, 1097 (Ariz. 1957). 
116.  Connecticut, meanwhile, abandoned the privity rule in warranty cases involving 
prepackaged consumer goods.  Hamon v. Digliani, 174 A.2d 294, 297 (Conn. 1961). 
117.  E.g., Midwest Game Co., 320 S.W.2d at 550. 
118.  Prosser, Assault upon the Citadel, supra note 84, at 1111. 
119.  See Alexander v. Inland Steel Co., 263 F.2d 314, 318 (8th Cir. 1958) (discussing these 
cases); Graham v. Bottenfield’s, Inc., 269 P.2d 413, 418 (Kan. 1954); Rogers v. Toni Home 
Permanent Co., 139 N.E.2d 871, 873 (Ohio Ct. App. 1957).  
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Supreme Court would go a step further in 1958.  The plaintiff in Spence 
v. Three Rivers Builders and Masonry Supply, Inc.,120 owned a cottage 
built with cinderblocks supplied by the defendant and sold to a contractor 
hired by the plaintiff.121  Shortly after the cottage was built, the blocks 
started to crack, chip, and decay.122  The plaintiff sued the manufacturer 
of the blocks on implied- and express-warranty theories.123  The court 
spotted actionable negligence on the facts alleged, but also gainsaid any 
privity requirement for recovery in warranty, as it saw “no reason in logic 
or sound law why recovery in [warranty cases] should be confined to . . . 
food and related cases and denied in all others.”124  
Through the 1950s, decisions such as Spence were few and far 
between.125  Nevertheless, these rulings cheered a cluster of academics 
who had spent the past several years advocating for strict liability to the 
consumer.  Among them, Yale Law School Professor Fleming James 
advocated for the “enterprise liability” of manufacturers in law review 
articles and in his influential 1956 treatise, co-authored with Professor 
Fowler Harper.126  William Prosser, who had started the strict-liability ball 
rolling almost two decades before, wrote in 1960 that Spence and a 
handful of similar decisions collected from other jurisdictions evidenced 
a positive “Trend” toward strict liability to the consumer.127  
Almost simultaneously with Prosser’s announcement,128 the New 
Jersey Supreme Court handed down Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, 
 
120.  90 N.W.2d 873 (Mich. 1958). 
121.  Id. at 874. 
122.  Id. 
123.  Id. at 874–75. 
124.  Id. at 878. 
125.  See, e.g., B.F. Goodrich Co. v. Hammond, 269 F.2d 501, 506 (10th Cir. 1959) 
(rejecting a privity requirement for an implied-warranty claim involving an exploding tire). 
126.  The most well-known of James’s works on products liability are Fleming James, Jr., 
Products Liability (pts. 1–2), 34 TEX. L. REV. 44, 192 (1955), and the relevant portions of his 
treatise, HARPER & JAMES, supra note 100, §§ 28.1–28.33.  A detailed review of James’s 
scholarship, as it pertains to products liability, appears at Priest, supra note 7, at 470–83, 501−03. 
127.  Prosser, Assault upon the Citadel, supra note 84, at 1112–14.  While Prosser is today 
the most celebrated of these prophets, the general trend toward greater liability on the part of 
manufacturers and sellers was quite obvious to many observers of the time.  E.g., Paul Oberst, 
Torts, 1959 ANN. SURV. AM. L. 442, 459 (1960) (“As might be expected the year saw continued 
changes in the direction of thrusting the risk of injury by defective products upon those most 
able to absorb and distribute this burden.”). 
128.  As sleuthed by Priest, supra note 7, at 506–07. 
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Inc.,129 which rewrote the law of warranty in that state.  Henningsen 
involved a new Plymouth automobile, bought by a husband for his wife.130  
Shortly after the vehicle’s purchase, while Mrs. Henningsen was driving 
it, she heard a cracking noise under the hood.131  Her Plymouth veered off 
the road, injuring Mrs. Henningsen and seriously damaging the car.132  She 
and her husband sued both the dealer from which Mr. Henningsen had 
purchased the car, as well as the automobile’s manufacturer, Chrysler.133  
The trial court threw out the plaintiffs’ negligence claim, but allowed their 
implied-warranty claim to go to the jury.134  After deliberations, the jury 
returned with a $30,000 plaintiffs’ verdict—$26,000 to Mrs. Henningsen 
and $4,000 for her husband.135  On appeal, the Henningsen defendants 
attacked the trial court’s decision to allow the plaintiffs’ warranty claims 
to proceed, since Mrs. Henningsen had not purchased the vehicle herself, 
and neither plaintiff had direct contractual relations with Chrysler.136  The 
New Jersey Supreme Court unanimously rejected these arguments, in a 
striking renunciation of a privity requirement.137  For good measure, 
Henningsen also held that the defendants’ written disclaimer of 
warranties was void as contrary to public policy.138  
The legal community appreciated the path-breaking nature of the 
Henningsen precedent, “the first unequivocal holding by the highest court 
of a state that privity is unnecessary to warranty liability.”139  Other states, 
most notably New York, soon followed Henningsen’s lead in eliminating 
 
129.  161 A.2d 69 (N.J. 1960).  For a thorough retelling and examination of the Henningsen 
case, drawing from original court documents, see Jay M. Feinman & Caitlin Edwards, 
Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc. (1960): Promoting Product Safety by Protecting 
Consumers of Defective Goods, in COURTING JUSTICE: TEN NEW JERSEY CASES THAT 
SHOOK THE NATION 5–22 (Paul L. Tractenberg ed., 2013). 
130.  Henningsen, 161 A.2d at 73. 
131.  Id. at 75. 
132.  Id. at 73, 75. 
133.  Id. at 73. 
134.  Id. at 75. 
135.  Feinman & Edwards, supra note 129, at 8. 
136.  Brief for Defendant, Bloomfield Motors, Inc., as Cross-Respondent and Appellant 
at 2324, Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, 161 A.2d 69 (1960) (No. A-50); Brief for 
Defendant, Chrysler Corporation as Cross-Respondent and Appellant at 13–16, Henningsen 
v. Bloomfield Motors, 161 A.2d 69 (1960) (No. A-50). 
137.  Henningsen, 161 A.2d at 84, 99–100. 
138.  Id. at 95, 97. 
139.  Recent Case, Sales—Implied Warranties—Implied Warranty of Merchantability 
Renders Manufacturer Liable to Buyer’s Wife Despite Disclaimer Clause and Absence of Privity 
of Contract—Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc. (N.J. 1960), 74 HARV. L. REV. 630, 630 
(1961). 
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or paring back privity requirements for warranty claims.140  Within three 
years, however, Henningsen had been trumped by the California 
Supreme Court’s Greenman decision, which shifted the focus of products-
liability reform from warranty protections to “pure” tort law.141  
Greenman, which involved an allegedly defective “ShopSmith” 
workbench, was brought as a negligence and warranty case.142  The 
plaintiff received a judgment in his favor, which the Court of Appeal 
affirmed over the manufacturer’s argument that the plaintiff had not 
given timely notice of the defect.143  Upon granting review, the California 
Supreme Court endorsed the Court of Appeal’s reasoning on the 
warranty issue.144  Though this conclusion sufficed to resolve the case, the 
court further opined that “[a] manufacturer is strictly liable in tort when 
an article he places on the market, knowing that it is to be used without 
inspection for defects, proves to have a defect that causes injury to a 
human being.”145  The Greenman court only cursorily canvassed the policy 
motivations for its adoption of strict liability, stating that these reasons 
had been “fully articulated” elsewhere.146  The court devoted more effort 
to explaining why tort, rather than warranty, represented the optimal 
doctrinal solution to the problems presented by defective products.147  
Notwithstanding the efforts that had been made to ground warranty in 
 
140.  E.g., Goldberg v. Kollsman Instrument Corp., 191 N.E.2d 81, 83 (N.Y. 1963); Randy 
Knitwear, Inc. v. Am. Cyanamid Co., 181 N.E.2d 399, 404 (N.Y. 1962); State Farm Mut. Auto. 
Ins. Co. v. Anderson-Weber, Inc., 110 N.W.2d 449, 453, 456 (Iowa 1961); Greenberg v. Lorenz, 
173 N.E.2d 773, 775–76 (N.Y. 1961); Peterson v. Lamb Rubber Co., 353 P.2d 575, 581 (Cal. 
1960); see also Gen. Motors Corp. v. Dodson, 338 S.W.2d 655, 660–61 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1960) 
(allowing a lawsuit to proceed against the manufacturer of an automobile, even when 
purchased through a dealer, as “the jury could have found that [the manufacturer] was the 
actual person or entity with whom plaintiffs were dealing, and [the dealer] was a conduit or 
subterfuge by which [the manufacturer] tried to exempt itself from liability to the consumers 
who are the plaintiffs”).  Federal courts were equally aggressive in attacking the privity 
requirement during this span.  See, e.g., Deveny v. Rheem Mfg. Co., 319 F.2d 124, 130 (2d Cir. 
1963); Bowles v. Zimmer Mfg. Co., 277 F.2d 868, 874 (7th Cir. 1960); Chapman v. Brown, 198 
F.Supp. 78, 118 (D. Haw. 1961), aff’d, Brown v. Chapman, 304 F.2d 149 (9th Cir. 1962); 
McQuaide v. Bridgeport Brass Co., 190 F.Supp. 252, 254–55 (D. Conn. 1960). 
141.  Greenman v. Yuba Power Products, Inc., 377 P.2d 897, 900 (Cal. 1963). 
142.  Id. at 898. 
143.  Greenman v. Yuba Power Products, Inc., 23 Cal. Rptr. 282, 286 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 
1962), aff’d, 377 P.2d 897, 899 (Cal. 1963).   
144.  Greenman, 377 P.2d at 900.  
145.  Id.  
146.  Id. at 901.  
147.  Id.  
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tort law,148 the Greenman court regarded warranty as still too closely 
tethered to the law of sales to provide an adequate basis for an obligation 
imposed for public-policy reasons.149  
Notwithstanding Greenman, no other state adopted strict products 
liability grounded squarely in tort prior to the promulgation of the 
Restatement (Second) of Torts § 402A.150  As prepared by Prosser, the 
reporter for this portion of the Restatement Second, this section went 
through a series of drafts that endorsed strict liability for an ever-
expanding universe of products.  A 1961 draft would have applied strict 
liability only to sales of food products.151  One year later, Prosser revised 
the provision to extend strict liability to “products for intimate bodily 
use.”152  Finally, in 1964 Prosser tendered to the American Law Institute 
(ALI) a provision that allowed the “ultimate user or consumer”153 to 
proceed in tort, on a strict liability basis, against the seller of “any product 
in a defective condition unreasonably dangerous to the user.”154  The 
blackletter of § 402A was accompanied by comments “a” through “q,” 
which provided an atlas to the frontier opened up by the new rule.155  
These comments did not resolve every conceivable products issue that 
might arise—far from it—but they did address enough of the high-profile 
fact patterns of the era (involving products such as tobacco (at 
comment i)156 and vaccines (at comment k))157 to assure would-be 
adopters that the concept of strict products liability in tort did have some 
 
148.  See, e.g., Randy Knitwear, Inc. v. Am. Cyanamid Co., 181 N.E.2d 399, 401 n.2 (N.Y. 
1962) (discussing this connection).  But see Gillam, supra note 66, at 131 (“The modern law 
generally regards warranty as contractual in nature.”). 
149.  Greenman, 377 P.2d at 901 (“[R]ules defining and governing warranties that were 
developed to meet the needs of commercial transactions cannot properly be invoked to govern 
the manufacturer’s liability to those injured by their defective products unless those rules also 
serve the purposes for which such liability is imposed.”). 
150.  Some courts had cited to tentative drafts of § 402A well before the section’s 
publication in finished form.  E.g., Lartigue v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 317 F.2d 19, 25–26 
(5th Cir. 1963); Strahlendorf v. Walgreen Co., 114 N.W.2d 823, 830–31 (Wis. 1962). 
151.  RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (Tentative Draft No. 6, 1961). 
152.  RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (Tentative Draft No. 7, 1962). 
153.  RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (Tentative Draft No. 10, 1964).  
154.  Id. 
155.  Id. cmts. a–q. 
156.  At issue in Green v. American Tobacco Co., 325 F.2d 673 (5th Cir. 1963); Green v. 
American Tobacco Co., 304 F.2d 70 (5th Cir. 1962); and Green v. American Tobacco Co., 154 
So. 2d 169 (Fla. 1963).  
157.  This provision may have been sparked by then-recent litigation over the defective 
Cutter polio vaccine.  Gottsdanker v. Cutter Labs., 6 Cal. Rptr. 320 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1960). 
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meaningful boundaries.  The ALI approved Prosser’s handiwork in May 
1964,158 and § 402A was formally published a year later.159 
In the years that followed, courts (and a few legislatures) rushed to 
adopt a tort-based theory of strict products liability.160  By 1976, forty-two 
states and the District of Columbia had jumped aboard the bandwagon,161 
a progression so rapid that it amazed even some of the judges who joined 
 
158.  Friday Afternoon Session, May 22, 1964, supra note 3, at 375. 
159.  RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (1965). 
160.  Bespeaking judicial enthusiasm for the theory, several courts (such as Greenman) 
adopted a tort basis for strict liability under circumstances where it was either unnecessary to 
the case or arguably not properly presented for the court’s consideration.  See Herbert W. Titus, 
Restatement (Second) of Torts Section 402A and the Uniform Commercial Code, 22 STAN. L. 
REV. 713, 715–17 (1970) (discussing this phenomenon).  
161.  In alphabetical order, these jurisdictions (with the accompanying decision or 
legislative act that adopted strict products liability in tort) are Alabama (Atkins v. Am. Motors 
Corp., 335 So. 2d 134 (Ala. 1976)); Alaska (Clary v. Fifth Ave. Chrysler Ctr., Inc., 454 P.2d 244 
(Alaska 1969)); Arizona (O.S. Stapley Co. v. Miller, 447 P.2d 248 (Ariz. 1968)); Arkansas (Act 
of Feb. 13, 1973, Act 111, 1973 Ark. Acts. 331); Colorado (Hiigel v. General Motors Corp., 544 
P.2d 983 (Colo. 1975)); Connecticut (Garthwait v. Burgio, 216 A.2d 189 (Conn. 1965)); D.C. 
(Cottom v. McGuire Funeral Serv., Inc., 262 A.2d 807 (D.C. 1970)); Florida (West v. Caterpillar 
Tractor Co., 336 So. 2d 80 (Fla. 1976)); Georgia (Act of Apr. 9, 1968, No. 1085, 1968 Ga. Laws 
1166); Hawaii (Stewart v. Budget Rent-A-Car Corp., 470 P.2d 240 (Haw. 1970)); Idaho (Shields 
v. Morton Chem. Co., 518 P.2d 857 (Idaho 1974)); Illinois (Suvada v. White Motor Co., 210 
N.E.2d 182 (Ill.  1965)); Indiana (Ayr-Way Stores, Inc. v. Chitwood, 300 N.E.2d 335 (Ind. 
1973)); Iowa (Hawkeye-Sec. Ins. Co. v. Ford Motor Co., 174 N.W.2d 672 (Iowa 1970)); Kansas 
(Brooks v. Dietz, 545 P.2d 1104 (Kan. 1976)); Kentucky (Dealers Transp. Co. v. Battery Distrib. 
Co., 402 S.W.2d 441 (Ky. Ct. App. 1965)); Louisiana (Weber v. Fid. & Cas. Ins. Co., 250 So. 2d 
754 (La. 1971)); Maine (Act of Oct. 3, 1973, ch. 466, 1973 Me. Laws 822); Maryland (Phipps v. 
Gen. Motors Corp., 363 A.2d 955 (Md. 1976)); Minnesota (McCormack v. Hankscraft Co., 154 
N.W.2d 488 (Minn. 1967)); Mississippi (State Stove Mfg. Co. v. Hodges, 189 So. 2d 113 (Miss. 
1966)); Missouri (Keener v. Dayton Elec. Mfg. Co., 445 S.W.2d 362 (Mo. 1969)); Montana 
(Brandenburger v. Toyota Motor Sales, Inc., 513 P.2d 268 (Mont. 1973)); Nebraska (Kohler v. 
Ford Motor Co., 191 N.W.2d 601 (Neb. 1971)); Nevada (Ginnis v. Mapes Hotel Corp., 470 P.2d 
135 (Nev. 1970)); New Hampshire (Buttrick v. Arthur Lessard & Sons, Inc., 260 A.2d 111 (N.H. 
1969)); New Jersey (Santor v. A & M Karagheusian, Inc., 207 A.2d 305 (N.J. 1965)); New 
Mexico (Stang v. Hertz Corp., 497 P.2d 732 (N.M. 1972)); New York (Codling v. Paglia, 298 
N.E.2d 622 (N.Y. 1973)); North Dakota (Johnson v. Am. Motors Corp., 225 N.W.2d 57 (N.D. 
1974)); Ohio (Lonzrick v. Republic Steel Corp., 218 N.E.2d 185 (Ohio 1966)); Oklahoma 
(Kirkland v. Gen. Motors Corp., 521 P.2d 1353 (Okla. 1974)); Oregon (Heaton v. Ford Motor 
Co., 435 P.2d 806 (Or. 1967)); Pennsylvania (Webb v. Zern, 220 A.2d 853 (Pa. 1966)); Rhode 
Island (Ritter v. Narragansett Elec. Co., 283 A.2d 255 (R.I. 1971)); South Carolina (Act of July 
9, 1974, No. 1184, 1974 S.C. Acts 2782); South Dakota (Engberg v. Ford Motor Co., 205 N.W.2d 
104 (S.D. 1973)); Tennessee (Ford Motor Co., v. Lonon, 398 S.W.2d 240 (Tenn. 1966)); Texas 
(McKisson v. Sales Affiliates, Inc., 416 S.W.2d 787 (Tex. 1967)); Vermont (Zaleskie v. Joyce, 
333 A.2d 110 (Vt. 1975)); Washington (Ulmer v. Ford Motor Co., 452 P.2d 729 (Wash. 1969)); 
and Wisconsin (Dippel v. Sciano, 155 N.W.2d 55 (Wis. 1967)). 
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in the movement.162  Utah and West Virginia straggled into the fold in 
1979.163  In 1986, Wyoming became the last state to date to follow the 
trend.164  As will be discussed in more detail later, Delaware, 
Massachusetts, Michigan, North Carolina, and Virginia remain holdouts, 
to a degree.165  These five states continue to couch their (enhanced) 
consumer protections in the language of warranty.166 
As a postscript, once courts adopted strict products liability in tort, it 
became apparent that the concept required further elaboration as applied 
to different types of claims.  The 1970s through the early 1980s 
represented strict products liability’s awkward teenage years, in which 
courts sought to define the parameters of the new rule.167  Today, the 
brand of “strict liability” applicable to a case depends on whether the 
defect involved constitutes a “manufacturing defect,” “design defect,” or 
“warning defect.”168  Only as to the first of these—defined as a defect 
whereby a product’s design does not conform to a manufacturer’s 
intentions169—is liability truly “strict.”  The general principles most 
jurisdictions now apply to design and warning claims echo negligence 
rules, albeit with a paramount focus upon the qualities of the product 
itself, not necessarily the actions of the human agents who produced it.170 
 
162.  See McCormack, 154 N.W.2d at 500 (commenting upon the “remarkable shift” 
toward adoption of strict products liability). 
163.  Ernest W. Hahn, Inc. v. Armco Steel Co., 601 P.2d 152 (Utah 1979); Morningstar v. 
Black & Decker Mfg. Co., 253 S.E.2d 666 (W. Va. 1979). 
164.  Ogle v. Caterpillar Tractor Co., 716 P.2d 334 (Wyo. 1986). 
165.  OWEN, supra note 30, at 282–84. 
166.  N.C. GEN. STAT. § 99B-1.1 (2011); Jacobs v. Yamaha Motor Corp., U.S.A., 649 
N.E.2d 758, 763 & n.6 (Mass. 1995); Sensenbrenner v. Rust, Orling & Neale, Architects, Inc., 
374 S.E.2d 55, 57 & n.4 (Va. 1988); Cline v. Prowler Indus. of Md., Inc., 418 A.2d 968, 975–76 
(Del. 1980).  For a discussion of the approaches these states (and the other holdout, Michigan) 
have taken to products liability, see OWEN, supra note 30, at 282–84. 
167.  See JANE STAPLETON, PRODUCT LIABILITY 29–34 (1994); Owen, supra note 75, at 
97879. 
168.  RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 2 (1998). 
169.  See id. (defining a manufacturing defect). 
170.  See id. (defining design and warning defects); Michael D. Green, The Road Less Well 
Traveled (and Seen): Contemporary Lawmaking in Products Liability, 49 DEPAUL L. REV. 377, 
380 (1999) (observing that “courts [have been] . . . essentially turning design defect law into a 
negligence standard”); James A. Henderson, Jr., Why Negligence Dominates Tort, 50 UCLA 
L. REV. 377, 384 (2002) (“In the areas involving generic product risks, common law liability of 
manufacturers has always been, and will always be, based on fault.”); James A. Henderson, Jr. 
& Aaron D. Twerski, Closing the American Products Liability Frontier: The Rejection of 
Liability Without Defect, 66 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1263, 1277 (1991) (“Although judges have talked 
repeatedly of imposing ‘strict liability’ for defective product designs and failures to warn, in 
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B. The History of Strict Products Liability: Prevailing Themes 
So goes a standard, if somewhat lengthy, retelling of how strict 
products liability in tort came into being.  Some form of this story 
represents the archetypal tale of doctrinal evolution in tort law—
probably because of its affirmational, familiar, and scalable nature.  The 
narrative details a steady and sensible progression of the law, in synch 
with broader social trends.  Marking this evolution are series of 
touchstone judicial opinions, two of which were written by the most 
prominent state-court judges of their respective eras.171  Academics also 
made significant contributions to the movement, with the most famous 
torts professor of all having perhaps the greatest impact.172  Furthermore, 
an author pressed for space can jettison many of the details associated 
with this narrative and still construct a coherent tale of doctrinal 
evolution around the bare skeleton of Winterbottom, MacPherson, and 
the Henningsen-Greenman-Restatement (Second) of Torts § 402A triad. 
That said, this story also contains some riddles.  Among them, this 
narrative begs the question of why strict products liability in tort, after 
being under consideration for so long, was adopted by so many states in 
an extremely short window of time.  Two explanations have been given 
for this dynamic.  One account argues that various attributes of 1960s and 
1970s culture disposed the judges of that era to adopt strict products 
liability.  The other assigns primary responsibility to a cadre of academics 
who, from the 1940s through the 1960s, provided the intellectual 
breakthroughs that made strict products liability respectable.  
The first of these explanations lays strict products liability in tort at 
the doorstep of the activist frisson of the 1960s and 1970s, and its impact 
upon judges.  Reflecting on this atmosphere, Gary Schwartz has written:  
[I]n expanding liability [during the 1960s and 1970s] modern 
judges drew upon tort law’s negligence tradition, upon the fairness 
and deterrence rationales embedded in that tradition, and upon 
the modern loss-distribution rationale, which could easily enough 
be linked with that tradition.  Furthermore, those judges were 
 
reality they have retained a primarily fault-based approach to generic product hazards.” 
(footnotes omitted)). 
171.  MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co., 111 N.E. 1050 (N.Y. 1916); Escola v. Coca Cola 
Bottling Co. of Fresno, 150 P.2d 436, 440–44 (Cal. 1944) (Traynor, J., concurring); see also 
ANDREW L. KAUFMAN, CARDOZO 3 (1998); Les Ledbetter, Roger J. Traynor, California 
Justice: Noted Legal Scholar Headed the State’s Supreme Court From 1964 Until 1970, N.Y. 
TIMES, May 17, 1983, at B6. 
172.  Priest, supra note 7, at 464–65; see infra text accompanying notes 177–84. 
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emboldened both by the problem-solving judicial activism of the 
Warren Court and by the more general reform-minded public-
policy discourse of the 1960s and 1970s.  In this latter respect 
modern tort law can be regarded as one of those ambitious 
programs initiated during the Great Society and then confirmed 
and further institutionalized during the 1970s.173 
As directed toward products liability, the prevailing sense was 
that major American corporations—and in particular, the Big 
Three automakers—were economic colossi that could easily bear 
whatever burdens might be imposed on them by way of regulation 
and liability.  A second feature of public opinion was that these 
corporations should not be held in high respect; indeed, they 
should be frequently distrusted. . . .  During the 1960s, the 
consumer movement was gaining force; this movement portrayed 
innocent consumers as needing strong protection from 
manufacturers, which frequently treat consumers in shabby 
ways. . . .  The willingness of courts by the late 1960s to impose 
strong liabilities on major corporations (especially on product 
manufacturers) was almost certainly facilitated by this discrediting 
of corporations that was occurring in the public outlook.174 
An alternative explanation for the adoption of strict products liability 
identifies legal academics as a singularly important influence.  George 
Priest’s article The Invention of Enterprise Liability: A Critical History of 
the Intellectual Foundations of Modern Tort Law represents the leading 
work in this genre.175  Priest discounts the significance of “contemporary 
social currents” in the adoption of strict products liability,176 and instead 
stresses the efforts made by Professors James and Prosser to lay a 
doctrinal foundation for strict liability in tort.177  
As Priest explains (and as summarized earlier, in retelling the 
conventional account of strict products liability’s ascendance), 
throughout the 1940s and 1950s James devised the basic theoretical 
framework for “enterprise liability,” a theory of policy and responsibility 
 
173.  Schwartz, supra note 8, at 619; see also Mark Geistfeld, Escola v. Coca Cola Bottling 
Co.: Strict Products Liability Unbound, in TORTS STORIES, supra note 58, at 229, 241–42 
(discussing this view). 
174.  Schwartz, supra note 8, at 615. 
175.  Priest, supra note 7; see also Robert L. Rabin, Some Thoughts on the Ideology of 
Enterprise Liability, 55 MD. L. REV. 1190, 1190–91 (1996) (discussing Priest’s article). 
176.  Priest, supra note 7, at 464. 
177.  Id. at 464–65. 
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that would undergird strict liability to the consumer.178  Prosser later 
advocated on behalf of strict liability in his scholarship, most famously in 
his Assault upon the Citadel (Strict Liability to the Consumer) article in 
the Yale Law Journal,179 and steered the American Law Institute toward 
a full embrace of strict products liability through the drafts of § 402A that 
he prepared.180  Per Priest’s explanation, James brought passion and 
persistence to the debate over products liability,181 while Prosser 
contributed catchy prose, a willingness to exaggerate,182 good timing,183 
and an unparalleled bully pulpit.184  Their combined efforts did the job.  
In Priest’s version of the story, once enterprise liability gained a 
consensus among academics, “[j]udicial implementation followed almost 
immediately.”185 
Priest makes three specific assertions as to why academic efforts 
primed the nation’s judges to adopt strict liability with “extraordinary” 
speed.186  First, he argues that “the entire world of legal academics and 
thirty years of accumulated writing supported the change.”187  Second, he 
infers that the thrust of this scholarship resonated with the personal 
experiences of judges.188  Third, according to Priest, strict products 
liability, as framed by James and Prosser, spread apace because of “its 
exceptional sophistication in comparison with extant theories of 
negligence and warranty law and the link that it provide[d] to a broader 
understanding of the judicial purpose.”189  Unlike the stodgy principles of 
negligence and warranty law, “[e]nterprise liability theory . . . appointed 
the judge an agent of the modern state.”190  The doctrinal shift “allowed 
judges . . . to aid the poor” and “adjust production decisions in the 
 
178.  For an overview of enterprise liability as a positive theory of tort law, see John C.P. 
Goldberg, Twentieth-Century Tort Theory, 91 GEO. L.J. 513, 537–44 (2003).  
179.  William Prosser, Assault upon the Citadel, supra note 84. 
180.  Priest, supra note 7, at 512–14. 
181.  Id. at 474. 
182.  Id. at 514. 
183.  As Priest observes, id. at 506, Prosser’s Assault upon the Citadel article arrived in 
libraries and judicial chambers only a few months after the New Jersey Supreme Court issued 
its path-breaking decision in Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc., 161 A.2d 69 (N.J. 1960). 
184.  Priest, supra note 7, at 464–65, 512–14. 
185.  Id. at 464. 
186.  Id. at 518. 
187.  Id.  
188.  Id. 
189.  Id. at 518–19. 
190.  Id. at 519. 
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economy” such that they, too, could participate in the hydraulic 
adjustments of modern governance.191 
The problem with these explanations is not that either is wrong, but 
that they do not tell the entire story.192  For one thing, both accounts focus 
principally upon judicial demand for strict products liability, and overlook 
the factors that produced a steady supply of cases that implicated this 
theory of recovery.  Adequate assessment of this other side of the 
products-liability equation requires an inquiry into the circumstances that 
led plaintiffs and their lawyers to press products claims.  Had plaintiffs 
not come to appreciate products-related injuries as tortious, or had 
lawyers not been willing to take their cases, courts would have lacked the 
raw material with which to innovate.193  It is easy to take these lawsuits as 
a given, at least if one assumes a receptive judiciary.  But this assumption 
is not necessarily accurate.  There exist plenty of potentially viable claims 
that never gain broad acceptance, either because plaintiffs do not 
recognize them, or lawyers do not consider them worth their while.194   
Likewise, neither explanation spends much time considering prosaic, 
nuts-and-bolts reasons why judges may have adopted strict products 
liability.  Writing in 1960, Prosser could identify only a few substantial 
problems with the application of negligence law in products cases.  
“Where the action is against the manufacturer of the product,” Prosser 
 
191.  Id. 
192.  Granted, it is impossible to isolate every trend or event that might have contributed 
toward the products-liability revolution.  For an example of an arguably important indirect 
influence, between 1957 and 1980, the number of states claiming intermediate appellate courts 
almost tripled, rising from 13 to 33.  Carl Norberg, Some Second and Third Thoughts on an 
Intermediate Court of Appeals, 7 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 93, 94 n.1, 98 (1981).  The creation 
of these courts conferred upon more state supreme courts the freedom of discretionary review, 
as opposed to mandatory jurisdiction over their torts caseload.  This transition may have made 
the judges on state supreme courts more interested in molding public policy with their 
decisions.  See Robert A. Kagan, Bliss Cartwright, Lawrence M. Friedman & Stanton Wheeler, 
The Evolution of State Supreme Courts, 76 MICH. L.  REV. 961, 983 (1978) (“[The] increasing 
discretion and diminishing caseload implied corresponding changes in the function of the 
supreme courts.  It suggested an emerging societal consensus that state supreme courts should 
not be passive, reactive bodies . . . but that these courts should be policy-makers and, at least 
in some cases, legal innovators.”). 
193.  See infra Part III. 
194.  See Marc Galanter, Case Congregations and Their Careers, 24 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 
371, 377–78 (1990) (discussing how claim consciousness (or a lack thereof) among plaintiffs, as 
well as the interests and abilities of plaintiffs’ counsel, affect the volume of litigation involving 
a particular cause of action); Kyle Graham, Of Frightened Horses and Autonomous Vehicles: 
Tort Law and Its Assimilation of Innovations, 52 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 1241, 1257–60 (2012) 
(discussing claim consciousness among plaintiffs).  
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acknowledged, “an honest estimate might very well be that there is not 
one case in a hundred in which strict liability would result in recovery 
where negligence does not.”195  To Prosser, negligence “[broke] down” 
only when the negligent manufacturer was insolvent, unknown, or 
unavailable for process, and a plaintiff’s suit against a middleman retailer 
or wholesaler would fail either because these entities had no duty to 
inspect the defective goods, or because a reasonable inspection would not 
have revealed the defect.196  In the abstract, these concerns seem like a 
thin premise for such an important change in the law, particularly when 
modestly broadened warranty protections against the retailer might have 
provided an adequate remedy.  But perhaps there existed prominent case 
tropes of Prosser’s era that highlighted the problems he spotted, and 
possibly other difficulties with the application of standard negligence and 
warranty principles.  If so, the clarity with which these cases framed the 
case for strict products liability may have intrigued even hard-headed 
judges who were otherwise skeptical about change.   
Finally, neither explanation fully accounts for the continued existence 
of the five holdouts against casting strict products liability in the tort 
verbiage that Prosser and Traynor prescribed.  Delaware, Massachusetts, 
Michigan, North Carolina, and Virginia also experienced “the more 
general reform-minded public-policy discourse of the 1960s and 1970s.”197  
And there exists little indication that these states denied their judges 
access to Prosser’s articles, much less the Restatement (Second) of Torts.  
Yet these states resisted the trend toward strict liability in tort, and opted 
to work within the law of warranty instead.198  Perhaps strict products 
liability in tort was less overdetermined than conventional wisdom would 
suggest.  
III. THE POPULIST NARRATIVE:  
THE CONTRIBUTIONS OF PLAINTIFFS AND THEIR COUNSEL 
Thus, notwithstanding the vast amount that has been written about 
strict products liability, there remain several tales to be told.  The first of 
the additional histories presented here concerns how heightened claim 
consciousness among would-be plaintiffs and an increasingly well-
organized plaintiffs’ bar affected the development and diffusion of this 
principle.  The predominant narrative concentrates upon the adoption of 
 
195.  Prosser, Assault upon the Citadel, supra note 84, at 1114.  
196.  Id. at 1116–17. 
197.  Schwartz, supra note 8, at 619; see also OWEN, supra note 30, at 282–83. 
198.  See OWEN, supra note 30, at 283–84; supra note 166. 
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strict products liability by judges.  A different perspective would consider 
the forces that inspired individual claimants and especially their lawyers 
to pursue products lawsuits and to argue for doctrinal change. 
A. The Emergence of Claim and Class Consciousness 
The prevailing sociolegal explanation for strict products liability 
acknowledges that popular hostility toward corporations somehow 
“facilitated” judicial recognition of this approach.199  This assessment 
understates the significance and agency of a burgeoning contingent of 
self-identifying consumers, who as the twentieth century progressed came 
to appreciate an ever-greater array of product-related claims.200  As 
Robert Rabin has noted, this “removal of intangible barriers to claim 
consciousness” set the stage for the products-liability revolution.201  The 
text below elaborates on Rabin’s observation.  
Consumer movements of various types have appeared throughout 
American history.  The American Revolution was sparked by one such 
crusade.202  A century later, the pure food and drug campaign drew 
strength from consumers sickened by accounts of unsanitary conditions 
in slaughterhouses and other food processing and distribution facilities.203  
The consumer movement that contributed to the strict products-
liability revolution evolved more gradually than had these earlier drives.  
This awakening originated with the same trends that caused jurists to 
reconsider the privity rule in negligence suits: mass production, the 
introduction of middlemen and retailers into the supply chain, enhanced 
advertising and promotion, and expanded retail showplaces.204  In 
 
199.  Schwartz, supra note 8, at 615. 
200.  See Robert L. Rabin, Tort Law in Transition: Tracing the Patterns of Sociolegal 
Change, 23 VAL. U. L. REV. 1, 13–14 (1988) (discussing the development of claim consciousness 
among post-World War II consumers). 
201.  Id. at 14.  
202.  See T.H. BREEN, THE MARKETPLACE OF REVOLUTION: HOW CONSUMER 
POLITICS SHAPED AMERICAN INDEPENDENCE (2004) (discussing the politicization of 
consumers in the years leading up to the American Revolution). 
203.  See LIZABETH COHEN, A CONSUMERS’ REPUBLIC: THE POLITICS OF MASS 
CONSUMPTION IN POSTWAR AMERICA 21 (2003) (discussing the Progressives’ identification 
of “consumers as a new category of the American citizenry”); STRASSER, supra note 67, at 252–
60.  Women’s organizations and magazines directed toward a female audience were particularly 
involved in this campaign.  See, e.g., Progress, GOOD HOUSEKEEPING, Jan. 1902, at 154, 154–
55 (discussing the ongoing pure-food movement, and the magazine’s role therein).  On the pure 
food and drink movement as a whole, see generally LORINE SWAINSTON GOODWIN, THE 
PURE FOOD, DRINK, AND DRUG CRUSADERS, 1879–1914 (1999). 
204.  See supra notes 64–73 and accompanying text. 
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response to these changes, consumers sought out new sources of 
information regarding the quality and safety of products placed on the 
market.205  One such resource was Good Housekeeping magazine’s “Seal 
of Approval” for products, inaugurated in 1909.206  Shoppers also began 
to receive assistance from organizations created to promote consumer 
awareness.  The most important of these groups appeared after the 1927 
publication of the best-selling exposé Your Money’s Worth: A Study in 
the Waste of the Consumer’s Dollar.207  The success of this book led to the 
formation of Consumers’ Research, Incorporated, a consumer advocacy 
group.208  Beginning in 1931, this organization’s biweekly bulletins 
detailed the hidden dangers of products such as toasters, vacuum 
cleaners, automobiles, and cosmetics.209  Two Consumers’ Research 
employees soon published another best-seller, 100,000,000 Guinea Pigs: 
Dangers in Food, Drugs, and Cosmetics, which condemned the lack of 
safety testing before the titular products were released onto the market.210  
In 1936, disgruntled employees of Consumers’ Research broke away and 
formed a rival organization, Consumers Union.211  This organization 
launched its own magazine, Consumer Reports, which also sought to help 
consumers by testing products for safety and utility, and offering 
recommendations as to their acceptability.212  This publication expanded 
 
205.  Cf. Lynd & Hanson, supra note 68, at 881 (“The increase in new kinds of goods and 
services, the decline in home handicraft knowledge, the increased complexity of mechanical 
devices and fabricated commodities, new pressures on the consumer to buy, and new tensions 
within the consumer, all make new demands for consumer literacy.”). 
206.  The Good Housekeeping Institute, GOOD HOUSEKEEPING, Dec. 1909, at 742, 743.  
207.  STUART CHASE & F.J. SCHLINK, YOUR MONEY’S WORTH: A STUDY IN THE 
WASTE OF THE CONSUMER’S DOLLAR (1927); see, e.g., MCGOVERN, supra note 68, at 170–83 
(discussing this book and the response to it); Norman D. Katz, Consumers Union: The 
Movement and the Magazine, 1936–1957, at 37 (June 1977) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, 
Rutgers University) (same).  
208.  NORMAN ISAAC SILBER, TEST AND PROTEST: THE INFLUENCE OF CONSUMERS 
UNION 1718 (1983). 
209.  MCGOVERN, supra note 68, at 191 & 426 n.7 (canvassing articles published by 
Consumers Research on the safety of products such as toasters, vacuum cleaners, automobiles, 
hair removal products, and cosmetics).   
210.  ARTHUR KALLET & F.J. SCHLINK, 100,000,000 GUINEA PIGS (1933); see also 
SILBER, supra note 208, at 18 (describing 100,000,000 Guinea Pigs as “[o]ne of the best-selling 
books of the decade”).  
211.  SILBER, supra note 208, at 21–23.  
212.  See id. 
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its circulation markedly in the years immediately after World War II, and 
boasted several hundred thousand subscribers by the early 1950s.213  
In the post-World War II era, Consumer Reports and similarly minded 
publications had plenty of products to criticize.  Cigarettes and a variety 
of other consumer products came under attack during this period as 
poorly designed or otherwise unsafe.  In 1952, Reader’s Digest—long “the 
only mainstream periodical of the time to crusade against the alleged 
perils of tobacco”214—ran a short story titled “Cancer by the Carton” that 
linked lung cancer to smoking.215  Several other mainstream publications, 
including Time and Life, picked up the story.216  When cigarette 
manufacturers unveiled “safer” filter-tip cigarettes in response to this 
negative publicity, reports circulated that these cigarettes had tar and 
nicotine levels similar to those found in “regular” cigarettes.217  Congress 
responded by investigating whether cigarette companies engaged in false 
or misleading advertising in promoting their new products.218  
While this hearing failed to produce legislation, other unsafe products 
did generate legislative responses.  After flammable cowboy outfits killed 
or seriously injured many children in the late 1940s and 1950s,219 leading 
to numerous lawsuits,220 Congress enacted the Flammable Fabrics Act of 
 
213.  See COHEN, supra note 203, at 131 (pegging Consumer Reports’ circulation at 
700,000 as of 1954).  
214.  RICHARD KLUGER, ASHES TO ASHES: AMERICA’S HUNDRED-YEAR CIGARETTE 
WAR, THE PUBLIC HEALTH, AND THE UNABASHED TRIUMPH OF PHILIP MORRIS 112 (1997). 
215.  Roy Norr, Cancer by the Carton, READER’S DIGEST, Dec. 1952, at 738. 
216.  SILBER, supra note 208, at 59–60.  
217.  KLUGER, supra note 214, at 188. 
218.  False and Misleading Advertising (Filter-Tip Cigarettes): Hearings Before a 
Subcomm. of the H. Comm. on Gov’t Operations, 85th Cong. (1957); see also KLUGER, supra 
note 214, at 188–89 (discussing these hearings); SILBER, supra note 208, at 66–68 (same). 
219.  At least one of the resulting lawsuits proceeded on a warranty theory (the statute of 
limitations having expired for the plaintiff’s negligence claim), even though the fatally injured 
child was not the purchaser of the cowboy suit.  Blessington v. McCrory Stores Corp., 111 
N.E.2d 421 (N.Y. 1953); see also Parish v. Great Atl. & Pac. Tea Co., 177 N.Y.S.2d 7, 13 (Mun. 
Ct. 1958) (discussing this case). 
220.  See Barbara Young Welke, Owning Hazard: A Tragedy, 1 U.C. IRVINE L. REV. 693, 
696 (2011) (discussing lawsuits brought between 1945 and 1953 over flammable cowboy 
outfits). 
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1953.221  This law offered modest protections,222 but it at least indicated a 
degree of interest in the subject of consumer protection.  Not long 
thereafter, the deaths of more than 75 children trapped in refrigerators 
over a five-year span223 brought about the Refrigerator Safety Act of 
1956.224  
Automobile design choices also came under closer scrutiny during the 
postwar period.  Up until around 1950, people who decried the mounting 
number of automobile-related deaths focused mostly upon unsafe 
driving, not defects in the vehicles involved.225  Consumer magazines had 
printed stories during the 1930s about how automobiles had been 
designed for “planned obsolescence,” but these articles failed to spark 
broader interest in the subject.226  Then, around mid-century, Cornell 
University’s Aeronautical Laboratory began to conduct safety tests on 
 
221.  Flammable Fabrics Act, Pub. L. No. 88, 67 Stat. 111 (1953); Flammable Fabrics: 
Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 82nd Cong. 8–10 (1952) 
(statement of Henry Miller, Assistant General Counsel in Charge of Industry Cooperation, 
Federal Trade Commission) (“The great wave of burnings and even deaths which children have 
suffered when wearing highly flammable cowboy playsuits is still within the memory of many 
of us.  Burning cases of most distressing character have also resulted from other fabrics and 
garments.”); see also id. at 9–10 (listing examples of injuries caused by flammable fabrics and 
other clothing items); Elliot P. Paley, Letters to the Times, Inflammable Play Clothes: Testing 
of Cowboy Suits and Stuffed Toys Suggested, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 4, 1948, at 24. 
222.  See Welke, supra note 220, at 737 (discussing the limited breadth of the Act’s 
provisions). 
223.  COMM. ON INTERSTATE AND FOREIGN COMMERCE, REQUIRING CERTAIN 
SAFETY DEVICES ON HOUSEHOLD REFRIGERATORS, SEN. REP. No. 2700, at 1 (2d Sess. 1956).  
This report described the toll taken by these accidents: 
From time to time the people of this Nation have been shocked to read in the 
newspapers stories of children who were entrapped inside refrigerators and iceboxes 
and were suffocated to death.  In 1952, 14 such deaths were recorded, and in 1953, 26 
deaths were recorded.  From January 1954 to June 1956, the records show that there 
were at least 33 incidents of suffocation in household refrigerators, involving 54 
children, of whom 39 died.  With the number of such deaths increasing each year, it is 
imperative that the Congress enact legislation to minimize these deaths insofar as 
possible. 
Id.; see also Old Refrigerators Are Safety Hazard, N.Y. TIMES, June 16, 1955, at 38; A Drive on 
Menace of Abandoned Iceboxes, LIFE, Dec. 14, 1953, at 57 (discussing child fatalities associated 
with iceboxes, and reporting upon an exchange drive whereby 12-lb turkeys were traded for 
icebox doors); cf. Child Safety Measure Passed, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 10, 1953, at 29 (describing an 
Oklahoma City ordinance that made it illegal to leave a refrigerator outside without removing 
the door or providing a means of escape). 
224.  Refrigerator Safety Act of 1956, Pub. L. No. 84-930, 70 Stat. 953. 
225.  SILBER, supra note 208, at 80. 
226.  Id. at 83. 
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automobiles.227  These studies led to the formation of the Automotive 
Crash Injury Research (ACIR) project at Cornell in 1952.228  The ACIR 
used the information it gathered from tests to develop specific 
recommendations about how to improve the design of automobiles for 
enhanced safety.229  One such recommendation involved the installation 
of seat belts, which became available on Ford and Chrysler vehicles 
beginning with the 1956 model year.230  Though few other immediate 
safety improvements resulted, the information produced by Cornell fed 
an emerging dialogue about automobile design and safety in the halls of 
Congress231 and elsewhere232 that continued throughout the 1950s and 
would yield significant results in the 1960s.233  
During this same postwar period, disturbing revelations emerged 
about drugs and vaccines only recently hailed as panaceas.  In the early 
1950s, the antibiotic chloromycetin—praised as a new “wonder drug” on 
 
227.  George H. Waltz, Jr., Making the Death Seat Safer, POPULAR SCI., July 1950, at 82, 
8283 (discussing research at Cornell). 
228.  SILBER, supra note 208, at 87. 
229.  Id.; see also SEYMOUR SCHWIMMER & ROBERT A. WOLF, LEADING CAUSES OF 
INJURY IN AUTOMOBILE ACCIDENTS (1962) (reporting the results of a study of crash-injury 
data). 
230.  SILBER, supra note 208, at 90. 
231.  In 1957, the House of Representatives held a hearing on safety belts in automobiles, 
in which witnesses testified as to their benefits.  Automobile Seat Belts: Hearings Before a 
Subcomm. of the H. Comm. on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 85th Cong. (1957); see also 
Paul N. Janes, Seat Belts vs. Traffic Deaths, POPULAR MECHANICS, Mar. 1955, at 137; Paul W. 
Kearney, How Safe Are the 1958 Cars?, POPULAR SCI., Jan. 1958, at 126 (“Despite some 
dragging of feet, it is evident from the 1958 models that safety is getting increasingly serious 
attention in Detroit.”). 
232.  E.g., Daniel P. Moynihan, Epidemic on the Highways, THE REPORTER, Apr. 30, 
1959, at 16 (arguing for the placement of greater pressure on automakers to enhance the safety 
of their vehicles); C. Hunter Shelden, Prevention, the Only Cure for Head Injuries Resulting 
from Automobile Accidents, 159 J. AM. MED. ASS’N 981 (1955); Death on the Highways, 163 J. 
AM. MED. ASS’N 262 (1957).  The Death on the Highways article explained the value of the 
testing at Cornell: 
Experimental tests at Cornell University and the careful investigation of recent 
highway accidents have demonstrated the real values of such safety devices as seat 
belts, crash padding, safety door locks, and collapsible steering wheels.  It is to be 
hoped that these safety features are only the beginning of a new era in basic 
automobile design.  Fundamental standard equipment should be designed in full 
recognition of the fact that every car may be involved, quite innocently, in a serious 
crash or roll over.  
Id. at 262. 
233.  E.g., SILBER, supra note 208, at 93–99 (discussing automobile safety legislation of 
the 1960s). 
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the front page of the New York Times just a few years before234—was tied 
to a spate of serious, occasionally fatal blood disorders.235  Meanwhile, a 
defective batch of polio vaccine manufactured by Cutter Laboratories in 
1955 infected many children with the disease the vaccine was intended to 
prevent.236  This tragedy led to a civil action and a plaintiffs’ verdict on a 
breach of warranty claim against Cutter (notwithstanding a lack of 
privity), which was affirmed by a California Court of Appeal in 1960.237  
And perhaps most strikingly, in 1961 it became apparent that the anti-
morning sickness drug thalidomide had resulted in serious birth defects, 
such as deformed limbs, in some of the children borne by women who 
used it.238  Thalidomide never had been licensed for use in the United 
States, a close call that owed to the skepticism of a Food and Drug 
Administration reviewer.239  Nevertheless, some samples had been 
distributed to doctors, leading to a small number of “thalidomide babies” 
being born in this country.240 
By the early 1960s, these seriatim revelations had started to instill in 
many consumers a healthy skepticism regarding the safety of the products 
they used241 and an enhanced appreciation of the available legal remedies 
when seemingly safe products proved to be anything but.  The existence 
of unsafe products was nothing new; but expectations had changed.  
Earlier products cases such as Winterbottom and MacPherson establish 
that at least some consumers had long appreciated a possible tort claim 
 
234.  William L. Laurence, “Wonder Drug,” Foe of Plagues, is Made Artificially in 
Quantity, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 27, 1949, at 1.  
235.  Continued Use of Chloromycetin Permitted, But Label Must Carry Warning to 
Physicians, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 14, 1952, at 30; U.S. Warns Doctors on Chloromycetin, N.Y. 
TIMES, Jul. 5, 1952, at 4; see also New Light on the Wonder Drugs, CHANGING TIMES, Dec. 
1953, at 35. 
236.  Note, The Cutter Polio Vaccine Incident: A Case Study of Manufacturers’ Liability 
Without Fault in Tort and Warranty, 65 YALE L.J. 262, 262 (1955). 
237.  Gottsdanker v. Cutter Labs., 6 Cal. Rptr. 320, 323, 326 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1960). 
238.  John Lear, The Unfinished Story of Thalidomide, SATURDAY REV., Sept. 1, 1962, at 
35, 35. 
239. ROBERT N. MAYER, THE CONSUMER MOVEMENT: GUARDIANS OF THE 
MARKETPLACE 27 (1989). 
240.  Carl Zimmer, Answers Begin to Emerge on How Thalidomide Caused Defects, N.Y. 
TIMES, Mar. 16, 2010, at D3. 
241.  This skepticism was buoyed by Vance Packard’s The Hidden Persuaders, a 1957 
bestseller on “[t]he use of mass psychoanalysis to guide campaigns of persuasion.”  VANCE 
PACKARD, THE HIDDEN PERSUADERS 1 (1957).  The Hidden Persuaders spent almost a year 
on the New York Times best-seller list.  Richard Severo, Vance Packard, 82, Challenger of 
Consumerism, Dies, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 13, 1996, at B16. 
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when a product unaccountably failed on them.242  The prevalence of cases 
involving adulterated food products from the early 1900s onward 
signified the more widespread recognition of a particularly pungent and 
obvious class of claims.243  As a further step in this progression, during the 
1950s and 1960s consumers gravitated toward a view that manufacturers 
of a broad range of products owed them a responsibility to make safer 
products, that many products could be made safer, and that some unsafe 
products were—in the words of Consumer Reports’ test results—not just 
to be avoided, but categorically “not acceptable.”244  
This enhanced claim consciousness, and its connection to both the 
trends of the time and the high-profile cases of the era, were captured by 
United States Supreme Court Associate Justice Robert Jackson in his 
dissent in Dalehite v. United States, a Federal Tort Claims Act case 
decided by the Court in 1953: 
This is a day of synthetic living, when to an ever-increasing extent 
our population is dependent upon mass producers for its food and 
drink, its cures and complexions, its apparel and gadgets.  These 
no longer are natural or simple products but complex ones whose 
composition and qualities are often secret.  Such a dependent 
society must exact greater care than in more simple days and must 
require from manufacturers or producers increased integrity and 
caution as the only protection of its safety and well-being.  
 
242.  Winterbottom v. Wright, (1842) 152 Eng. Rep. 402 (Exch.); 10 M. & W. 109; 
MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co., 111 N.E. 1050 (N.Y. 1916). 
243.  See supra notes 106–16 and accompanying text. 
244.  See ARWEN P. MOHUN, RISK: NEGOTIATING SAFETY IN AMERICAN SOCIETY 
236−37 (2013) (discussing the emergence of this perception by the mid-1960s); Nat’l Comm’n 
on Product Safety: Hearings Before the Consumer Subcomm. of the S. Comm. on Commerce, 
90th Cong. 9–11 (1967) (relating the types of products found “not acceptable” by Consumers 
Union between 1956 and 1966, and the reasons for this rating).  This progression did not 
operate at an even pace across claims.  Design defect claims tended to be more difficult for 
juries to appreciate: 
[I]n the design cases, particularly those involving widely-used products made by 
established manufacturers, judges and juries have been understandably hesitant to 
impose liability.  This hesitation results partly from a reluctance to let a jury pass on 
a product prepared by experts in the field, and partly from a realization that a 
judgment for a particular plaintiff may open the door to many additional claims and 
suits.  Occasionally there has been apprehension that a judgment for the plaintiff will 
necessitate extensive remodeling, or perhaps even removal from the market of some 
much-used and widely-advertised product, with serious consequences to both the 
manufacturer and his employees. 
Dix W. Noel, Manufacturer’s Negligence of Design or Directions for Use of a Product, 71 YALE 
L.J. 816, 816 (1962). 
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Purchasers cannot try out drugs to determine whether they kill or 
cure.  Consumers cannot test the youngster’s cowboy suit or the 
wife’s sweater to see if they are apt to burst into fatal flames.  
Carriers, by land or by sea, cannot experiment with the 
combustibility of goods in transit.  Where experiment or research 
is necessary to determine the presence or the degree of danger, 
the product must not be tried out on the public, nor must the 
public be expected to possess the facilities or the technical 
knowledge to learn for itself of inherent but latent dangers.  The 
claim that a hazard was not foreseen is not available to one who 
did not use foresight appropriate to his enterprise.245 
In short, by the time President Kennedy proposed a bundle of modest 
consumer-protection measures to Congress in 1962,246 ushering in a 
decade of legislative innovation in this sphere,247 a growing number of 
American consumers had learned to “name” their products-related 
injuries and were prepared to “blame” these injuries on manufacturers 
and others within the supply chain.248  And as these consumers came to 
appreciate the possibility of legal redress for a growing array of products-
related injuries, they could consult an increasingly sophisticated and well-
organized pool of plaintiff’s attorneys, who had reasons of their own for 
pursuing products claims. 
 
245.  Dalehite v. United States, 346 U.S. 15, 51–52 (1953) (Jackson, J., dissenting). 
246.  CONSUMERS’ PROTECTION AND INTEREST PROGRAM, supra note 71, at 2. 
247.  See COHEN, supra note 203, at 345–63 (discussing the consumer movement of the 
1960s and 1970s and its origins).  
248.  William L.F. Felstiner, Richard L. Abel & Austin Sarat, The Emergence and 
Transformation of Disputes: Naming, Blaming, Claiming . . ., 15 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 631, 635 
(198081); see also Rabin, supra note 200, at 14 (discussing the “removal of intangible barriers 
to claims consciousness” as a factor in the strict products liability revolution).  Of course, this 
transformation was a gradual one, and the events of the 1950s simply laid a foundation for 
further evolution.  The skepticism with which some early 1960s juries greeted products cases 
underscores that not every product-related injury was tethered to the product’s manufacturer.  
See MARK A. PETERSON & GEORGE L. PRIEST, THE CIVIL JURY: TRENDS IN TRIALS AND 
VERDICTS, COOK COUNTY, ILLINOIS, 1960–1979, at 42–44 (1982) (discussing the low success 
rate of Cook County plaintiffs in products cases during the early 1960s).  But see MICHAEL G. 
SHANLEY & MARK A. PETERSON, COMPARATIVE JUSTICE: CIVIL JURY VERDICTS IN SAN 
FRANCISCO AND COOK COUNTIES, 1959–1980, at 54–55 (1983) (noting the high success rate 
among early 1960s products-liability plaintiffs in San Francisco).  For an example of burgeoning 
claim consciousness within a particular milieu, see RANDOLPH E. BERGSTROM, COURTING 
DANGER: INJURY AND LAW IN NEW YORK CITY, 1870–1910, at 191–95 (1992) (attributing an 
increase in personal-injury lawsuits in New York City in the late 1800s and early 1900s to 
greater claim awareness among plaintiffs). 
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B. The Rise of Sophisticated Plaintiffs’ Counsel 
Personal injury lawyers, like attorneys generally, gravitated toward 
professional associations in the post-World War II era.249  In 1946, eleven 
plaintiffs’ workers’ compensation attorneys formed the National 
Association of Claimants’ Compensation Attorneys, or NACCA.250  This 
organization soon expanded to serve the entire plaintiffs’ personal-injury 
bar.251  By 1956 the NACCA claimed 8,300 members across forty-four 
state branches and affiliates, and its flagship publication, the NACCA 
Law Journal, had a circulation of around 10,000.252   
The law journal represented part of the NACCA’s larger educational 
mission.  It and another publication produced by the organization, the 
NACCA News Letter, informed readers of recent appellate opinions and 
lucrative jury verdicts, and offered tips on pleading, discovery, and trial 
techniques.253  To similar effect were educational tours of the nation by 
some of the leaders of the organization, most notably Melvin Belli.254  The 
San Francisco attorney and author of the multi-volume series Modern 
Trials255 estimated in 1954 that over the preceding four years, he had 
addressed audiences in all but three states.256  Also, each year the 
NACCA held an annual convention and pre-convention that functioned 
as a networking session, teaching seminar, and call to arms.257  Nearly 
 
249.  Membership in the American Bar Association also swelled during this period.  The 
ABA’s membership rose from 34,134 as of July 1, 1945, Report of the Special Committee on 
Membership, 71 ANN. REP. A.B.A. 246, 246 (1946), to more than 100,000 in 1961, Report of the 
Standing Committee on Membership, 86 ANN. REP. A.B.A. 533, 533 (1961). 
250.  RICHARD S. JACOBSON & JEFFREY R. WHITE, DAVID V. GOLIATH: ATLA AND 
THE FIGHT FOR EVERYDAY JUSTICE 8–11 (2004); Thomas F. Lambert, Jr., Editorial, 
NACCA—Rumor and Reflection, 18 NACCA L.J. 25, 26–27 (1956); see also WITT, supra note 
9, at 240–46 (summarizing the history of the NACCA).  In 1960, the NACCA changed its name 
to the National Association of Claimants’ Counsel of America.  Id. at 242.  In 1964, it changed 
its name again, this time to the American Trial Lawyers Association.  Id.  Today, the 
organization is known as the American Association for Justice.  
251.  Lambert, supra note 250, at 27–28.  
252.  JACOBSON & WHITE, supra note 250, at 23; Lambert, supra note 250, at 27–28.  The 
organization would continue to grow.  By 1966, it claimed approximately 20,000 members.  
William E. Knepper, About Tomorrow’s Tort Trends, 18 SYRACUSE L. REV. 1, 1 (1966). 
253.  See Lambert, supra note 250, at 30.  
254.  WITT, supra note 9, at 241–42. 
255.  For discussions of Belli and his work during this period, see Marshall A. Bernstein 
& Robert M. Landis, Modern Trials by Melvin Belli, 104 U. PA. L. REV. 129 (1956) (book 
review); Joseph A. Page, Roscoe Pound, Melvin Belli, and the Personal-Injury Bar: The Tale of 
an Odd Coupling, 26 T.M. COOLEY L. REV. 637 (2009).   
256.  Robert Wallace, The King of Torts, LIFE, Oct. 18, 1954, at 71, 80.  
257.  See WITT, supra note 9, at 241–43 (describing these conventions). 
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verbatim transcripts of these proceedings were stitched together into 
book form and made available for purchase.258 
One of the NACCA’s priorities involved products-liability reform, 
and in particular, elimination of the privity requirement.259  The NACCA 
fostered in its members a sense that by taking products-liability cases and 
arguing for doctrinal change, they could do good while doing well.  
Arnold Elkind, a prominent NACCA member,260 summarized both the 
altruistic and the selfish reasons for bringing products cases in a speech to 
the American Bar Association’s Section on Insurance, Negligence and 
Compensation Law in 1957.261  Elkind told his audience that “there is a 
public service element involved.  There is the satisfaction that by your 
lawsuit you are protecting consumer [sic], and frequently such a result 
obtains even though the lawsuit is unsuccessful.”262  Also, and probably of 
at least equal significance: 
On the practical side, we have found that the recoveries in such 
lawsuits represent satisfactory compensation for damage 
sustained more frequently than in the average case.  We believe 
that this is so because first, there is usually absolutely no question 
of contributory negligence; secondly, there is a dramatic contrast 
between the innocent plaintiff and the profit-hungry 
manufacturer.  If pressed, I would have to admit that in the 
capably tried products liability case there is probably an element 
 
258.  E.g., TRIAL AND TORT TRENDS (Melvin M. Belli ed., 1956). 
259.  See, e.g., Thomas F. Lambert, Jr., Editorial, Touchstones of Tort Liability, 24 
NACCA L.J. 25, 25–26 (1959). 
260.  Elkind would later helm the National Commission on Product Safety.  Eric Pace, 
A.B. Elkind, A Lawyer, Panel Chief and Writer, 80, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 23, 1996, at B10.  
261.  Arnold B. Elkind, Reflections of a Plaintiff’s Lawyer on Manufacturers’ Liability 
Cases, 1957 A.B.A. SEC. INS. NEGL. & COMPENSATION L. PROC. 50. 
262.  Id. at 53.  In their attractiveness to plaintiffs’ lawyers, products-liability cases might 
be contrasted with slip-and-falls—frequently identified as least-loved component of a lawyer’s 
caseload.  E.g., Robert G. Begam, Slip and Fall, in AMERICAN TRIAL LAWYERS ASSOCIATION 
(FORMERLY NACCA) NINETEENTH ANNUAL CONVENTION 1965, at 674, 674 (Jean Martin 
ed., 1966) (“The ‘slip and fall’ is the Cinderella of torts, and the stepchild of personal injury 
litigation.  It is the case that can’t be settled, except for nuisance value, and which can’t be won 
if tried.  Therefore, it is the case that no lawyer wants.”); Thomas F. Lambert, Jr., From the 
Editor’s Scratch Pad, NACCA NEWS LETTER (Boston, Mass.), May 1964, at 99, 99 (“There is 
a wearisome sameness in slip-&-fall cases, & after a while experienced trial lawyers can work 
them up by a kind of genetic awareness.  But they remain important not only because of their 
recurrence (they rank next to automobile accidents in incidence), but because they can be 
singularly tough cases to win.”). 
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of penal damages which enters into the deliberations of the jury in 
fixing compensation.263 
Other NACCA presentations also stressed the lucrative possibilities 
presented by products cases.264  Attendees at the 1958 NACCA annual 
convention, for example, were advised of a recent Missouri decision in a 
products-liability matter, “a wonderful case” that, the speaker advised, 
was  
interesting on the damages point, too, because they gave an award 
of $85,000 to a woman claimant.  And the court entered a 
remittitur and sliced her down to $65,000.  But we have been 
advised that, even as reduced to $65,000, it is the largest award 
sustained for a woman claimant in Missouri.265   
Three conventions later, a speaker reminded attendees that “products 
liability cases today, properly prepared, are bringing among the highest 
of damage awards.”266  Data bore out this assertion; just as the California 
Supreme Court was handing down its Greenman decision,267 a report on 
jury verdicts calculated an average verdict of $25,879 in products-liability 
cases in which the plaintiffs had prevailed, as compared to an average 
plaintiff’s verdict of $11,473 in personal-injury cases generally.268  
 
263.  Elkind, supra note 261, at 53. 
264.  In emphasizing the large awards issued in a handful of products cases, these speakers 
may have deliberately or inadvertently sidestepped the fact that products cases could be a tough 
sell to juries.  See PETERSON & PRIEST, supra note 248, at 42–44 (discussing plaintiffs’ poor 
winning percentage in products-liability trials in Cook County, Illinois during the 1960s and 
1970s, but also noting the large judgments that plaintiffs sometimes received in these cases). 
265.  Thomas F. Lambert, Jr., Torts, Prospects and Retrospects, in NACCA TWELFTH 
ANNUAL CONVENTION 1958, at 1, 9 (The Convention Comm. ed., 1958). 
266.  Louis R. Frumer, Recent Product Liability Highlights, in NACCA FIFTEENTH 
ANNUAL CONVENTION 1961, at 417, 417 (1962).  These cases were not necessarily cheap to 
prosecute.  One attorney estimated in 1969 that the costs incurred by a plaintiff in a mine-run 
products case, independent of legal fees, normally exceeded $5,000.  NAT’L COMM’N ON 
PRODUCT SAFETY, HEARINGS 488 (1970) (statement of James J. Reidy). 
267.  Greenman v. Yuba Power Products, Inc., 377 P.2d 897 (Cal. 1963). 
268.  Wallace E. Sedgwick, Products Liability: Trial Problems in Warranty Cases, 30 INS. 
COUNS. J. 616, 616 (1963).  A study of Chicago jury verdicts in tort cases tried during this time 
frame also revealed higher average verdicts in products-liability lawsuits than in any other class 
of tort suits.  PETERSON & PRIEST, supra note 248, at 24–26.  But see SHANLEY & PETERSON, 
supra note 248, at 18 (describing products-liability lawsuits as “modest-payoff” cases for 
plaintiffs in San Francisco courts, based on a study of jury verdicts rendered in that city between 
1960 and 1979).  Shanley and Peterson do observe, however, that “[u]nlike other types of cases, 
product liability suits always had a few very large awards,” even in the early 1960s.  Id. at 54. 
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The NACCA’s publications, training curriculum, networking 
opportunities, and other offerings sought to help members overcome the 
practical issues associated with recognizing and trying products cases.  In 
the 1950s and early 1960s, appellate decisions that chipped away at privity 
requirements in warranty cases received close attention in the NACCA 
Law Journal.269  Annual meetings commonly featured sessions in which 
attorneys shared tips on handling products-liability matters.270  Leading 
cases were promoted at these meetings as “wedges” for further doctrinal 
change in the products field.271  Other speakers encouraged plaintiffs’ 
attorneys to pursue novel products-liability claims.  One speech given at 
the NACCA’s annual convention in 1954, The Liability in Tort or 
Warranty of Automobile Manufacturers for the Inherently Dangerous 
Design of Passenger Automobiles, urged attendees to incorporate design-
defect allegations into their automobile-accident cases.272  “As lawyers, 
our inquiry in automobile accident cases has been directed toward 
determining the cause of the accident,” the speaker advised, “to the 
exclusion of the equally pertinent question as to whether the injuries may 
have resulted from the design of the vehicle in which our client was riding 
in addition to the fact of the collision.”273  A few years later, the 
organization initiated a products-liability “exchange” whereby members 
could share pleadings, briefs, and information regarding experts and 
individual products.274  In launching the exchange, the NACCA’s 
 
269.  E.g., Thomas F. Lambert, Jr., Comments on Recent Important Personal Injury (Tort) 
Cases, 25 NACCA L.J. 47, 84–91 (1960) (discussing B.F. Goodrich Co. v. Hammond, 269 F.2d 
501 (10th Cir. 1959)); id. at 94–95 (discussing Peterson v. Lamb Rubber Co., 343 P.2d 261 (Cal. 
1960)). 
270.  E.g., Products Liability, in NACCA TWELFTH ANNUAL CONVENTION 1958, supra 
note 265, at 290, 305 (1958) (comments of Melvin Belli) (encouraging plaintiffs’ attorneys to 
plead several causes of action in products-liability cases, as they were “on the frontier of 
something new”); see also TRIAL AND TORT TRENDS: 1957 BELLI SEMINAR 86–89 (Melvin M. 
Belli ed., 1958) (relating a free-ranging discussion about products liability among several 
NACCA attorneys); TRIAL AND TORT TRENDS: 1958 BELLI  SEMINAR 50–57 (Melvin M. Belli 
ed., 1959) (discussing warranty cases). 
271.  Products Liability, supra note 270, at 308 (comments of Melvin Belli). 
272.  Harold A. Katz, The Liability in Tort or Warranty of Automobile Manufacturers for 
the Inherently Dangerous Design of Passenger Automobiles, in TRIAL AND TORT TRENDS: THE 
1955 NACCA CLEVELAND CONVENTION PROCEEDINGS 903 (Melvin M. Belli ed., 1956). 
273.  Id. at 904. 
274.  Paul D. Rheingold, NACCA Products Liability Exchange, in NACCA SIXTEENTH 
ANNUAL CONVENTION 1962, at 359, 359–64 (1963); Alfred S. Julien, President’s Column, 
NACCA NEWS LETTER (Boston, Mass.), Sept. 1958, at 1, 2 (discussing the creation of the 
products-liability exchange). 
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president advised the organization’s members that “no one need ever 
again feel alone in his professional tasks in the tort field.”275 
This increasingly well-organized plaintiff’s personal-injury bar helped 
catalyze and capitalize upon the caselaw breakthroughs of the early 
1960s.276  Attorneys increasingly framed their products cases with an eye 
toward prompting doctrinal change.  For example, Martin Itzikman, the 
attorney who tried the Henningsen case for the plaintiffs, perceived in the 
matter an opportunity to make new law.277  Working toward this same 
goal, Bernard Chazen, an NACCA member who argued the Henningsen 
appeal for the plaintiffs, incorporated within the plaintiffs’ opening 
appellate brief excerpts from both the Prosser and the Harper and James 
treatises in which the authors criticized a rigid privity requirement in 
warranty cases.278  Then, when the New Jersey Supreme Court sided with 
the Henningsen plaintiffs,279 the NACCA’s publications arm immediately 
broadcast the decision to its members.  The July 1960 NACCA News 
Letter announced that 
The New Jersey Supreme Court, on May 9, 1960, in a masterly 
opinion by Justice Francis, handed down a decision which is not 
only a milestone, landmark and turning point in the history of 
products liability but also one of the finest accomplishments of the 
judicial process in our generation.280 
The NACCA Law Journal similarly described Henningsen as “a 
milestone, turning point and breakthrough in the law of products 
liability.”281  Later that year, Chazen and another attorney who also 
worked on the Henningsen appeal told attendees at the NACCA’s annual 
convention that the opinion was “[l]ike a new star in the skies.”282  
 
275.  Julien, supra note 274, at 2.  
276.  See Knepper, supra note 252, at 2 (discussing the efforts of the plaintiffs’ bar during 
this period). 
277.  Interview with Martin Itzikman, Jan. 9, 2014; Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc., 
161 A.2d 69, 72 (N.J. 1960). 
278.  Brief for Plaintiffs as Cross-Appellants 18–21, Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, 
Inc., 161 A.2d 69 (1960) (No. A-185-58); HARPER & JAMES, supra note 100, § 28.16; PROSSER, 
supra note 75, § 84. 
279.  Henningsen, 161 A.2d at 102. 
280.  Thomas F. Lambert, Jr., From the Editor’s Scratch Pad, NACCA NEWS LETTER 
(Boston, Mass.), July 1960, at 3, 3. 
281.  Lambert, supra note 269, at 96. 
282.  Nathan Baker & Bernard Chazen, The Henningsen Case: A Landmark in Products 
Liability, in NACCA FOURTEENTH ANNUAL CONVENTION 1960, at 588 (1961). 
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Armed with Henningsen, plaintiffs’ attorneys filed an unprecedented 
number of products-liability actions across the nation.283  As early as 1961, 
a former NACCA president said that the field was “widening so rapidly 
that it is difficult to keep up with the march of citations.”284  By 1963, a 
defense attorney would describe products liability as “the fastest growing, 
the most controversial and probably the most important field in tort law 
and casualty insurance today.”285  On this point, the attorney related the 
findings of a recent study that had detected an uptick in products-liability 
lawsuits.286  The authors of the report attributed this spike to “(1) 
relaxation of the privity requirement in many jurisdictions, and (2) 
increased awareness and use of the breach of warranty cause of action.”287  
Plaintiffs’ lawyers redoubled their efforts after the Greenman decision 
and the promulgation of §402A, as the products-liability terrain shifted 
away from a warranty framework and toward a more “pure” tort-law 
approach.288  The overlapping nature of warranty and tort in the products-
liability context encouraged these attorneys to dangle §402A bait in front 
of courts that already had bit on warranty.  After all, it cost very little to 
allege an additional theory of recovery in these cases.289  As early as 1958, 
Melvin Belli had advised his colleagues at the NACCA annual 
convention to allege as many as six or seven causes of action in a products 
case: a specific act of negligence, res ipsa loquitur, express and implied 
warranty, “absolute liability,” a violation of any pertinent statute, and a 
failure to warn claim.290  The availability of multiple possible defendants 
 
283.  Jack L. Kroner, Michael Pantaleoni, Leonard J. Koerner & Kenneth A. Mutterperl, 
Torts, 1966 ANN. SURV. AM. L. 209, 224 (1967) (“[I]n the mere six years following Henningsen, 
over 200 decisions in more than thirty states have adopted strict liability.” (footnotes omitted)).  
284.  Alfred S. Julien, Trial Techniques, in NACCA FIFTEENTH ANNUAL CONVENTION 
1961, at 403, 403 (1962). 
285.  Sedgwick, supra note 268, at 616. 
286.  Id. 
287.  Id. 
288.  JACOBSON & WHITE, supra note 250, at 98–99 (discussing the ubiquity of NACCA 
members in lobbying courts to adopt strict products liability). 
289.  See Products Liability, supra note 270, at 305 (comments of Melvin Belli) (discussing 
the strategy of pleading a products-liability case). 
290.  Id.; see also TRIAL AND TORT TRENDS: 1958 BELLI SEMINAR, supra note 270, at 
50−51 (also relating this presentation).  Tellingly, Belli did not include a design-defect claim 
within this mix, underscoring its marginal status as of that time.  Cf. Kenneth A. Parker, 
Lawrence S. Horn, Howard P. King & Edward J. Trieber, Torts, 1967 ANN. SURV. AM. L. 191, 
217 (1968) (observing that design-defect cases are “still predicated upon the theory of 
negligence” and that there was a “low rate of recovery in this area of products liability law”); 
Kroner et al., supra note 283, at 210 (“As a practical matter, it is probably a good deal more 
difficult to convince a judge to permit a jury to decide a design issue, as distinguished from a 
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in many products cases also encouraged innovation.  Even where courts 
had not adopted broadened warranty protections, if the plaintiff had 
purchased the offending item the retailer (at a minimum) represented a 
viable defendant under existing law.291  With at least some recovery likely, 
it cost the plaintiff relatively little to add the manufacturer or wholesaler 
as a defendant, and to tack on a strict-liability tort claim as to all of the 
allegedly responsible parties.292  
The discussion above provides a different way of understanding the 
switch to strict products liability.  Academics conceived of products 
liability and defined its contours; judges adopted it.  The prevailing 
narrative ends there.  But the contributions of plaintiffs and their 
attorneys also must be acknowledged, since they provided the lifeblood 
for this transformation in the law.  Without their cases, academics and 
judges would have little motivation to innovate, and no material with 
which to work.  And while it is easy to assume that plaintiffs and their 
attorneys will rally around every liability-enhancing reform—an “if you 
build it, they will come” approach to doctrinal change—this is not in fact 
the case.  Plaintiffs do not appreciate each and every cause of action that 
may arise,293 and may abandon even well-recognized torts.294  Likewise, 
attorneys may turn their backs on or decline to cultivate causes of action 
that do not appear to be especially lucrative.295  In this respect, the 
proliferation of strict products liability may owe as much to its literal 
 
construction issue, and to get a jury to decide a design issue against a defendant, because of the 
relatively esoteric nature of the question . . . .”). 
291.  See Lambert, supra note 269, at 97–98. 
292.  See Graham L. Fricke, Personal Injury Damages in Products Liability, 6 VILL. L. 
REV. 1, 1–2 (1960). 
293.  See DEBORAH R. HENSLER ET AL., COMPENSATION FOR ACCIDENTAL INJURIES 
IN THE UNITED STATES 121–23 (1991) (finding a marked difference in claiming tendencies 
between persons injured in automobile accidents on the one hand, and persons injured in 
different circumstances on the other); Marc Galanter, Real World Torts: An Antidote to 
Anecdote, 55 MD. L. REV. 1093, 1099–103 (1996); Michael J. Saks, Do We Really Know 
Anything About the Behavior of the Tort Litigation System—And Why Not?, 140 U. PA. L. REV. 
1147, 1183–86 (1992) (reviewing several studies regarding injury awareness and claiming 
patterns among prospective and actual plaintiffs). 
294.  See generally Kyle Graham, Why Torts Die, 35 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 359 (2008) 
(discussing the disappearance of various tort theories due to abolition, abandonment, or other 
reasons). 
295.  See Joanna Shepherd, Uncovering the Silent Victims of the American Medical 
Liability System, 67 VAND. L. REV. 151, 154 (2014) (discussing the damages threshold under 
which plaintiffs’ attorneys, per their survey responses, will not accept a medical-malpractice 
case). 
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value, from the perspective of attorneys, as to its expressive value, in the 
minds of judges.  
At the same time, not all mid-century products lawsuits placed equal 
pressure on existing doctrine.  Some types of cases made the argument 
for a strict-liability approach better than others did.  The next section of 
this Article discusses another way to view the products-liability 
revolution, as a practical response to the challenges presented by 
particular case tropes that appeared often at mid-century, if not today. 
IV. THE PRACTICAL NARRATIVE:  
“BOTTLE CASES” AND THEIR DISCONTENTS 
In hindsight, it seems odd that courts adopted strict products liability 
as quickly as they did, given the relative rarity of these cases at the time 
of this transition.  According to one study, between 1955 and 1970, 
products liability and malpractice cases, combined, amounted to only 
1.6% of all cases heard by a surveyed subset of the nation’s state supreme 
courts.296  Products cases were not especially common at the trial-court 
level, either; one study of case outcomes in Los Angeles Superior Court 
in 1961 and 1962 identified only fifteen warranty cases among the 945 jury 
verdicts rendered in tort matters during that span.297  
That courts nevertheless rushed en masse toward strict liability to the 
consumer suggests that either they perceived products cases as more 
common than they actually were or that they regarded the issues 
presented by these cases as particularly troubling or significant.  On the 
latter point, prevailing explanations of strict products liability’s rise 
attribute judicial enthusiasm for this reform to a sense that it perfectly 
captured the intellectual and social zeitgeist.298  Judges had to sign on, lest 
they were to appear behind the times.299 
Such sentiments probably did influence many judges.  Yet there 
existed another, more practical reason for courts to adopt an unvarnished 
 
296.  Robert A. Kagan, Bliss Cartwright, Lawrence M. Friedman & Stanton Wheeler, The 
Business of State Supreme Courts, 1870–1970, 30 STAN. L. REV. 121, 145 (1977).  
297.  Los Angeles Jury Verdicts for 1961–1962 Summarized, L.A. DAILY J., Mar. 25, 1963, 
at 1.  Per this tabulation, automobile cases dominated the Superior Court’s docket.  Id.  
Warranty cases also were outnumbered by slip-and-falls, malpractice cases, and construction 
accidents.  Id.; see also Jury Verdict Chart for 1954–57 Shows L.A. County Recoveries, 
METROPOLITAN NEWS (L.A.), Apr. 22, 1958, at 1 (showing only a handful of warranty cases 
among Los Angeles Superior Court cases with reported jury verdicts during the 1954–1957 time 
frame).  
298.  Priest, supra note 7, at 518–19. 
299.  Id. at 519. 
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exception to the prevailing negligence rule.  While strict products liability, 
whether framed in tort or in warranty, had much to commend it from a 
broad policy perspective, it also had certain practical (if less 
revolutionary) advantages over a negligence regime, especially as applied 
to certain case types that appeared quite often before mid-century judges.  
Most notably, strict products liability averted the thorny problems that 
could arise with proving a particular defendant’s fault when there existed 
multiple parties in the supply chain and a product that could have been 
compromised anywhere between the points of manufacture and sale.  
This advantage represented an essential component of the reformist 
pitch for strict liability.  Here, consider once again Prosser’s discussion in 
his Assault upon the Citadel article of the specific problems associated 
with applying the negligence rule to products cases.300  In relating his 
concerns, Prosser’s usual talent for drumming up string citations to 
hammer home a point momentarily deserted him.  Prosser cited only one 
case for the proposition that the product’s manufacturer may be outside 
the jurisdiction, and just one other for the principle that the manufacturer 
may be unknown.301  But when it came to the problem of proving 
negligence on the part of a particular defendant in the supply channel, 
Prosser had no trouble producing a hypothetical with a lengthy list of 
citations.302  These cases all involved a single product: glass beverage 
bottles that had exploded, shattered, or chipped.303  
Prosser wisely relied upon breaking bottles to advance his argument 
for strict products liability, as Traynor had done sixteen years earlier in 
his Escola concurrence.304  Bottle lawsuits neatly captured the intractable 
 
300.  Prosser, Assault upon the Citadel, supra note 84, at 1116. 
301.  Id. at 1116 nn.125–26. 
302.  Id. at 1116 n.127. 
303.  Id.  
304.  Escola v. Coca Cola Bottling Co. of Fresno, 150 P.2d 436, 440–44 (Cal. 1944) 
(Traynor, J., concurring); Prosser, Assault upon the Citadel, supra note 84, at 1120.  Likewise, 
Harper and James would rely on exploding bottles as a paradigm example of the problems that 
could be associated with proving a particular defendant’s negligence in a products case.  
HARPER & JAMES, supra note 100, § 28.14.  Other commentators of that era made similar 
observations.  One noted: 
A classic example of the difficulties involved in actions based on negligence is pointed 
up in the exploding bottle claims.  It is quite generally accepted that the almost 
complete impossibility of proving negligence in such suits together with the lack of 
privity of contract upon which to base a breach of warranty action, is responsible for 
the trend towards adoption of the res ipsa loquitur doctrine in many states.  
Gleason, supra note 84, at 117; see also Fleming James, Jr., Products Liability (pt. 1), 34 TEX. 
L. REV. 44, 74–75 (1955) (using exploding-bottle cases as an example of the difficulties 
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problems with negligence doctrine as applied to certain products cases, 
and were common (and factually similar) enough to make these 
shortcomings apparent to a broad audience.  
Though this fact may be difficult to appreciate today, as late as 1969 
the humble glass beverage bottle was described by a National 
Commission on Product Safety official as being among the most 
dangerous of all household products.305  And although Escola v. Coca 
Cola Bottling Company of Fresno306 is the only widely remembered bottle 
case today, these matters once provided courts with a great deal of 
business.307  Stacks of reported cases dealt with the aftermath of a bottle 
that had cracked or exploded.308  In the fifteen years prior to 1963, the 
supreme courts of more than half of the states took up at least one of 
these matters.309  Indeed, bottle cases may have been the most common 
 
associated with connecting a product defect to a particular defendant in the supply chain); 
Robert W. Miller, Manufacturers’ Product Liability Re-Visited, 23 INS. COUNS. J. 175 (1956) 
(discussing numerous bottle cases in connection with a more general examination of products 
liability). 
305.  NAT’L COMM’N ON PRODUCT SAFETY, supra note 266, at 441–42 (testimony of 
Larry A. Schott) (describing the results of a survey of insurance claims involving household 
products, which revealed that glass bottles gave rise to the most claims, by far).  According to 
this official, glass bottles were associated with 150,000 injuries a year, 90,000 of which involved 
children ages 15 or younger.  Id. at 441; see also Paul S. Bergeson, Sally A. Sehring & James R. 
Callison, Pop Bottle Explosions, 238 J. AM. MED. ASS’N 1048, 1049 (1977) (“The problem of 
explosions of carbonated soft drink bottles is an environmental hazard that has not received 
adequate attention in the medical literature but appears to be of substantial magnitude.”). 
306.  150 P.2d 436 (Cal. 1944). 
307.  See Julien, Trial Techniques, supra note 284, at 404 (describing bottle cases as “a real 
staple in products liability”).  
308.  In 1960, Roscoe Pound identified 133 published decisions involving exploding 
bottles, coming from 31 different jurisdictions.  Roscoe Pound, The Problem of the Exploding 
Bottle, 40 B.U. L. REV. 167, 169 (1960); see also Paul D. Kaufman, Torts, 1944 ANN. SURV. AM. 
L. 938, 954 (1946) (“The bottle cases continue without abatement.  Standardization of judicial 
treatment would seem to be indicated.” (footnote omitted)); Lambert, supra note 269, at 99 
(referencing a “floodtide” of bursting-bottle cases); Walter M. Clark, Note, The Applicability 
of the Doctrine of Res Ipsa Loquitur to Cases Involving Bursting Bottles, 1951 WASH. U. L.Q. 
216, 216 (“The past few decades have seen the rise of considerable litigation concerning injuries 
to persons resulting from bursting or exploding bottles.”); C.S. Patrinelis, Annotation, Res Ipsa 
Loquitur as Applied to Bursting of Bottled Beverages, Food Containers, Etc., 4 A.L.R.2d 466 
(1949) (listing bottle cases). 
309.  At least 28 state supreme courts decided at least one injury-by-bottle case during 
this span (with only the last decision listed in jurisdictions entertaining more than one of these 
cases): Alabama (Florence Coca Cola Bottling Co. v. Sullivan, 65 So. 2d 169 (Ala. 1953)); 
Arkansas (Coca-Cola Bottling Co. of Fort Smith, Ark. v. Hicks, 223 S.W.2d 762 (Ark. 1949)); 
California (Zentz v. Coca Cola Bottling Co. of Fresno, 247 P.2d 344 (Cal. 1952)); Colorado 
(Chapman v. Redwine, 370 P.2d 147 (Colo. 1962)); Connecticut (Crisanti v. Cremo Brewing 
Co., 72 A.2d 655 (Conn. 1950)); Delaware (Ciociola v. Del. Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 172 A.2d 
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of all products-liability lawsuits during that era.310  These cases were well 
 
252 (Del. 1961)); Florida (Burkett v. Panama City Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 93 So. 2d 580 (Fla. 
1957)); Kansas (Morrison v. Kan. City Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 263 P.2d 217 (Kan. 1953)); 
Kentucky (Bogie v. Royal Crown Bottling Co. of Danville, 343 S.W.2d 809 (Ky. 1961)); 
Maryland (Joffre v. Canada Dry Ginger Ale, Inc., 158 A.2d 631 (Md. 1960)); Massachusetts 
(Selissen v. Empire Bottling Co., 180 N.E.2d 324 (Mass. 1962)); Michigan (Pattinson v. Coca-
Cola Bottling Co. of Port Huron, 52 N.W.2d 688 (Mich. 1952)); Minnesota (Johnson v. Coca 
Cola Bottling Co. of Willmar, 51 N.W.2d 573 (Minn. 1952)); Mississippi (Johnson v. Coca-Cola 
Bottling Co., 125 So. 2d 537 (Miss. 1960)); Missouri (Maybach v. Falstaff Brewing Corp., 222 
S.W.2d 87 (Mo. 1949)); New Hampshire (Smith v. Coca Cola Bottling Co., 92 A.2d 658 (N.H. 
1952)); New Jersey (Bornstein v. Metro. Bottling Co., 139 A.2d 404 (N.J. 1958)); New York 
(Day v. Grand Union Co., 109 N.E.2d 609 (N.Y. 1952)); North Carolina (Graham v. Winston 
Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 125 S.E.2d 429 (N.C. 1962)); North Dakota (Kuntz v. McQuade, 95 
N.W.2d 430 (N.D. 1959)); Oklahoma (Michel v. Branham, 327 P.2d 440 (Okla. 1958)); Oregon 
(Robertson v. Coca Cola Bottling Co. of Walla Walla, Wash., 247 P.2d 217 (Or. 1952)); 
Pennsylvania (Braccia v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co. of Philadelphia, 157 A.2d 747 (Pa. 1960)); 
South Carolina (Boyd v. Marion Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 126 S.E.2d 178 (S.C. 1962)); 
Tennessee (Coca Cola Bottling Works, Inc., v. Crow, 291 S.W.2d 589 (Tenn. 1956)); Texas 
(Hankins v. Coca Cola Bottling Co., 249 S.W.2d 1008 (Tex. 1952)); West Virginia (Ferrell v. 
Royal Crown Bottling Co. of Charleston, W. Va., 109 S.E.2d 489 (W. Va. 1959)); and Wisconsin 
(Weggeman v. Seven-Up Bottling Co.,  93 N.W.2d 467 (Wis. 1958)). 
310.  To probe this point, a search was conducted of all state supreme court decisions 
issued between January 1, 1955 and December 31, 1959, that have been tagged with West 
Reporter Service Key 313A (Products Liability).  This query returned 87 decisions, two of 
which were discarded on the ground that they did not appear to involve any defective products.  
Notwithstanding the key, some of these decisions were not “true” products-liability cases, in 
that the gravamen of the plaintiff’s claim or claims concerned negligence on the part of a 
product user, rather than a defect in the product itself.  Nevertheless, the products involved in 
these cases provide some indication of the sorts of products-liability claims being pressed at 
that time.  In declining order of frequency with which they appeared, the products associated 
with these cases were: beverage bottles (fifteen cases); automobiles (eight cases); tractors and 
tractor accessories (four cases); mink feed, rifles (three cases each); firearm cartridges, 
liniments (two cases each); antiseptic, a baler, a building truss, carbon tetrachloride, cattle feed, 
a cautery instrument, cement, cement base paint, a chair, cinder blocks, a concrete mixer, 
concrete, concrete slabs, an escalator, feed barrels, fish food, flea repellant, floor finish, a 
furnace, a gas meter, a gas range, gasoline, a glass door, a glass jar, hair dye, a harvester, a house 
trailer, an ice crushing machine, insecticide, a kerosene wallpaper steaming machine, liquefied 
natural gas, lockers, a mixer machine, a perfume bottle, a portable grain elevator, a power 
mower, a refrigerator, sausage, a scaffold, shampoo, a steam pipe, a stepladder, steel, suntan 
lotion, turkey feed, a valve, wood preservative, and an X-ray cable (one case each).  
In an identical search performed on case law issued one decade earlier (i.e., state supreme 
court cases decided between 1945 to 1949), the proportion of bottle cases among the 48 cases 
marked with a Products Liability key (one case appearing twice, due to a petition for rehearing) 
was even more pronounced.  Beverage bottles were involved in fifteen of these cases, as 
compared with automobiles (three cases); pesticide, a water heater (two cases each); an 
abrasive cutting-off wheel, antifreeze, a baler, a beer barrel, carbon tetrachloride, a cosmetic 
box, fungicide, a fur collar, a furnace, a gas heater, glass, hair lacquer, hay, hydrofluoric acid, 
an ice-scoring machine, liquid heat quench, milling machinery, perfume, a portable grain 
elevator, a rail-support hanger, seed corn drier, shampoo, a stove, stove polish, sulphuric acid, 
and a vulcanizing machine (one case each). 
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known among academics and practitioners, too.  Numerous law review 
articles addressed exploding-bottle lawsuits and the problems they 
presented,311 and NACCA seminars often included presentations on how 
to try these matters.312  
Bottle cases were common throughout the early to mid-1900s because 
of a robust claim consciousness of the sort discussed in the prior 
narrative.313  Glass beverage bottles were ubiquitous from the early 1900s, 
when new technologies appeared that allowed for their mass 
manufacture,314 through the 1970s, when they were overtaken first by 
aluminum cans equipped with the novel “pop-top” mechanism,315 and 
later by plastic containers.316  Throughout this span, when one of these 
bottles suddenly ruptured, it was easy for would-be plaintiffs to 
appreciate that they had suffered an injury attributable to an outside 
force rather than their own fault.317  Enough bottles exploded, shattered, 
 
311.  E.g., Will D. Davis, Comment, Liability of Manufacturers of Bottled Beverages, 5 
BAYLOR L. REV. 258 (1953); William E. Night, Let the Bottler Beware!, 21 INS. COUNS. J. 72 
(1954); Pound, supra note 308; Craig Spangenberg, Exploding Bottles, 24 OHIO ST. L.J. 516 
(1963); Alfred L. Steff, Jr., Comment, The Exploding Bottle—Why Not Absolute Liability?, 26 
U. PITT. L. REV. 115 (1964); Leon Whitehurst, Jr., Case Comment, Torts: Res Ipsa Loquitur in 
Exploding Bottle Cases, 1 U. FLA. L. REV. 470, 472 (1948) (“[W]ith each new application of res 
ipsa loquitur the growing majority of American courts move ever nearer to the imposition of 
absolute liability upon the bottler.” (footnote omitted)); Res Ipsa Loquitur—Explosion of 
Bottle, 92 CENT. L.J., 290 (1921); Clark, supra note 308. 
312.  E.g., Products Liability, supra note 270, at 296–99 (comments of Alfred S. Julien); 
see also J. Campbell Palmer III, Advances in Exploding Bottle Cases, NACCA THIRTEENTH 
ANNUAL CONVENTION 1959, at 191, 192–95 (The Convention Comm. ed., 1960). 
313.  See supra Part III.A. 
314.  Machinery that could mass-produce glass bottles was invented in 1907.  U.S. 
CONSUMER PRODUCT SAFETY COMM’N, HAZARD ANALYSIS: BOTTLES FOR CARBONATED 
SOFT DRINKS 1 (1975).  Some of these bottles were “returnable.”  Id.  The cleaning and reuse 
of these bottles subjected them to significant wear-and-tear, making them more prone to 
breakage.  See id.  In 1948, there appeared “nonreturnable” bottles, which avoided the 
problems of reuse, but at a price.  Nonreturnable bottles were made of thinner glass, and may 
have been more likely to explode upon initial use.  Id.  
315.  E.C. Fraze invented a practical pull-top for beverage canisters in 1962.  2 PHAIDON 
DESIGN CLASSICS 592 (2006); Alfonso A. Narvaez, E.C. Fraze, 76; Devised Pull Tab, N.Y. 
TIMES, Oct. 28, 1989, at 11.  This invention (and its successor, the ring top) solved a problem 
that, up to that point, had prevented the widespread use of metal cans as beverage containers. 
316.  Glenn Fowler, N.C. Wyeth, Inventor, Dies at 78; Developed the Plastic Soda Bottle, 
N.Y. TIMES, July 7, 1990, at 12.  Today, soda sold in glass bottles accounts for only two percent 
of all soda sales.  Paul Ziobro, Glass Bottles Lend Pop to Soda Makers, WALL ST. J., June 24, 
2013, at B3. 
317.  Once these cases started to appear, there may have been a “snowball effect,” with 
other would-be plaintiffs and their attorneys becoming conditioned to regard bottlers and 
bottle manufacturers as entities amenable to suit.  Cf. TRISTAN DONOVAN, FIZZ: HOW SODA 
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or chipped to inflict a substantial number of cut fingers and gouged 
eyes,318 but not so many that people appreciated these harms as the price 
paid for a “pause that refreshes.”319  Quite the contrary; these injuries 
seemed completely at odds with the pleasant messages conveyed by 
beverage companies’ omnipresent advertising.320  Finally, the popularity 
and notoriety of a related variety of lawsuit, the “mouse in a bottle” 
adulterated-beverage claim, may have conditioned prospective plaintiffs 
and their lawyers to regard bottlers as entities susceptible to suit in tort.321  
Given these circumstances, people seriously injured by glass bottles 
readily appreciated that they might have a claim and found lawyers to 
take their cases.322  But regardless of whether a plaintiff sued the bottle’s 
manufacturer, the bottler who filled it with a drink, the retailer who sold 
 
SHOOK UP THE WORLD 77–78 (2014) (discussing various types of claims brought against soda 
bottlers, and the bottlers’ response).  One datapoint that suggests that people injured by 
bursting bottles were especially cognizant of the possibility of recovery involves the frequency 
with which these individuals filed insurance claims.  At least in the 1960s, people injured by 
bottles appear to have filed more insurance claims, on a per-injury basis, than people injured 
by other products.  See NAT’L COMM’N ON PRODUCT SAFETY, supra note 266, at 447 
(statement of Larry A. Schott) (discussing how far more insurance claims were filed for injuries 
associated with glass bottles than were filed for injuries associated with power lawn mowers, 
even though the two types of products produced roughly equal injury tolls.). 
318.  E.g., Weggeman v. Seven-Up Bottling Co., 93 N.W.2d 467, 471 (Wis. 1958) 
(referencing a damages demand of $31,537 in an exploding-bottle case where the glass had put 
out a child’s eye); 10 AM. JUR. TRIALS Exploding Bottle Litigation § 3 (1965) (discussing the 
types of injuries that appeared in exploding bottle cases); Morton Mintz, Insurers Report High 
Claims of Injury by Exploding Bottles, WASH. POST, July 30, 1969, at A2 (discussing the injuries 
that children had suffered due to exploding or broken bottles). 
319.  Andrew Dingwall, Exploding Bottles, 11 NACCA L.J. 158, 170 (1953) (“[T]he public 
knows nothing of ‘the idiosyncrasies of glass’ especially with regard to internal damage and 
does not expect to handle beverage bottles with all the tenderness of a new father for his first 
born child.”); see also NAT’L COMM’N ON PRODUCT SAFETY, supra note 266, at 567–68 
(statement of Owens-Illinois, Inc.) (observing that Owens-Illinois bottles were involved in 
approximately twelve billion soft drink and beer bottle “usages” annually between 1965 and 
1968, but the company encountered fewer than ninety bottle claims and lawsuits each year). 
320.  For an example of judicial notice being taken of soda companies’ prolific advertising 
campaigns, see Le Blanc v. Louisiana Coca Cola Bottling Co., 60 So. 2d 873, 874–75 (La. 1952). 
321.  See DONOVAN, supra note 317, at 77–78 (discussing the various types of lawsuits 
alleged against soda bottlers, and the bottlers’ response). 
322.  More speculatively, the abundance of published appellate decisions that involved 
bottle cases also may have owed to particularly aggressive defenses put on in these matters.  A 
plaintiff’s attorney testified before the National Commission on Product Safety in 1969 that the 
defendants in bottle cases “generally don’t settle them,” partially because “it was very difficult 
to prove” these cases—at least, prior to the adoption of strict liability in tort.  NAT’L COMM’N 
ON PRODUCT SAFETY, supra note 266, at 484–85 (testimony of James J. Reidy). 
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the product,323 or some combination of these defendants, she usually had 
a tough row to hoe in proving negligence.324  Even assuming a jurisdiction 
had adopted the MacPherson doctrine, removing privity as an issue in 
most negligence cases,325 the mere fact of a broken or exploding bottle did 
not necessarily spell negligence on the part of the manufacturer, bottler, 
or retailer, either individually or collectively.  Each of these defendants 
could point a finger at the others (or at the plaintiff) as the culpable 
parties, and even a bottle that had been created, cleaned, filled, and 
inspected with care could break or explode for unknown reasons.326  
Many of these bursting-bottle plaintiffs, lacking a clear act of 
negligence to focus upon, sought to rely on res ipsa loquitur as a path 
toward recovery.327  These litigants encountered several difficulties.  The 
offending bottle typically had gone through the hands of several actors as 
part of the supply chain, and the plaintiff herself often had custody of the 
bottle for some time prior to its rupture.  These facts meant a given 
 
323.  Of these possible defendants, bottlers were identified as plaintiffs’ “prime target” in 
bottle cases.  Exploding Bottle Litigation, supra note 318, § 27.  This same resource described 
suits against bottle manufacturers as rare, due to jurisdictional issues that sometimes appeared, 
and difficulties associated with proving the manufacturer’s fault.  Id. § 14.  As for retailers, “[a]s 
a tactical matter a plaintiff suing the bottler on a negligence theory will often join the retailer 
as a defendant on a warranty theory,” for reasons including the fact that “[t]he memory of the 
retailer’s clerks . . . is often greatly improved under these circumstances.”  Id. 
324.  Gleason, supra note 84, at 117; Clark, supra note 308, at 216 (“In order to recover 
from the manufacturer, a person so injured is confronted with a serious proof problem.”).  
325.  For a sample of the many cases that expressly rejected a privity requirement in bottle 
cases sounding in negligence, as opposed to warranty, see Macres v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 
287 N.W. 922, 925–26 (Mich. 1939); Stolle v. Anheuser-Busch, 271 S.W. 497, 499 (Mo. 1925); 
Smith v. Peerless Glass Co., 181 N.E. 576, 577 (N.Y. 1932); Grant v. Graham Chero-Cola 
Bottling Co., 97 S.E. 27, 28–29 (N.C. 1918). 
326.  See Dingwall, supra note 319, at 167–70 (discussing the difficulties associated with 
detecting a defective bottle).  Most plaintiffs’ attorneys focused blame on the soda bottler, 
rather than the manufacturer of the bottle or the retailer.  Products Liability, supra note 270, 
at 296–97 (comments of Alfred S. Julien).  Among the errors attributed to the bottler, it was 
believed that methods used to clean returnable bottles introduced “chattersleek,” a scoring of 
their interiors that might make them prone to explode upon reuse.  Id.; see also 33 AM. JUR. 
PROOF OF FACTS 2D, Due Care in Handling Bottle Containing Carbonated Beverage § 1 (1983) 
(discussing the various ways in which the integrity of a glass bottle can become compromised); 
Dingwall, supra note 319, at 167–69 (same). 
327.  The doctrine of res ipsa loquitur permits an inference (or, in some jurisdictions), a 
presumption of negligence upon the satisfaction of three conditions:  
(1) [T]he accident must be of a kind which ordinarily does not occur in the absence of 
someone’s negligence; (2) it must be caused by an agency or instrumentality within 
the exclusive control of the defendant; (3) it must not have been due to any voluntary 
action or contribution on the part of the plaintiff. 
PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS, supra note 85, § 42. 
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defendant lacked the “exclusive control” of the harm-causing 
instrumentality that courts traditionally demanded as a prerequisite for 
application of res ipsa loquitur.328  
Unsurprisingly, some judges tinkered with existing doctrine to 
provide a remedy, or at least a jury, to sympathetic plaintiffs.329  Writing 
in 1960, Roscoe Pound identified seven different approaches courts had 
taken to the negligence issue in exploding bottle cases.330  Several of these 
approaches liberalized res ipsa loquitur doctrine to allow plaintiffs an 
inference of negligence, at least against the bottler, notwithstanding the 
lack of exclusive control.331  One case cluster allowed the plaintiff a res 
ipsa loquitur inference provided that she introduced some evidence that 
indicated the bottle had not been abused or mishandled after it left the 
defendant’s hands.332  Other courts allowed the plaintiff to invoke res ipsa 
loquitur if she showed that other bottles filled by the bottler had exploded 
around the time of the accident in question.333  And still another approach 
allowed a plaintiff to rely upon res ipsa loquitur merely upon establishing 
that her bottle had exploded, “since reasonable men know that when 
bottles are properly manufactured and filled, they do not blow up.”334  
The increasingly aggressive application of res ipsa loquitur in bottle 
cases335 meant that by mid-century, many observers understood that some 
 
328.  Id.; Mark Shain, Res Ipsa Loquitur, 17 S. CAL. L. REV. 187, 192 (1944). 
329.  See Johnson v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 125 So. 2d 537, 541–42 (Miss. 1960) (relating 
a perceived transition toward liberalized application of res ipsa loquitur in bottle cases); 
Evangelio v. Metro. Bottling Co., 158 N.E.2d 342, 346 & n.3 (Mass. 1959) (same); James, supra 
note 304, at 76–77 (same); Patrinelis, supra note 308, at 467–68 (same). 
330.  Pound, supra note 308, at 169–70. 
331.  Id.; see also Dix W. Noel, Manufacturers of Products: The Drift Toward Strict 
Liability, 24 TENN. L. REV. 963, 978 (1957) (discussing the trend toward application of 
liberalized versions of res ipsa loquitur in exploding-bottle cases). 
332.  E.g., Thompson v. Burke Eng’g Sales Co., 106 N.W.2d 351, 353–54 (Iowa 1960) 
(discussing this line of precedent); Florence Coca Cola Bottling Co. v. Sullivan, 65 So. 2d 169, 
175 (Ala. 1953) (stating that the “general trend” in exploding-bottle cases was to adopt this 
approach); see also James, supra note 304, at 76–77 (“Today . . . a majority of courts seem 
willing to invoke res ipsa loquitur in bursting bottle cases, where a proper foundation is laid.”). 
333.  E.g., Merch. v. Columbia Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 51 S.E.2d 749, 751 (S.C. 1949); see 
also Patrinelis, supra note 308, at 479 (discussing this approach). 
334.  Ford Motor Co. v. Fish, 335 S.W.2d 713, 718 (Ark. 1960).  A few courts, but only a 
few, also authorized the use of res ipsa loquitur to generate an inference of negligence against 
multiple defendants in the supply chain.  E.g., Nichols v. Nold, 258 P.2d 317, 323 (Kan. 1953); 
Loch v. Confair, 93 A.2d 451, 454 (Pa. 1953). 
335.  See, e.g., Riecke v. Anheuser-Busch Brewing Ass’n, 227 S.W. 631, 632 (Mo. Ct. App. 
1921) (affirming the use of res ipsa loquitur in an exploding-bottle case where the defendant 
bought “only the highest grade of bottles,” part of each order was tested before purchase, the 
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courts were applying negligence in name only in these matters, and 
justifying this sleight-of-hand on public-policy grounds.336  One such 
commentator, summing up the state of the law in 1960, wrote that “it 
seems obvious from the talk of public policy which constantly recurs in 
opinions, that courts are designedly imposing strict liability as a means of 
ensuring that soft drink manufacturers take consummate protections.”337  
But these reforms did not assist every plaintiff in a bottle case.  Even 
under liberalized regimes, many plaintiffs could not show that the bottle 
in question had been handled reasonably carefully since it left the 
bottler’s hands.338  Most bottle cases therefore remained difficult to prove 
when grounded in negligence.339  In these situations, the law of warranty 
provided the plaintiffs’ only hope.340  But many courts continued to insist 
 
bottles’ mold also was tested prior to its use in the manufacture of bottles, the substance (Bevo) 
poured into the bottles was “not naturally an explosive substance,” and the case before the 
court “was the first time that a bottle had ever exploded.”). 
336.  See Night, supra note 311, at 73 (“[I]t is apparent that the present judicial trend is 
toward absolute liability in bottle cases.”); Whitehurst, supra note 311, at 472 (“[W]ith each 
new application of res ipsa loquitur the growing majority of American courts move nearer to 
the imposition of absolute liability upon the bottler.”). 
337.  Fricke, supra note 292, at 32 (footnote omitted).  Four years earlier, a similar 
observation had been made regarding judicial handling of a close cousin of the exploding-bottle 
line of cases, the mouse-in-a-bottle case: 
New York, for what appears to be the first time, applied res ipsa to a foreign-object-
in-a-bottle case.  The facts were typical.  The bottling company’s evidence indicated 
that a mouse couldn’t possibly have been in a bottle of coke, but there it was just the 
same.  This case is a good illustration of the way strict liability is extending its grip in 
the area of manufacturer’s liability.  Courts more and more are taking the attitude 
that industry must pay its way, regardless of “fault” in the conventional sense.  Once 
res ipsa is applied in a bottle case, for instance, the bottler might as well give up the 
ghost.  If he introduces no evidence, he is sure to lose.  If, on the other hand, he 
introduces evidence that his washing, capping, and inspection systems are excellent, 
he will probably lose anyway because the jury will conclude that, if the precautions 
are so high grade, some employee must have erred in applying them.  It is true for all 
practical purposes, therefore, that res ipsa in such cases “has ceased to be a procedure 
for proving actual negligence to sustain liability, and has become a means of 
establishing a basis for liability irrespective of negligence.” 
John V. Thornton & Harold F. McNiece, Torts, 1955 ANN. SURV. AM. L., 433, 442 (1956) 
(footnotes omitted) (quoting C.A. Peairs, Jr., The God in the Machine: A Study in Precedent, 
29 B.U. L. Rev. 37, 65 (1949)). 
338.  E.g., Joffre v. Canada Dry Ginger Ale, Inc., 158 A.2d 631, 636–37 (Md. 1960); 
Trust v. Arden Farms Co., 324 P.2d 583, 585–86 (Cal. 1958); Burkett v. Panama City Coca-Cola 
Bottling Co. 93 So. 2d 580, 582 (Fla. 1957). 
339.  See Julien, Trial Techniques, supra note 284, at 404 (describing bottle cases as “a real 
challenge”).  
340.  See, e.g., Greenman v. Yuba Power Products, Inc., 377 P.2d 897 (Cal. 1963) (the 
plaintiff brought a breach of warranty and a negligence claims). 
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upon privity in bottle cases when a breach of warranty was alleged, a 
position that tightly circumscribed the universe of viable plaintiffs and 
plausible defendants.341  
The ongoing post-World War II trend toward lifting the privity 
requirement in warranty cases involving food thus presented an 
opportunity for plaintiffs in bottle cases, and a challenge for judges.  
Bottle cases stood at a crucial analogical pivot, halfway between food and 
all other consumer products.  On the one hand, increasingly widespread 
rejection of a privity requirement in adulterated food cases begged the 
question of why defective food containers should be treated any 
differently.  Why should the plaintiff’s recovery depend upon whether a 
soda bottle chipped on the inside, depositing glass shards into a drink, or 
on the outside, sending the shards into the plaintiff’s hand?342  On the 
other hand, if courts accepted this analogy and lifted the privity 
requirement for food containers, too, such a holding contained no 
apparent limiting principle.  If food containers, why not automobiles, 
space heaters, or any other consumer good?  In the 1950s, a few courts 
leapt into the breach, rejecting a privity requirement for warranty claims 
in bottle cases.343  It was around this time that proposals for strict products 
 
341.  E.g., Ciociola v. Del. Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 172 A.2d 252, 257 (Del. 1961) 
(rejecting a plaintiff’s claim in a bottle case on lack-of-privity grounds); Prince v. Smith, 119 
S.E.2d 923, 925 (N.C. 1961) (same); Wolfe v. S.H. Wintman Co., 139 A.2d 84, 85–86 (R.I. 1958) 
(same); Burke v. Associated Coca-Cola Bottling Plants, Inc., 181 N.Y.S.2d 800, 801 (N.Y. App. 
Div. 1959) (same); see also Exploding Bottle Litigation, supra note 318, § 1 (observing that in 
exploding-bottle cases, “the principal legal problem [for the plaintiff] is the requirement of 
privity between the plaintiff and the defendant”); Hursh, supra note 100, at 44–45 (discussing 
the privity rule).  Where the plaintiff had purchased the bottle, she typically could sue the 
retailer for breach of an implied warranty.  Exploding Bottle Litigation, supra note 318, § 1.  
But non-purchasing plaintiffs lacked privity with even the retailer, and the bottler, not the 
retailer, was generally understood as the party most to blame for an exploding bottle.  Products 
Liability, supra note 270, at 296–97 (comments of Alfred S. Julien).  An additional problem 
that vexed plaintiffs in some states involved judicial limitation of implied warranties to the 
contents of a container, as opposed to the contents and container combined.  See Exploding 
Bottle Litigation, supra note 318, § 1 (discussing this issue in the context of exploding-bottle 
lawsuits). 
342.  Canada Dry Bottling Co. of Fla. v. Shaw, 118 So. 2d 840, 843 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 
1960), disapproved by Foley v. Weaver Drugs, Inc., 177 So. 2d 221, 222, 225–27 (Fla. 1965) 
(drawing this analogy); see also Note, Strict Products Liability and the Bystander, supra note 
102, at 929–30 (making this argument); Richard G. Wilson, Products Liability: The Protection 
of the Producing Enterprise (pt. 2), 43 CALIF. L. REV. 809, 821 (1955) (“[I]t is not self-evident 
that a marketer of a bottle which explodes should be held to bear less risks . . . than a marketer 
of a bottle which turns out to contain a foreign substance.”). 
343.  E.g., Shaw, 118 So. 2d at 843; Nichols v. Nold, 258 P.2d 317, 323 (Kan. 1953); 
Mahoney v. Shaker Square Beverages, Inc., 102 N.E.2d 281, 289 (Ohio Ct. Com. Pl. 1951). 
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liability in tort began to coalesce into a workable rule, through the 
Restatement (Second) of Torts § 402A.344  
Would some variation of § 402A have come about, even without 
bursting-bottle lawsuits?  Almost certainly.  Thought leaders like Prosser 
and Traynor had lobbied for a strict-liability approach to products 
problems, grounded in tort, for more than twenty years.345  Bottle cases 
only typified, rather than exhausted, their concerns.346  And yet these 
cases deserve more than the obscurity in which they have languished.  
Each time a bottle case appeared, from the 1940s through the 1960s,347 it 
reminded even the most unimaginative judges of the nagging problems 
created by the prevailing rules.348  The recurrence of these disputes, 
meanwhile, allowed courts to use them as an ongoing experiment with 
negligence doctrine, trying to blaze a path around the problems of proof 
associated with these cases (and other, similar case types as well).349  In 
the end, these efforts gravitated toward a negligence approach in name 
that imposed strict liability in fact.350  Judges who surveyed this record 
likely found that it justified their more straightforward embrace of strict 
liability, whether couched in warranty or in tort.351 
Meanwhile, even if bottle cases did not prompt § 402A, judging from 
Dean Prosser’s pointed reference to bottle cases in his Assault upon the 
Citadel article, they likely informed the approach toward product defects 
that he promoted in the Restatement.352  Much ink has been spilled over 
 
344.  RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (1965); see supra text accompanying 
notes 150–54. 
345.  See supra text accompanying notes 83–86.  
346.  See supra text accompanying notes 84–93, 302–12; see also Rabin, supra note 200, 
at 9. 
347.  The California Supreme Court, for example, heard three more bottle cases during 
the interval between Escola and Greenman.  Trust v. Arden Farms Co., 324 P.2d 583 (Cal. 
1958); Zentz v. Coca Cola Bottling Co. of Fresno, 247 P.2d 344 (Cal. 1952); Gordon v. Aztec 
Brewing Co., 203 P.2d 522 (Cal. 1949).  These cases represented a substantial subset of all 
products cases heard by that court over this span.  See also Simmons v. Rhodes & Jamieson, 
Ltd., 293 P.2d 26 (Cal. 1956) (cement); Rose v. Melody Lane of Wilshire, 247 P.2d 335 (Cal. 
1952) (collapsing stool installed at a restaurant).  
348.  See supra notes 300–04, 323–28 and accompanying text. 
349.  See supra notes 329–34 and accompanying text. 
350.  See supra notes 283–92 and accompanying text. 
351.  Indeed, bottle cases had served as a testing ground for doctrinal reforms well before 
the adoption of strict products liability in tort.  See Hewitt v. Gen. Tire & Rubber Co., 284 P.2d 
471, 475 (Utah 1955) (likening the exploding tire in the matter before the court to the exploding 
bottles addressed in other cases, and concluding that the present case should be resolved under 
res ipsa loquitur rules developed in the bottle cases). 
352.  Prosser, Assault upon the Citadel, supra note 84, at 1116 n.127. 
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Prosser’s intentions in drafting § 402A.  In particular, there exists an 
ongoing dispute over whether § 402A contemplated only what are today 
known as “manufacturing” defects (with other products claims being left 
to negligence law), or both these and other types of product-defect 
allegations, such as lawsuits premised on unsafe designs and inadequate 
warnings.353  The bottle cases suggest that this argument may be 
orthogonal to the issue as Prosser perceived it, at least if one assumes his 
thinking was framed by the recurring case tropes of his era.  A glass bottle 
could explode or shatter for any of several reasons.  Among them, these 
bottles could be designed with glass too thin to withstand successive 
reuse;354 a bottle could contain an inclusion or other irregularities that 
made it more prone to shatter;355 or the bottler could abrade and thereby 
weaken the glass in cleaning prior to reuse,356 over-carbonate the 
beverage inside,357 or damage the bottle when affixing the bottle cap.358  
Alternatively, the glass could be damaged by careless handling by the 
distributor, retailer, plaintiff, or someone else,359 or the glass simply might 
break for reasons unknown.360  Today, some of these fact patterns would 
be classified as involving “manufacturing” defects, others as “design” 
defects, and still others as negligence.  To Prosser, an essential point of 
strict liability was to make these distinctions essentially irrelevant to 
recovery.361  Per the Restatement, the liability issue would instead simply 
hinge on whether the product had failed to satisfy the expectations of a 
reasonable consumer.362  A soda bottle that inexplicably exploded in the 
 
353.  Compare George L. Priest, Strict Products Liability: The Original Intent, 10 
CARDOZO L. REV. 2301, 2303 (1989) (“[T]he [creators of Restatement (Second) of Torts 
Section 402A] intended the Section’s strict liability standard, with minor exceptions, to apply 
only to what we now call manufacturing defect cases.”), with Michael D. Green, The 
Unappreciated Congruity of the Second and Third Torts Restatements on Design Defects, 74 
BROOK. L. REV. 807, 836 (2009) (“Section 402A and the scholars and courts that crafted it were 
concerned about easy cases in which products failed in performing at a minimal level of 
safety. . . .  In this era, the type of defect was not important.”).  
354.  See Dingwall, supra note 319, at 167; Due Care in Handling Bottle Containing 
Carbonated Beverage, supra note 326, § 1. 
355.  Dingwall, supra note 319, at 167; Due Care in Handling Bottle Containing 
Carbonated Beverage, supra note 326, § 1. 
356.  Dingwall, supra note 319, at 168–69. 
357.  Due Care in Handling Bottle Containing Carbonated Beverage, supra note 326, § 1. 
358.  Dingwall, supra note 319, at 161. 
359.  Due Care in Handling Bottle Containing Carbonated Beverage, supra note 326, § 1. 
360.  See James, supra note 304, at 74–75 (discussing these possibilities).  
361.  Prosser, Assault upon the Citadel, supra note 84, at 1143. 
362.  Id. at 1145. 
 612 MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW [98:555 
plaintiff’s hands certainly qualified under this test, regardless of the 
source of the defect.363 
In the final analysis, perhaps the most intriguing aspect of the bottle 
cases is the fact that strict products liability, as extended to all products, 
was built atop a fairly limited universe of decided cases,364 and the most 
numerous of these case types has virtually disappeared.365  For several 
decades, bottle cases appeared in the background (and sometimes the 
forefront) of the debate over products liability.366  Even if these cases were 
banal, their ubiquity and the substantial body of caselaw they produced 
made them an integral part of the legal culture.367  Now they are mostly 
gone, and essentially forgotten.  Meanwhile, strict products liability lives 
on.  One might infer from this disconnect that the different lifespans of 
specific case types on the one hand, and doctrine on the other, can make 
it difficult to appreciate, in hindsight, the specific concerns that prompted 
judges of other eras to adopt a given doctrinal innovation.  Where now-
defunct cases contributed to a still-intact rule, modern observers may 
overestimate the importance of broad policy arguments in making the 
case for change, and underestimate the contributions made by particular 
problems associated with the most visible and common cases of an earlier 
era.   
 
363.  This perspective on original intentions, if credited, would tend to support the 
position taken by Professor Green.  See Green, supra note 353, at 836.  
364.  Priest, supra note 7, deconstructed the seemingly voluminous body of case citations 
that Prosser tendered in support of § 402A, and concluded that few supported a broad strict-
liability-in-tort principle.  Id. at 514–17. 
365.  The infrequency with which bottle cases appear today captures in miniature the 
rarity of modern litigation over “manufacturing” defects, the sort of defect (to impose modern 
terminology on the cases of yesteryear) likely associated with most exploding or collapsing 
bottles.  By the mid-1980s, at the latest, design-defect cases had become far more common than 
manufacturing-defect cases.  WILLIAM M. LANDES & RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMIC 
STRUCTURE OF TORT LAW 303 tbl.10.5 (1987) (charting the number of design-defect and 
manufacturing-defect cases heard by the federal courts of appeals between January 1982 and 
November 1984); STAPLETON, supra note 167, at 30 (observing that since the early 1980s, 
defective-design claims “have formed the overwhelming bulk of US product lawsuits”); see also 
Peter Nash Swisher, Products Liability Tort Reform: Why Virginia Should Adopt the 
Henderson-Twerski Proposed Revision of Section 402A Restatement (Second) of Torts, 27 U. 
RICH. L. REV. 857, 890 (1993) (“[M]anufacturing defect injuries are random and relatively rare 
events.”); Aaron D. Twerski, Chasing the Illusory Pot of Gold at the End of the Rainbow: 
Negligence and Strict Liability in Design Defect Litigation, 90 MARQ. L. REV. 7, 18 (2006) 
(“Manufacturing defects are rare events.”). 
366.  See supra text accompanying notes 305–10. 
367.  See supra text accompanying notes 307–12. 
 2014] STRICT PRODUCTS LIABILITY AT 50 613 
Of course, judges vexed by bottle cases did not necessarily have to 
adopt a “pure” tort solution to the problems presented by these matters; 
the law of warranty, with some adjustments, might have done the trick 
just fine.  The next section of this Article begins at this junction, and 
discusses why so many courts adopted an approach to products liability 
consciously grounded in tort law.  
V. THE CONTINGENCY NARRATIVE: TORT VS. WARRANTY 
A third and final story concerns how a “pure” tort theory eclipsed the 
rhetoric of warranty as the dominant method of framing a products-
liability claim.  As late as the 1950s, most of those who saw some form of 
strict products liability as inevitable assumed that this transition would 
occur within the prevailing warranty rubric.368  Defying these 
expectations, an approach squarely grounded in tort law came to conquer 
the field of consumer protection, with warranty law now occupying a 
backup role.  
In hindsight, it is easy to attribute this shift to certain perceived 
advantages of a “pure” tort approach, as embodied in Restatement 
(Second) of Torts § 402A, over a regime that would remold the law of 
warranty so as to give it the function, if not quite the precise form, of a 
tort remedy.  Unlike warranty, a tort solution was not encumbered by 
notice and disclaimer rules associated with generic sales law.369  The tort 
approach also did not suffer from decades of name-calling by Prosser, 
who described warranty as “a freak hybrid born of the illicit intercourse 
of tort and contract,” among other choice epithets.370  But none of these 
 
368.  Gillam, supra note 66, at 124; see also Sales—Manufacturers and Dealers, supra note 
46, at 322 (“The theory most likely to be relied on in the future as a means of holding the 
manufacturer liable to the ultimate consumer is the theory of an implied warranty running from 
the manufacturer to the ultimate consumer.”); cf. Titus, supra note 160, at 781 (“One cannot 
help concluding that Greenman and section 402A would not have come into being if the courts 
and lawyers had used the Sales Act warranties more creatively.”). 
369.  See Prosser, Assault upon the Citadel, supra note 84, at 1127–34. 
370.  Id. at 1126.  This comment represented a continuation of Prosser’s longtime 
preference for a “pure” tort approach to products liability over a scheme premised on warranty 
law.  In 1941, he had written: 
[I]t seems far better to discard the troublesome sales doctrine of “warranty,” and 
impose strict liability outright in tort, as a pure matter of social policy.  It is “only by 
some violent pounding and twisting” that the concept can be made to yield the desired 
result; and the reliance traditionally necessary to a warranty is not easy to find in the 
case of a consumer who does not even know who made the goods, or who has not 
even made a purchase but is a mere donee.  
PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS, supra note 85, § 83 (quoting Edwin W. 
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problems was intractable—Henningsen refused to honor a seemingly 
airtight disclaimer of warranties,371 and Greenman gainsaid a notice 
requirement in warranty suits before going on to recognize a tort 
remedy.372  Meanwhile, warranty had its competitive advantages, too, the 
most important of which was inertia.373  The fact that, even today, a 
handful of states still apply a modified warranty framework to products 
claims374 suggests that the broad, swift adoption of the tort approach may 
have owed to fortuitous circumstances as much as any inherent 
superiority of a tort formulation.  The text below spins out this possibility, 
suggesting that the preference for tort over warranty may owe partially 
to the fact that warranty was compromised as an alternative to tort at an 
especially crucial moment.  By the time this damage had been repaired, 
§ 402A already had gained a critical mass of adherents.375  
This crucial setback for a warranty approach occurred in 1951, in the 
drafting process for the UCC.376  As background, a decade earlier Karl 
Llewellyn had unsuccessfully sought to engraft liberalized privity rules 
onto the Uniform Sales Act.377  This effort failed,378 but Llewellyn tried 
again with the UCC.  In 1951, Llewellyn prepared a draft of the UCC that, 
within its proposed § 2-318, would have extended express and implied 
warranties to  
 
Patterson, The Apportionment of Business Risks Through Legal Devices, 24 COLUM. L. REV. 
335, 358 (1924)).  
371.  Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc., 161 A.2d 69, 85–97 (N.J. 1960); see also 
Jeffery W. Deaver, Note, Products Liability in New York: Section 2-318 of the U.C.C.—The 
Amendment Without a Cause, 50 FORDHAM L. REV. 61, 70–71 (1981) (discussing New York’s 
assimilation of the UCC, which the state adopted in 1964, with its prior recognition of broad 
warranty protections). 
372.  Greenman v. Yuba Power Products, Inc., 377 P.2d 897, 900 (Cal. 1963).  For a 
discussion of the discretion accorded judges in interpreting this requirement, see Morris G. 
Shanker, Strict Tort Theory of Products Liability and the Uniform Commercial Code: A 
Commentary on Jurisprudential Eclipses, Pigeonholes and Communication Barriers, 17 W. RES. 
L. REV. 5, 27–29 (1965). 
373.  An anecdote underscores this point.  Observers were so conditioned to think of 
products liability in warranty terms the headline for the Los Angeles Daily Journal article that 
reported the Greenman decision read, “Injured Consumer Need Not Give Notice Under Sales 
Act.”  Injured Consumer Need Not Give Notice Under Sales Act, L.A. DAILY J., Jan. 30, 1963, 
at 1.  The revolutionary portion of the Greenman opinion, grounding the plaintiff’s recovery in 
tort law, went unmentioned.  See id.  
374.  See supra note 165–66 and accompanying text. 
375.  See supra text accompanying notes 160–66. 
376.  U.C.C. § 2-318 (Proposed Final Draft Spring 1950); U.C.C. § 2-318 (Final Text 
Edition November 1951). 
377.  See discussion supra note 87. 
378.  See discussion supra note 87. 
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any natural person who is in the family or household of the buyer 
or who is his guest or one whose relationship to him is such as to 
make it reasonable to expect that such person may use, consume 
or be affected by the goods and who is injured in person by breach 
of the warranty.379  
The National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws 
(NCCUSL) rejected Llewellyn’s approach in favor of a narrower view.380  
As approved by the conference, § 2-318 extended warranties only to  
any natural person who is in the family or household of his buyer 
or who is a guest in his home if it is reasonable to expect that such 
person may use, consume or be affected by the goods and who is 
injured in person by breach of the warranty.381 
This language excluded persons such as employees of the buyer, friends 
who were not houseguests, and bystanders.  Meanwhile, in its comments, 
the code expressed a neutral view about whether remote purchasers could 
claim warranty protections, leaving the issue open for development in 
caselaw.382 
Section 2-318, as promulgated, quickly become the law in most states.  
Between 1953 and 1967, the Uniform Commercial Code swept the nation, 
in the same way that strict products liability in tort soon would.  Only six 
states had adopted the UCC by the end of 1960.383  But eight states did so 
in 1961, four more in 1962, ten in 1963, one in 1964, thirteen in 1965, five 
 
379.  U.C.C. § 2-318 (Proposed Final Draft Spring 1950).  A Comment to this section 
provided that it followed  
the dominant trend of judicial opinion developed in the light of modern distribution 
methods and the fact of group consumption,” and was “intended to broaden the right 
and the remedy of the consumer in warranty, to free them from any technical rules as 
to “privity” and to make them, insofar as feasible, directly enforceable against the 
party ultimately responsible for any injury. 
Id. § 2-318 cmt. 2. 
380.  See U.C.C. § 2-318 (Final Text Edition November 1951). 
381.  Id.; see also PERMANENT EDITORIAL BD. FOR THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE, 
1966 OFFICIAL RECOMMENDATIONS FOR AMENDMENT OF THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL 
CODE 8–9 (1967) (discussing the history of Section 2-318).  
382.  U.C.C. § 2-318 cmt. 3 (Official Draft, Text and Comments Edition 1952); U.C.C. § 2-
318 cmt. 3 (1962 Official Text with Comments) (providing that the section was “neutral,” and 
“not intended to enlarge or restrict the developing case law on whether the seller’s warranties, 
given to his buyer who resells, extend to other persons in the distributive chain.”). 
383.  FRED H. MILLER, 12 WEST’S LEGAL FORMS, COMMERCIAL TRANSACTIONS § 1.1 
(4th ed. 2013). 
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in 1966, and two in 1967, leaving Louisiana as the lone holdout.384  The 
version of the UCC adopted by most states parroted the language of § 2-
318 as promulgated.385  There were some dissenters, however.  California 
and Utah declined to adopt § 2-318.386  In California, where the supreme 
court already had extended warranty protections to employees of the 
purchaser,387 concerns existed that the UCC’s privity rules represented a 
“step backward” from the status quo.388  Other states, meanwhile, 
adopted counterparts to § 2-318 that incorporated broader warranty 
protections than appeared in the standard text.  In 1961 and 1962, 
respectively, Wyoming and Virginia adopted statutes that extended sales 
warranties to any person “who may reasonably be expected to use, 
consume or be affected by the goods” and was “injured by breach of the 
warranty”389 (Wyoming) or “a person whom the manufacturer or seller 
might reasonably have expected to use, consume or be affected by the 
goods” (Virginia).390  
Notwithstanding these developments, upon revisiting the privity issue 
in 1964 the Permanent Editorial Board for the UCC decided to stand pat 
with the existing language of § 2-318.  The Board observed, “At present 
there appears to be no national consensus as to the scope of warranty 
protection which is proper.  Therefore, no amendment to the Official 
Text should be made in order to permit the decisional development of 
such a consensus.”391  After other states also adopted statutes with 
broadened warranty provisions over the next two years,392 in 1966 the 
 
384.  Id.  Louisiana would veer toward the pack in 1974, when it adopted the UCC except 
for Articles 2 and 2A.  Id. 
385.  See Brian D. Cochran, Emerging Products Liability Under Section 2-318 of the 
Uniform Commercial Code: A Survey, 29 BUS. LAW. 925 app. (1974) (surveying state laws). 
386.  William Michael Karnes, Comment, Section 2-318 of the UCC: the Sleeping Giant, 
20 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 181, 186–87 (1971); see also The Uniform Commercial Code: A Special 
Report by the California State Bar Committee on the Commercial Code, 37 J. ST. B. CAL. 119, 
144 (1962) (explaining why California rejected Section 2-318 of the UCC). 
387.  Peterson v. Lamb Rubber Co., 353 P.2d 575, 581 (Cal. 1960). 
388.  PERMANENT EDITORIAL BD. FOR THE UCC, REPORT NO. 2, at 40 (1964). 
389.  Act of Feb. 28, 1961, ch. 219, 1961 Wyo. Sess. Laws 406, 426–27.  
390.  Act of Mar. 31, 1962, ch. 476, 1962 Va. Acts 804, 804; see also William I. Aronwald, 
Note, Privity and Section 2-318 of the Uniform Commercial Code, 31 BROOK. L. REV. 367, 
370−71 (1965) (discussing the Virginia and Wyoming statutes). 
391.  PERMANENT EDITORIAL BD. FOR THE UCC, supra note 388, at 39.  This declination 
caused one set of authors to wonder, “After generating the monumental change wrought by 
the Code, are its fathers now afraid to push their luck?”  Kroner et al., supra note 283, at 229. 
392.  PERMANENT EDITORIAL BD. FOR THE UCC, 1966 OFFICIAL RECOMMENDATIONS 
FOR AMENDMENT OF THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE 8 (1967). 
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Permanent Editorial Board finally yielded and proposed two 
“alternatives” (labeled “Alternative B” and “Alternative C”) to the 
pertinent language of § 2-318.393  These alternatives followed the Virginia 
and Wyoming models by extending warranties to any persons “who may 
reasonably be expected to use, consume or be affected by the goods.”394  
Alternative B extended warranties only for personal-injury claims, while 
Alternative C did so for all claims.395  By 1974, a total of 17 states had 
adopted either Alternative B or C, or had previously endorsed closely 
analogous provisions.396 
But by then, more than three dozen states had adopted a tort 
approach to strict products liability, and it was too late for warranty to 
make up its lost advantage.397  The timing of the UCC’s diffusion across 
the states, relative to the Greenman decision and the promulgation of the 
Restatement (Second) of Torts § 402, could not have been better 
calibrated to nudge courts toward a tort-law approach to products-
liability cases.  The narrow warranty protections of the UCC doubtless 
encouraged courts in adopting jurisdictions to look to tort law for a 
solution to ongoing products problems.  Even though the UCC was 
neutral regarding judicial expansion of “vertical” privity,398 the boundary 
it drew around the family, household, and household guests insofar as 
“horizontal” privity was concerned may have convinced many judges that 
they would be rewriting recently enacted law, contrary to their 
 
393.  Id.  
394.  Id.  
395.  “Alternative B” provided that a seller’s express or implied warranty would extend 
to “any natural person who may reasonably be expected to use, consume or be affected by the 
goods and who is injured in person by breach of the warranty.”  Id.  “Alternative C” extended 
the warranties to “any person who may reasonably be expected to use, consume or be affected 
by the goods and who is injured by breach of the warranty.”  Id.  All three Alternatives (the 
original text now being identified as “Alternative A”) provided that the seller could not 
“exclude or limit the operation of this section,” at least with respect to the person of an 
individual to whom the warranty, so redefined, extended.  Id. 
396.  Cochran, supra note 385, at 939–45.  In alphabetical order, these states were 
Alabama, Arkansas, Colorado, Delaware, Hawaii, Kansas, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, 
Minnesota, North Dakota, Rhode Island, South Carolina, South Dakota, Vermont, Virginia, 
and Wyoming.  Id.; see also MILLER, supra note 383, § 1.1 (listing dates of adoption). 
397.  See supra text accompanying notes 160–64. 
398.  And indeed, several state supreme courts would embrace such an expansion as the 
1960s progressed.  See, e.g., Morrow v. Caloric Appliance Corp., 372 S.W.2d 41, 55 (Mo. 1963); 
State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Anderson-Weber, Inc., 110 N.W.2d 449, 456 (Iowa 1961). 
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legislature’s intent, if they cast additional consumer and (especially) 
bystander protections in warranty terms.399   
Concurrently, the excitement that surrounded the development of a 
coherent theory of strict products liability in tort drowned out, for a few 
years, concerns that the UCC’s warranty provisions displaced or 
preempted alternative strict-liability approaches to products liability.400  
Some members of the American Law Institute wondered about overlaps 
between the UCC and the Restatement (Second) of Torts § 402A when 
drafts of the section were under consideration.401  These concerns were 
brushed aside, with Prosser disavowing any conflict between the UCC 
and the Restatement.402  The first few courts to address the subject likewise 
gave the matter short shrift, paying little heed to defendants’ 
displacement contentions.403 
 
399.  See Karnes, supra note 386, at 181 (observing that the enactment of UCC § 2-318 in 
many states “compelled courts to stretch, bend and squeeze breach of warranty into the realm 
of strict liability in tort”); Kroner et al., supra note 283, at 226 (observing that in arguing for 
strict liability, “[p]laintiffs will probably prefer to rely upon Restatement section 402A because 
of the reluctance of some courts to extend the duty beyond that expressly defined in the Code”); 
Comment, UCC Section 2-318: Effect on Washington Requirements of Privity in Products 
Liability Suits, 42 WASH. L. REV. 253, 261 (1966) (observing that while “[t]he majority of courts 
seemingly do not regard section 2-318 as a restraint on judicial resolution of the privity issue in 
warranty actions . . . the danger of a restrictive approach . . . should not be overlooked”); cf. 
Mitchel J. Ezer, The Impact of the Uniform Commercial Code on the California Law of Sales 
Warranties, 8 UCLA L. REV. 281, 327 (1961) (warning that if California were to adopt § 2-318, 
doing so might “inadvertently reverse” recent case law that had extended warranties to the 
employees of the product’s purchaser).  A relatively recent study of the privity requirement in 
jurisdictions that retain the “standard” language of § 2-318 found a relatively tangled web of 
rules.  William L. Stallworth, An Analysis of Warranty Claims Instituted by Non-Privity 
Plaintiffs in Jurisdictions That Have Adopted Uniform Commercial Code Section 2-318 
(Alternative A), 20 PEPP. L .REV. 1215, 1220–22 (1993). 
400.  See Titus, supra note 160, at 715 & n.13. 
401.  Wednesday Morning Session, May 17, 1961, 38 A.L.I. PROC. 19, 69–70 (1962). 
402.  During the ALI’s consideration of the 1961 draft of § 402A, Dean Prosser 
emphasized that the UCC, in its comments to § 2-318, contemplated possible judicial 
engrossment of warranties to remote purchasers.  See Wednesday Afternoon Session, May 17, 
1961, 38 A.L.I. PROC. 76, 77–78 (1962).  The next year, Prosser acknowledged that the 
Restatement “entrenched” upon the UCC insofar as both addressed liability to non-purchasers, 
but otherwise disclaimed any conflicts.  Thursday Afternoon Session, May 24, 1962, 39 A.L.I. 
PROC. 198, 238–240 (1963) (comments of William L. Prosser). 
403.  Pearson v. Franklin Labs., Inc., 254 N.W.2d 133, 139 (S.D. 1977) (“In adopting the 
doctrine of strict liability in tort . . . we did not pause to consider the potential conflict between 
the warranty provisions of the Uniform Commercial Code and the concept of strict liability.  In 
this we were not alone.”); see also Franklin, supra note 105, at 974 (“Recently . . . several cases 
have raised the possibility that the products liability development may be affected, indeed 
controlled, by the Uniform Commercial Code.  The possibility has been barely recognized—
and still is not fully appreciated.”); John W. Wade, Is Section 402A of the Second Restatement 
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As years passed, however, it became more difficult to ignore this 
argument.  A prominent law review article concluded that while the UCC 
contemplated some judicial expansion of warranty protections, certain 
provisions of the UCC, such as its notice and disclaimer provisions, could 
not be avoided simply by replacing the vocabulary of warranty with that 
of tort.404  Another author regarded the displacement issue as a state-by-
state affair, with the status of warranty law within a jurisdiction prior to 
its adoption of the UCC dictating whether warranty would represent the 
exclusive vehicle for strict products-liability lawsuits in that state.405  In 
the early 1970s, the first of these arguments found a taker in Oregon 
Supreme Court Chief Justice Kenneth O’Connell, who wrote separately 
in a products-liability case to express his opinion that 
[a] careful reading of the Uniform Commercial Code reveals that 
it prescribes a legal framework for the recovery of damages for 
personal injuries resulting from defective products.  Recovery for 
personal injuries resulting from the negligent conduct of the seller 
is left for the courts to develop.  But it is apparent that aside from 
the negligence cases the Code provides an integrated and 
comprehensive scheme under which recovery for personal injuries 
may be sought both by privity and non-privity plaintiffs.406 
None of O’Connell’s colleagues joined his opinion,407 highlighting the 
marginal nature of the displacement argument at the time.  In 1980, 
however, the Delaware Supreme Court unanimously concluded that strict 
products liability in tort had been preempted by the state’s adoption of 
 
of Torts Preempted by the UCC and Therefore Unconstitutional?, 42 TENN. L. REV. 123, 125 
(1974) (noting that up through the time of writing, most courts had ignored the preemption 
argument, but that there were “indications that some judges, at least, may have a feeling of guilt 
regarding the matter, and the whole atmosphere is one suggesting uneasiness and malaise”). 
404.  Franklin, supra note 105.  For other law review articles expressing concern that the 
UCC may preempt or displace a strict-liability approach grounded wholly in tort, see Reed 
Dickerson, Products Liability: Dean Wade and the Constitutionality of Section 402A, 44 TENN. 
L. Rev. 205 (1977); Reed Dickerson, Was Prosser’s Folly Also Traynor’s? Or Should the Judge’s 
Monument be Moved to a Firmer Site? 2 HOFSTRA L. REV. 469 (1974); Donald J. Rapson, 
Products Liability under Parallel Doctrines: Contrasts Between the Uniform Commercial Code 
and Strict Liability in Tort, 19 RUTGERS L. REV. 692 (1965); Shanker, supra note 372, at 25.  
Surveying the literature in 1983, John Wade observed that “the preemption viewpoint may 
perhaps be the weightier side from the standpoints of both the number of articles and the 
vehemence of the position taken.”  Wade, supra note 87, at 3–4.  
405.  Titus, supra note 160, at 760–82. 
406.  Markle v. Mulholland’s, Inc., 509 P.2d 529, 536 (Or. 1973) (O’Connell, C.J., 
concurring) (footnote omitted).  
407.  Id.  
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Alternative B to the UCC in 1966.408  The Massachusetts Supreme 
Judicial Court similarly observed that the Bay State legislature’s 
“expansive amendments” to the UCC meant that no space remained for 
strict products liability in tort.409  Through these amendments, the court 
said, the Massachusetts legislature had “transformed warranty liability 
into a remedy intended to be fully as comprehensive as the strict liability 
theory of recovery that has been adopted by a great many other 
jurisdictions.”410 
The point is not that this preemption argument is correct, only that it 
might have persuaded a few more judges, had it more time to develop 
before courts rushed to adopt strict products liability in tort.  Such an 
interval also would have allowed courts the opportunity to tinker with the 
newly adopted UCC.  Decisions that engrossed the UCC’s warranty 
protections and limited its notice and disclaimer provisions might have 
relieved some of the pressure for a different solution for gnawing 
products problems.411  
Significantly, states that embraced robust warranty protections at an 
early juncture lagged behind other jurisdictions in adopting strict 
products liability in tort.  Among the states where legislatures enacted 
warranty protections more expansive than those found in the initial 
version of § 2-318, only Minnesota adopted strict products liability in tort 
during the 1960s, and that state’s high court did so in a case that arose 
before the enhanced warranty protections became effective.412  Most of 
the other Alternative B or Alternative C states took their time in 
 
408.  Cline v. Prowler Industries of Md., Inc., 418 A.2d 968, 975 (Del. 1980).  The Cline 
court acknowledged that other states had rejected the preemption argument, but regarded 
those decisions as distinguishable.  Id. at 979.  Four years earlier, the Delaware Supreme Court 
had adopted strict liability in the “bailment-lease” context.  Martin v. Ryder Truck Rental, Inc., 
353 A.2d 581, 584 (Del. 1976).  Delaware thus adheres to a system in which the applicability of 
strict liability in tort hinges on whether the product at issue was distributed to the public 
through a sales transaction (in which case the UCC preempts strict liability in tort) or otherwise 
(in which there is no such preemption).  Beattie v. Beattie, 786 A.2d 549, 553–54, 559 (Del. 
Super. Ct. 2001). 
409.  Jacobs v. Yamaha Motor Corp., U.S.A., 649 N.E.2d 758, 763 n.6 (Mass. 1995); see 
also Act of Aug. 18, 1971, ch. 670, 1971 Mass. Acts 497; Act of Sept. 7, 1973, ch. 750, 1973 Mass. 
Acts 739; Act of Apr. 25, 1974, ch. 153, 1974 Mass. Acts 80. 
410.  Back v. Wickes Corp., 378 N.E.2d 964, 968 (Mass. 1978).  
411.  One such decision was Piercefield v. Remington Arms Co., 133 N.W.2d 129, 135 
(Mich. 1965) (refusing to require privity of contract in a lawsuit brought by an injured 
bystander).  See also Salvador v. Atl. Steel Boiler Co., 319 A.2d 903, 904 (Pa. 1974) (abolishing 
the “horizontal privity” requirement in warranty). 
412.  McCormack v. Hankscraft Co., 154 N.W.2d 488, 499 n.13 (Minn. 1967). 
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recognizing strict products liability in tort.  The seventeen states to adopt 
statutory variations of Alternative B or C as of the early 1970s account 
for eleven of the nineteen last states to adopt strict products liability in 
tort, and three of the five remaining holdouts.413  Wyoming adopted strict 
products liability in tort only in 1986;414 Virginia never has.  Thus pioneers 
in one area of the law became laggards in another. 
The differences between tort and warranty might seem like mere 
semantics, given how warranty protections have been construed so 
broadly in Delaware, Massachusetts, Michigan, and Virginia as to be 
essentially equivalent to strict liability in tort.415  Even so, the different 
path taken by these states illustrates how there often exists more than one 
doctrinal route to a generic objective, and that the amount of traffic on 
each of these avenues may depend in large part on idiosyncratic 
circumstances and matters of timing.416  
The status of products liability in the one true outlier, North Carolina, 
offers additional instruction on this point.  Among warranty states, only 
North Carolina has adopted a truly distinctive approach.  North Carolina 
courts never adopted a tort-law approach to strict products liability prior 
to the enactment of a statute in 1979 that made products-liability cases 
more difficult for plaintiffs to win417 and of a 1995 statute that expressly 
 
413.  The laggards were Alabama (1976), Arkansas (1973), Colorado (1975), Kansas 
(1976), Maine (1973), Maryland (1976), North Dakota (1974), South Carolina (1974), South 
Dakota (1973), Vermont (1975), and Wyoming (1986).  See, e.g., Act of Feb. 1973, Act 111, 
1973 Ark. Acts. 331; Act of Oct. 3, 1973, ch. 466, 1973 Me. Laws 822; Act of July, 1974, No. 
1184, 1974 S.C. Acts 2782; Act of Feb. 28, 1961, ch. 219, 1961 Wyo. Sess. Laws 406.  The holdouts 
are Delaware, Massachusetts, and Virginia.  See supra note note 166. 
414.  Ogle v. Caterpillar Tractor Co, 716 P.2d 334 (Wyo. 1986). 
415.  See Cline v. Prowler Indus. of Md., Inc., 418 A.2d 968, 976 (Del. 1980) (“[T]he 
defenses of privity, notice, and disclaimer have, in large measure, become ineffective in 
consumer product liability cases in this State.”); Back, 378 N.E.2d at 969 (“The Legislature has 
made the Massachusetts law of warranty congruent in nearly all respects with the principles 
expressed in Restatement (Second) of Torts § 402A (1965).”); Owens v. Allis-Chalmers Corp., 
268 N.W.2d 291, 293 (Mich. Ct. App. 1978) (“[T]he requisite elements for a cause of action 
based upon strict liability in tort are congruent to those for breach of warranty.”); OWEN, supra 
note 30, at 282–84 (discussing all five states’ approaches toward products liability). 
416.  For a somewhat similar tale of convergence, see Nora Freeman Engstrom, An 
Alternative Explanation for No-Fault’s “Demise,” 61 DEPAUL L. REV. 303, 371–79 (2012) 
(discussing the practical convergence, over time, of automobile-accident compensation 
schemes premised on liability for negligence with regimes that embrace no-fault principles). 
417.  Act of May 28, 1979, ch. 654, 1979 N.C. Sess. Laws 687.  Among its provisions, this 
statute interposed contributory negligence as a defense to all products-liability actions, whether 
framed in negligence or warranty, id. at 688–89, and created a six-year statute of repose, id. at 
689.  The period before repose has since been increased to 12 years.  Act of Aug. 5, 2009, ch. 
420, 2009 N.C. Sess. Laws 808.  
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prohibited judicial recognition of strict products liability in tort.418  These 
developments mean that, more so than any other state, North Carolina 
still relies on negligence and warranty law as rules of decision in products-
liability cases.419  Insofar as claims against product manufacturers are 
concerned, however, this difference does not place many North Carolina 
plaintiffs in much worse of a position than that occupied by their 
counterparts elsewhere.420  Since most contemporary products-liability 
claims involve design or warning issues,421 where even strict liability has 
gravitated toward what resembles a negligence approach, the burden that 
North Carolina plaintiffs bear is strikingly similar to that cast upon 
claimants in other states.422  
VI. CONCLUSION 
Ever since the works of Willard Hurst,423 legal historians have 
appreciated that a “complete” narrative of doctrinal change must 
encompass more than merely a series of stepping-stone judicial opinions.  
Nevertheless, subtle biases as well as common limitations of time, space, 
and attention mean that discussions of particular shifts in the law tend to 
focus upon seminal decisions, with a few trends in the ambient legal, 
political, or social culture perhaps thrown in for context.  Other narratives 
tend to get marginalized.  
 
418.  Act of July 29, 1995, ch. 522, 1995 N.C. Sess. Laws 1872.  
419.  Moore v. Coachmen Indus., Inc., 499 S.E.2d 772, 777 (N.C. Ct. App. 1998) (“A 
products liability plaintiff may base the claim on various causes of action, including negligence 
(negligent design, manufacture, assembly, or failure to provide adequate warnings) and breach 
of warranty.”); see also DeWitt v. Eveready Battery Co., 565 S.E.2d 140 (N.C. 2002) (allowing 
a plaintiff in a products case to proceed on an implied warranty theory); Red Hill Hosiery Mill, 
Inc. v. MagneTek, Inc., 582 S.E.2d 632 (N.C. Ct. App. 2003) (affirming a jury verdict for the 
plaintiff on an implied-warranty theory). 
420.  A more significant hurdle for North Carolina plaintiffs in products cases is the fact 
that contributory negligence (still recognized in that state) represents a defense to all products-
liability claims, whether framed in negligence or in tort.  N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 99B-4(3) 
(West 2011). 
421.  See Geoffrey Christopher Rapp, Torts 2.0: The Restatement 3rd and the Architecture 
of Participation in American Tort Law, 37 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 1582, 1592 (2011) 
(“[D]efective design . . . came to dominate the products liability caseload of courts in the latter 
part of the twentieth century.”); Dominick Vetri, Order out of Chaos: Products Liability 
Design-Defect Law, 43 U. RICH. L. REV. 1373, 1375 (2009) (“Product design defects are the 
predominate type of litigated [products liability] cases today.”). 
422.  N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 99B-4 (West 2011). 
423.  E.g., JAMES WILLARD HURST, THE GROWTH OF AMERICAN LAW: THE LAW 
MAKERS (1950). 
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The standard history of strict products liability, in particular, suffers 
from three biases that can compromise histories of doctrinal change in 
tort law.  First, developments in the claim consciousness of prospective 
plaintiffs and the capabilities and interests of their attorneys may not 
receive enough attention.424  These transformations can be difficult to 
identify and track, at least compared to judicial opinions, law review 
articles, treatises, and other influences that are memorialized in print and 
connected to one another through citations.425  The challenges associated 
with charting the relative sophistication of claimants and their lawyers 
tends to obscure the importance of these actors in the process of doctrinal 
change.  But as related above, without plaintiffs and their counsel courts 
would lack both raw material with which to work, and a sense of urgency 
in their task.426 
Likewise, it is easy to underestimate the importance of old case tropes 
whose significance lay principally in the frequency with which they 
appeared.  Bottle cases were bread-and-butter matters for the personal-
injury attorneys of the 1940s and 1950s, and judges of that era certainly 
knew about these cases and the problems they presented.  The prosaic 
nature of these disputes and their subsequent disappearance has erased 
them (except, of course, for the Escola case)427 from modern retellings of 
why strict products liability emerged when and in the form that it did.  
This invisibility, combined with the seeming indignity of associating broad 
doctrinal shifts with particular case tropes, has meant that bottle cases are 
assigned no credit in the development of strict products liability.  This 
omission seems wrong, as bottle cases were an important part of the mid-
century legal culture.  It seems hardly coincidental that for good or for ill, 
the products-liability framework that Prosser devised was perfectly 
attuned to the difficulties associated with bottle cases.428  Furthermore, 
not many courts would have felt compelled to adopt strict products 
liability in tort had judges regarded this approach as applicable to only a 
handful of disparate cases.  Bottle lawsuits provided a center of gravity to 
 
424.  Id.  That these subjects are underemphasized does not mean that they are entirely 
ignored.  For example, there exists a body of scholarship on the contributions that lawyers may 
make to doctrinal change.  See, e.g., Frank B. Cross, The Role of Lawyers in Positive Theories 
of Doctrinal Evolution, 45 EMORY L.J. 523 (1996) (discussing and critiquing what is described 
as the “lawyer rent-seeking hypothesis”).  
425.  See Gordon, supra note 10, at 120 (commenting on the accessibility and utility of 
“mandarin materials” such as cases and treatises). 
426.  See supra Part III. 
427.  Escola v. Coca Cola Bottling Co. of Fresno, 150 P.2d 436 (Cal. 1944). 
428.  See supra text accompanying notes 300–04, 338–51. 
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an otherwise disparate array of products matters.  By instantiating and 
grounding the argument for a strict-liability approach, these cases may 
have helped persuade courts that the reform game was worth the candle.  
Finally, the history of strict products liability provides additional 
evidence of another documented bias—an eagerness to treat doctrinal 
change as inevitable once it already has occurred.429  It seems likely that 
by the Atomic Age, circumstances had aligned so as to guarantee some 
additional protections to consumers injured by a defective product.  But 
it was not similarly preordained that almost all jurisdictions would cast 
these protections in the language of tort law, as opposed to expanded 
warranty safeguards.  It seems likely that had circumstances changed only 
modestly, perhaps ten or more states would have preferred to continue to 
tinker with prevailing warranty rules instead of making the leap to a 
“pure” tort solution.  In this alternate reality, the substance of the law 
might be similar to its present state, but the moral of the products-liability 
“revolution” might be subtly different.  Instead of a functionalist tale of 
academics and judges rushing to invent and adopt new theories to keep 
the law in step with the times, the core message to be drawn from a 
movement grounded more in warranty law might be one of pragmatic 
doctrinal flexibility, or of the availability of alternative doctrinal 
approaches to arrive at similar results. 
 
429.  Gordon, supra note 10, at 71. 
